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This thesis examines the process of establishing HTA in two middle-income 
countries, Thailand and the Philippines. It conceptualises HTA establishment as 
involving decisions in relation to creating HTA organisations, developing processes 
and the methods used for analysing and appraising evidence, and embedding HTA in 
existing decision-making and governance structures. These elements make up the 
path towards institutionalisation. 
A comparative case study design with a pragmatic constructivist approach was 
chosen to allow for a rich description of the process of institutionalisation. The two 
case countries were selected based on their similarity with regard to their early 
interest in HTA, but differences regarding the degree to which HTA has been 
institutionalised at the time of the study. The analysis of the process of 
institutionalisation was informed by interviews with key policy actors and 
documentary review. The conceptual perspectives chosen for the analysis of HTA 
institutionalisation focus on ideas, interests and institutions.   
This study found that HTA advocates organised in policy networks, of which senior 
civil servants were important members, were key to initiating the process of 
establishing HTA. The rules of the administrative systems, which provide civil 
servants with varying degrees of independence, determined the way in which HTA 
organisations were established. The development of HTA processes was largely 
influenced by the existing rules for making coverage decisions. HTA processes and 
methods were not directly copied from other countries but were developed in each 
country and adjusted over time.  The interests of some policy actors opposed to HTA 
seemed to undermine institutionalisation at different points in time. However, this 
thesis also found examples in which opposition to the results of HTA strengthened 
its development in the long term. How HTA processes operated was influenced by 
other aspects of health systems governance, especially mechanisms for procurement 
and reimbursement, as well as the long-term evolution of the heath system, which 
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Many governments across the world have adopted health technology assessment 
(HTA) as part of their approach to governing their healthcare systems, specifically to 
assist decision-making on which health services to cover and which to exclude from 
publicly funded health care. The argument for institutionalising HTA relies on the 
belief that, if used well, HTA can lead to an equitable distribution of scarce 
healthcare resources, by making coverage decision-making more systematic and 
transparent, reducing their exposure to the influence of vested interests, and 
increasing their legitimacy (Glassman and Chalkidou, 2012). However, the process 
by which HTA becomes part of countries’ health systems governance is not yet fully 
understood. It is clear that HTA takes different forms in different countries, but what 
explains these different organisational arrangements, procedures for decision-making 
or even the types of technologies being assessed is not equally clear. This thesis aims 
to understand the process of establishing HTA organisations and processes – often 
termed institutionalisation of HTA – in the context of two middle-income countries, 
the Philippines and Thailand. It is important to expand our understanding of how 
HTA institutionalisation has taken place because countries at various levels of 
economic development continue setting goals to institutionalise HTA  (Augustovski, 
Alcaraz, Caporale, García, et al., 2015; Downey et al., 2017; Wild, Stricka and 
Patera, 2017).  
To date, there have not been many studies of HTA institutionalisation, which means 
we are not able to explain why there are major differences in the resulting HTA 
arrangements between countries. For example, agencies and other organisations 
mandated with conducting HTA differ widely with regards to their organisational 
structures or their overall role in health system governance. Many HTA 
organisations have some degree of independence from government, either as 
institutes at arm’s length from government, such as the National Institute for Health 
and Care Excellence (NICE) in the United Kingdom (UK), or as independent public 
institutes, such as the Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) in France or the Agency for 




an advisory role to the Ministers of Health (or other decision-makers), such as 
AHTAPol, whereas others are mandated with decision-making, as is the case for 
NICE (Oortwijn et al., 2017). Emerging literature from high-income countries 
focuses on such aspects of HTA establishment in order to explain what influences 
observed differences (Löblová et al., 2019).  Some authors have linked the choice of 
organisational arrangements to existing characteristics of the regulatory system that 
give market approval for new technologies (Allen et al., 2013; Barron et al., 2015) 
while others explain the divergence based on the administrative traditions that 
characterise the political system of a country (Torbica, Tarricone and Drummond, 
2018). Further, value for money considerations are given more or less importance in 
different countries, which has been hypothesised to be due to differences between 
preferred social values among the general population (Landwehr and Klinnert, 
2014).  However, focusing on such specific elements of HTA establishment is 
insufficient to explain how the entire process of institutionalisation takes place.  
Even less is known about the development of HTA organisations to inform coverage 
decisions in middle-income countries (Augustovski, Alcaraz, Caporale, García 
Martí, et al., 2015), despite the fact that some middle-income countries have long 
histories of engagement with HTA and of attempts to establish HTA bodies. 
Specifically, starting in the 1990s, a number of middle-income countries initiated 
processes of HTA institutionalisation, including Malaysia (1995), Brazil (1999) and 
the Philippines (1999), followed in the 2000s by countries such as Thailand (2007) 
and Colombia (2011). Other examples are Poland and Hungary, two countries that 
started their HTA projects as middle-income countries, in 2005 and 2007 
respectively, but have since been classified in the high-income group 
(Chootipongchaivat et al., 2016; Löblová, 2016; Castro, 2017).   
There is an increasing body of work that is dedicated to advising middle-income 
countries – many of which aim to develop universal health coverage (UHC) - on how 
to determine the type of services covered by publicly funded health systems and on 
the likely challenges to making such coverage decisions (Chalkidou et al., 2013; 
Voorhoeve et al., 2017). This advice includes HTA, but also other attempts to define 




referred to as ‘priority-setting’. This advice, and the criteria suggested for decision-
making, are developed building on the cumulative experience of high-income 
countries (Daniels, Porteny and Urritia, 2015). However, in middle-income 
countries, HTA and other tools for priority-setting will respond to policy problems 
specific to this context. In high-income countries, HTA became associated with 
coverage decisions for innovative technologies, often made by comparing alternative 
technologies based on criteria of value for money. Middle-income countries 
encounter additional challenges with regards to coverage of health services. These 
challenges include fast adoption of innovative health services, in parallel with 
increases in health budgets as these countries’ economies grow. In this context, 
decision-makers in these countries are likely to face tough questions on what to fund 
first, as well as how best to allocate health budgets to achieve competing UHC goals, 
often in the context of fast-growing private healthcare provision. As middle-income 
countries expand public coverage to innovative services, they may also need to 
ensure access to services considered essential and well-established, and may 
therefore experience pressure to ensure essential services and set harder limits to 
their benefit packages (Glassman et al., 2016). This specific context of middle-
income countries is likely to influence procedural, methodological or organisational 
choices on the path towards HTA institutionalisation. 
Therefore, to understand the process of HTA institutionalisation, it is necessary to 
understand differences in context, such as the ideas, interests and institutions that 
shape the development of health system governance in each country; whether and 
how these differences influence how HTA bodies become established; and how these 
bodies function. It is reasonable to expect controversies about the use of HTA for 
coverage and resource allocation decisions in middle-income countries, as 
experienced in high-income countries. In the latter, such contestation has influenced 
specific arrangements for HTA - for example, the establishment of mechanisms for 
public participation - or has even ended the process of institutionalisation 
(Hassenteufel et al., 2017). Debates that are likely to emerge in middle-income 
countries on whether value for money is a reasonable criterion for decision-making, 
whether HTA processes lead to more public involvement and transparency of 




political (Baltussen et al., 2016). However, debates in middle-income countries are 
likely to be shaped first and foremost by the specific problems policy-makers in 
these contexts encounter, which are different than the ones in high-income countries, 
as explained above. In addition, in high-income countries, HTA institutionalisation 
as a tool for informing coverage decisions and for distributing healthcare resources 
attracted controversy both among academics, as well as among politicians, officials, 
industry representatives, members of civil society and the wider public. Therefore, 
these categories of actors and their interests should be understood in middle-income 
countries as well.  
Existing literature, albeit scarce, indicates that there is likely to be a degree of policy 
transfer of HTA from high-income countries, whereby countries learn from, or even 
copy models of HTA approaches established by high-income countries. HTA is an 
idea that crossed borders, with some academics and HTA approaches from specific 
countries, such as the UK, being particularly influential (Benoit and Gorry, 2017). 
However, policy transfer is insufficient to explain institutionalisation, in the absence 
of an understanding of how institutional characteristics, such as administrative 
traditions or health system arrangements, may influence the process of establishing 
HTA (Landwehr and Böhm, 2014; Hassenteufel et al., 2017; Torbica, Tarricone and 
Drummond, 2018). Since such arrangements will from high-income countries and 
between  differ in middle-income countries and from country to country, therefore 
they need to be understood in each country context in order to explain HTA 
institutionalisation.  
To conclude, this thesis aims to understand better how HTA has been established to 
inform coverage decisions of publicly funded health services in middle-income 
countries, by analysing the ideas, interests and institutions involved in shaping the 
development of HTA bodies mandated with this task in Thailand and the Philippines. 
Specifically, this thesis examines how policy actors conceptualised the problems 
they wanted HTA to address and their expectations towards HTA providing a 
solution to these problems; the interest pursued by different groups of policy actors 
in supporting, or opposing, the development of HTA; the choices policy actors made 




established organisations and developed rules and processes to conduct HTA and to 
use the evidence generated by HTA to inform coverage decisions. Using the multiple 
lenses of ideas, interests and institutions, this thesis aims to unpack the process of 
institutionalising HTA as experienced in Thailand and the Philippines, to understand 
better the challenges policy-makers in middle-income countries face when working 
towards universal health coverage and introducing HTA to inform coverage 
decisions.   
This thesis is structured as follows. Chapter 2 presents the review of the literature 
with a view to define the concepts used in this analysis.  Chapter 3 introduces the 
aims and objectives, clarifies the theoretical approach taken by this thesis and 
describes the methods used in this thesis. Chapter 4 provides a historical account of 
the development of HTA in Thailand and the Philippines to provide information 
about the cases selected for this study. Chapters 5 to 8 present the comparative 
analysis, including the ideas shaping how and why HTA was developed (Chapter 5), 
how HTA organisations were established (Chapter 6), how the rules and processes 
underpinning HTA were developed (Chapter 7), and what were the barriers and 
opportunities encountered during HTA institutionalisation (Chapter 8). The final 
chapter discusses the key findings in the light of the literature on HTA 






2. Establishing HTA: a literature review 
Organisations that promote the use of HTA, such as the International Network for 
Agencies in Health Technology Assessment (INAHTA), Health Technology 
Assessment International (HTAi) and the World Health Organisation (WHO) have 
produced different definitions of HTA. These definitions can refer to HTA as a type 
of research (e.g., WHO), or as a process of using evidence to inform decisions on 
including or excluding a health technology (e.g., HTAi, 2019). Reference to ‘HTA’ 
might include all these elements or prioritise one specific element, which has led to a 
significant degree of complexity in the literature on HTA. More generally, the 
concept of HTA tends to include at least three core elements: a) the methods of 
scientific enquiry on the impacts of health technology (‘assessment’); b) the critical 
appraisal of the evidence generated by this enquiry and the deliberative process of 
reaching a recommendation on the adoption of the technology (‘appraisal’); and c) 
the organisations that conduct and/or coordinate the assessment and appraisal 
(Velasco Garrido et al., 2008; Drummond et al., 2012). HTA institutionalisation 
necessarily includes all of the above elements.  
This chapter will review the literature on the distinct elements of HTA. Specifically, 
it will clarify the nature of the policy decisions that HTA can inform discussed by 
scholars of HTA, the methods used as part of HTA processes, the means whereby 
HTA processes link evidence generation to decision-making, the role of HTA 
organisations in this process, and, finally, it will propose an operationalisation for 
HTA institutionalisation.  
The role of HTA in policy-making  
Governments use HTA to inform coverage decisions about the types of healthcare 
services that are available to patients through public funding schemes, such as 
publicly funded health insurance. Such decisions can be made in many different 
ways and the organisational arrangements developed for the purpose of making such 
decisions take different forms in different countries. Generally, some form of 




implemented at different levels of the health system. Taken together,  they define the 
health benefits package. Coverage decisions can be more or less explicit, on a 
spectrum from services that are implicitly included or excluded via resource 
allocation decisions or organisational arrangements to an explicitly defined health 
benefit package that is continuously updated through a list of inclusions or exclusion 
(Velasco Garrido et al., 2008).  
Starting in the 1980s, governments in Europe and the United States of America 
(USA) showed increasing interest in making coverage decisions more explicit and 
directive. To that end, they developed specific processes and methods to make 
decision-making more transparent and rational (Schreyögg et al., 2005; Sabik and 
Lie, 2008). One of the most commonly invoked explanations for this willingness of 
policy-makers to be more explicit about coverage decisions– as well as the use of 
HTA for that purpose – was the need to limit or control rising health expenditures 
(Banta, 2003; Syrett, 2007b). Concerns arose specifically about new, costly health 
technologies, which were believed to drive the observed increase in health care 
expenditure. Studies confirm that changes in medical technology contribute to 
raising health expenditures, although estimates on the size of that contribution vary 
considerably1 (Fan and Savedoff, 2014). The desire to make coverage decisions 
more transparent was also informed by the evidence-based medicine (EBM) 
movement, whose main goal was to ensure that treatment decisions were made based 
on the best available evidence about the safety and efficacy of interventions (Sackett 
et al., 1996). However, efforts to make coverage decisions more explicit have always 
attracted criticism of rationing in healthcare, on the grounds that they  exclude 
patients with certain conditions from receiving treatments judged as insufficiently 
effective or too expensive (Smith, 1996; Ubel and Goold, 1998a; Maynard, 1999).  
The rationing debates have driven the development of an extensive branch of 
normative literature focusing on justice in health and healthcare. Theories of 
distributive justice were particularly important in framing the early debates about 
 
1 Depending on assumptions about technical innovation being an independent factor or being 




priority-setting or rationing in healthcare. These theories proposed a series of core 
principles as to what is being distributed – e.g. utilities, welfare or primary goods.  
Economists and  medical ethicists then defined and operationalised these principles 
as relevant criteria for the distribution of healthcare (Olsen, 1997). These underlying 
definitions and their operationalisations matter because they inform, directly or 
indirectly, health policies and medical practice. One of the most used criteria for 
distributing health care is need, which is defined in relation to what constitutes ill-
health, a controversial topic. On its face, this concept can easily be understood as 
clinical need, which indicates that need should be judged by physicians. According 
to Cookson and Dolan (2000), this principle was one of the more palatable for 
physicians in the United Kingdom (UK). However, most attempts to define need 
agree that any definition of need should indicate what is meant by ill-health, which 
can mean the degree of ill-health; immediate pain and suffering as well as threat to 
life; lifetime ill-health; and considerations about the potential to benefit from health 
care based on the initial state of ill-health (Cookson and Dolan, 2000). Finally, need 
has also been used in relation to effectiveness – specifically in relation to what needs 
can be met by available interventions (Culyer, 1995). 
Another important principle in distributional justice is about maximising the 
consequences of healthcare. As in the case of need principles, the definition of what 
these ‘consequences’ are has been widely debated and multiple proposals exist 
(Cookson and Dolan, 2000). One proposed maximising principle is that health and 
distribution of health care should maximise population health. However, difficulties 
in measuring (i.e. comparing and ranking) all possible health states is both 
practically and conceptually challenging, if not impossible. An alternative was 
proposed under the name of ‘wellbeing’, which is a term that indicates attempts to 
value health instead of measuring it. These valuations can be subjective, i.e., 
preference based, or objective, that is, derived by valuing opportunities and 
capabilities (Hausman, 2008).  In practice, preference-based valuations have been 
used the most widely.  
Lastly, equalitarian principles of distributional justice focus on reducing inequalities 




criterion, instead they have been considered in addition of one of the other 
principles. Some of these proposals were developed in relation to tools of 
maximising wellbeing, subjectively valued (e.g. fair innings) (Kelleher, 2014).  
These will be discussed in the following section, on HTA methods.   
These answers to the question of how health care should be distributed in a fair 
manner outlined above are important foundational principles that underlie the 
rationale for establishing HTA. These core principles were applied through the tools 
that were developed to measure or evaluate health in order to meet goals of 
distributive justice, which were extensively used in HTA processes. While 
alternatives to what is viewed as just in the distribution of health care exist - for 
example, rights-based approaches  - distributive justice theories were the lens 
through which rationing problems were approached most often (Dolan and Olsen, 
2002).  
Because there is no consensus on what substantive moral principles should guide 
distribution of resources for health care, scholars focused on procedural justice 
principles instead, while continuing to attempt to combine the core principles and 
guide decision-making (Cookson and Dolan, 2000). In particular, the accountability 
for reasonableness framework has proven particularly influential in the development 
of HTA processes (Daniels and Sabin, 1997). Daniels and Sabin (1997) propose four 
conditions that need to be satisfied for coverage decisions (which are about 
distribution of health care) to be fair: publicity, relevance, appeals and enforcement. 
The publicity condition refers to a requirement that two types of information are 
publicly and transparently accessible: a) the actual decisions about a service being 
covered or excluded; and b) the reasons for these decisions.  The relevance condition 
focuses more closely on these reasons. A reasonable basis for decision-making is one 
that is accepted by the actors who want to find a solution for coverage decisions and 
that is justifiable and co-operative, knowing that agreement on substantive principles 
will be elusive. The appeals condition refers to establishing a mechanism to review 
decisions that are challenged or that should be re-considered based on emerging 




public regulation to make sure that the previous three conditions are met (Daniels 
and Sabin, 1997).  
Daniels does not attempt to solve the problem of which ethical principles should be 
applied to reach distributional fairness, which continues to be unsolved (Daniels, 
2000; Daniels, Porteny and Urritia, 2015). In fact, Cookson and Dolan (2000) noted 
that the most consistent engagement in attempting to combine existing principles 
came from health economists. Some of these attempts were tested when governments 
established policy process of making explicit coverage decisions for their health 
systems. The earliest cases of explicit priority-setting took place in Norway (1987), 
the USA state of Oregon (1989), the Netherlands (1992), Sweden (1993), and New 
Zealand (1993).  These first attempts at explicit priority-setting generally stopped 
short of making binding decisions. Rather, they worked on identifying principles that 
should guide selection, as well as working on more public involvement and 
transparency in decision-making (Sabik and Lie, 2008). The notable exception is the 
Oregon experience, which became notorious as an experiment in which the use of a 
sole health measure to prioritise treatments and conditions, drawing heavily from 
health economics methods, was met with strong resistance from the local 
community, in particular disability rights groups. Their criticism highlighted that the 
way in which quality of life was measured would lead to discrimination against 
people living with disabilities (Fox and Leichter, 1993; Smith, 1996). Such criticism 
linked to methods for valuing quality of life will be discussed further in the 
following section, on scientific methods for HTA. Some other countries used HTA 
agencies to provide a partial answer to this question (e.g. UK), whereas other 
countries established separate processes for clarifying the health benefits packages 
and for assessing new technologies (e.g. Sweden) (Sabik and Lie, 2008). 
These and other attempts to make coverage decisions more explicit were 
accompanied by fierce debates. The term rationing in particular attracted much of 
that contestation. As a response, many researchers and policy-makers preferred to 
use the more palatable concept of priority-setting instead. In the UK,  the term of  
‘rationing’ was banned from usage at the Department of Health (DoH) for a while,  




‘priority-setting’ emphasises a more ‘rational’ process of applying a systematic 
process to find the best courses of action. Of course, the difference is one of form 
(discourse) rather than essence (Syrett, 2007b). Some scholars, aware that the 
different term would not remove the likely contestation and the need for hard choices 
to exclude certain services that individuals might demand, argued against this shift in 
language as another way of concealing hard choices (Ubel and Goold, 1998). 
Interestingly, Ubel (2015) revised this position years later, agreeing that the term 
rationing was polarising to the point of impeding debate and progress.  
Still, the shift in discourse seems to have taken hold to a certain extent. Currently, 
the term priority-setting is used widely to refer to any government attempt to clarify 
its reasons for inclusion of services. In theory, HTA is part of priority-setting, if the 
latter is understood as making coverage decisions explicitly. However, there seems 
to be a separation between the two.  First, HTA is most often associated with limits – 
exclusions rather than inclusions. Second, HTA does not consider priorities across 
conditions, traditionally, but rather single technologies. As will be shown later, this 
distinction is being blurred in middle-income countries.  
Scientific methods used for HTA 
Many different criteria can be applied in HTA to inform coverage decisions. These 
criteria are generally about the health technology being assessed: its clinical benefit 
(safety, efficacy, effectiveness), its efficiency/value for money (cost-effectiveness, 
cost), or the ethical implications of a positive or negative coverage decision. Other 
considerations are emerging, depending on the technology, such as socioeconomic 
impact (loss of productivity) or innovation (Stephens, Handke and Doshi, 2012; 
Angelis, Lange and Kanavos, 2018). The conditions for which the treatment is 
indicated also raise relevant criteria, specifically disease severity and unmet need 
(i.e. burden of disease). The selection of criteria will depend on policy goals, defined 
by policy-makers. However, each comes with associated operationalisations which 
consists - often but not always - of scientific methods that are used for evidence 
generation in HTA processes. They also come with specific links with the theories of 




The following section discusses the most common methods used to generate 
evidence that speak to these criteria. Note that some of these methods will be more 
established and more frequently used than others. Specifically, most countries use a 
comparative assessment of benefits at well as economic evaluations. However, 
‘additional’ criteria such as the ones outlined above are increasingly used. Angelis 
and colleagues (2018) have assessed how the additional criteria that go beyond 
clinical benefit and efficiency are applied for new medicines and found that the 
relative importance of these criteria is often unknown, which they suggest may be a 
reason for differences in coverage recommendations for the same technology 
between countries at similar income levels.   
Methods to assess safety, efficacy and effectiveness of technologies 
Clinical studies of safety and efficacy of health technology typically form the core of 
HTA. They use statistical analyses to produce ‘mathematical estimates of the risk of 
benefit and harm, derived from high-quality research on population samples’ 
(Greenhalgh, 2014, p. 2). There has been much debate about appropriate study 
designs and relevant outcome measures, which can only be outlined in general terms 
below.  
Proponents of EBM have successfully advocated for a hierarchy of evidence to 
establish a scientific standard for evidence of safety and efficacy of clinical 
interventions, with systematic reviews and/or meta-analyses of randomised 
controlled trials (RCTs) seen as the most robust type of evidence. However, the 
reliance on RCTs in the quest of identifying the best way of practicing medicine has 
also been criticised (Jones and Podolsky, 2015).  Some clinicians have argued that 
the use of RCTs is unnecessary, for example where interventions have large effects 
that can be established through the use of other measures, such as treatment outcome 
over expected prognosis (Glasziou et al., 2007). RCTs are also limited with regard to 
generalisability as they purposefully exclude the context of an intervention (Deaton 




Health professionals also feared that a ‘religious’ adherence to RCTs would limit 
their professional freedom (Sackett et al., 1996).  They argued that clinical decision-
making cannot be solely based on RCT evidence and that it should equally draw on 
patient characteristics and preferences, as well as the experience of the health 
professionals themselves. Lastly, they pointed out that there were many cases when 
an RCT would not be ethical or feasible (Lambert, 2006). In contrast, proponents of 
the hierarchy of evidence did not dispute the importance of such factors, or that there 
will be cases in which conducting an RCT is not ethical or feasible, but believed that 
RCTs, when available, provided the best evidence of treatment efficacy, that health 
professionals should be able to appraise such evidence and apply it effectively, 
alongside their professional judgement (Sackett et al., 1996).  In an anthropological 
enquiry of the EBM movement, Lambert (2006) notes that, throughout the history of  
EBM, its proponents tended to absorb criticism by expanding the remit of EBM to 
include a broader evidence base.  
If safety and efficacy are at the core of assessing health technologies, measuring the 
effectiveness of health technologies is the most prominent criterion used by HTA 
(Stephens, Handke and Doshi, 2012). Evidence on clinical effectiveness, i.e. the 
effects of an intervention under ‘real world’ conditions, can draw on a variety of 
study designs, and responds to some of the limitations of RCTs. Evidence of 
effectiveness can be generated by observational or pragmatic experimental studies. 
To establish evidence of effectiveness, pragmatic clinical trials can be conducted that 
relax some of the more stringent design requirements of RCTs, but increase the 
external validity of their findings (generalisability). Pragmatic clinical trials can also 
be less intrusive, for example by measuring rates of adherence (as opposed to 
enforcing adherence) and by selecting end points that are relevant for patients. On 
this later point, final health outcomes are more relevant for patients than surrogate 
outcomes (typical example: cholesterol levels), which are frequently used for RCTs. 
Finally, in many cases, it is only feasible or ethically permissible to collect 
effectiveness data by using routine data collected in registries and other 
administrative databases. There is increasing acknowledgement that other types of 
studies, including from other disciplines, can contribute to our knowledge of the 




The choice of any of these methods for HTA should be understood in relation to the 
philosophical debates about the fair distribution of health and healthcare. As we have 
seen, a satisfactory answer is elusive, which explains why proponents of specific 
methods and processes - such as HTA or EBM - encountered considerable 
resistance. For example, EBM has been criticised for over-managerialising 
healthcare (introducing an ‘audit culture’) and working in the service of ‘cost-
cutters’ (Sackett et al., 1996, p. 71).  Sackett explained that such criticism was due to 
a misunderstanding of the role of EBM and of its consequences, which was to 
‘identify and apply the most efficacious interventions to maximise the quality and 
quantity of life for individual patients’ and by this it ‘may raise rather than lower the 
cost of their care’ (Sackett et al., 1996, p. 72). Maynard (1996) argued that it would 
in fact be unethical from a societal perspective to provide the treatment that is most 
effective, irrespective of its costs, because it will mean an inefficient use of scarce 
resources (Maynard, 1996, p. 170). In contrast, based on an individual equity 
judgement, the most efficacious and effective treatments should be the ones 
provided.  
These different views exemplify how ethical principles are codified in the methods 
used for HTA and why methodological choices are both important and a source of 
debate. For example, the underlying reasoning for using RCTs and systematic 
reviews or meta-analyses of RCTs is about establishing safety and efficacy of 
treatments for the average patient, using statistical analysis.  The analysis of 
effectiveness tends to be less standardised than evidence of efficacy, because it 
responds to a wider range of the questions; it can therefore draw on different types of 
studies such as clinical trials (including pragmatic trials), observational studies and 
clinical case series. However, the space between the average patient and the needs of 
individual patients remain at the forefront of the concerns of many clinicians. As 
effectiveness evidence is sometimes unavailable, expert opinion, based on clinicians’ 
experience, is also used in HTA processes.  When that happens, the deliberative 
process is about negotiating principles and priorities in the committee room. HTA 
processes, with their rules and standards, are designed to equalise one perspective 




Methods used for economic evaluation of health interventions 
As explained above, introducing clinical innovation does not only raise questions of 
safety and effectiveness. In addition, innovation in healthcare has often been linked 
to the increasing costs of health care and raised questions about efficiency (Cookson, 
Griffin and Nord, 2014). Thus, at health system level, a relevant question is not only 
whether the medical services provided are effective, but also whether they are 
efficient.  
Economic evaluation is used in HTA processes to apply the criterion of efficiency 
(or value for money) to coverage decisions. Economic evaluations can be conducted 
in many different ways for the purpose of HTA, although some have become more 
widely used than others.  Some of these approaches can be used to promote technical 
efficiency, i.e., how best to produce services, or allocative efficiency, i.e. which 
services to produce. The degree to which both goals can be achieved by specific 
types of economic evaluation has been a source of debate among health economists 
(see Oliver, Healey and Donaldson, 2002).  
Cost-benefit analysis (CBA), as the most established method for comparing the 
overall costs and benefits (valued in monetary terms) of alternative courses of action, 
developed to inform investment in different areas of public policy, can inform 
allocative efficiency, including in healthcare. However, due to criticism about 
assigning monetary value to health benefits, as well as the impractical data 
requirements, health economists migrated towards applying cost-effectiveness 
analysis (CEA) instead (Meltzer and Smith, 2011). If CBA can compare the overall 
benefits and costs of a technology, CEA compares the marginal health benefits 
attributed to a new technology with the benefits attributed to alternative treatment. 
The result, an incremental cost-effectiveness ratio (ICER), expresses the cost per 
extra unit of health gain achieved by the new technology. However, because CEAs 
can only compare alternative courses of actions with similar benefits, it can only 
inform decision-making by reference to an incremental cost-effectiveness threshold.  
The use of cost-effectiveness thresholds is one of the most controversial aspect to 




applied to the incremental cost per benefit ratios in order to determine whether an 
intervention offers good value for money and therefore should be funded.  In 
principle, such a threshold can be empirically calculated based on the available 
health budgets (Culyer et al., 2007; Culyer, 2015). However, HTA agencies that 
used a cost-effectiveness threshold, such as NICE, did not establish a clearly defined 
and transparently communicated threshold at first and did not generate these 
thresholds by calculating them empirically. This has been a source of criticism to the 
use of CEA to inform coverage decisions (Harris, 2005).  
As acceptability for the idea of a threshold grew, more research about the appropriate 
manner of estimating such a threshold was undertaken. Thokala et al. (2018) 
reviewed the methods that can be applied to determine cost-effectiveness thresholds 
empirically, distinguishing supply-side and demand-side approaches. Health 
economists who prefer supply-side approaches take as a starting point the existence 
of fixed budgets, which cannot be changed, at least not in the short-term (Vallejo-
Torres et al., 2016). In other words, at any given time, the threshold is implied by the 
existing budgets. In contrast, proponents of demand-side approaches aim to derive a 
cost-effectiveness threshold by estimating societal willingness to pay. Discussing the 
advantages and disadvantages of both perspectives, Thokola and colleagues (2018) 
note that threshold set by using supply-side reasoning tend to be higher than those 
supported by demand-side arguments. As a result, they argue that the two approaches 
could be complementary and that the approach to setting cost-effectiveness 
thresholds should be selected based on the problem the analysis is aimed to address 
(Thokala et al., 2018).  
Another type of economic evaluation often used in HTA, cost-utility analysis (CUA) 
is a type of analysis that uses a multi-dimensional health outcome measure, such as 
quality-adjusted life years (QALYs) or disability-adjusted life years (DALYs). As a 
composite measure of health benefits, QALYs were first developed  as a way of 
capturing the benefits of interventions that were not related to life years gained, but 
to quality of life (Klarman, 1982). Economists began to use QALYs as part of early 
applications of cost-effectiveness analysis to health, which highlighted the need to 




There have been extensive debates about and criticism directed at the methods used 
to elicit QALYs and the resulting estimates. These debates are either about the 
valuation of health states, or the underlying assumptions used in order to apply a 
unitary method of health gain.  Measurement issues refer to the health state 
classification tools (including the domains of health) or the samples to which these 
are applied (general population or a relevant subgroup). Methods to value health 
states have also been contested. The health states are valued through preference 
derivation methods2  (e.g., standard gamble, time trade-off or rating scales), but it is 
relevant which sample3 these techniques are applied to. The existing systems of 
health state classification, description and preference derivation result in values that 
differ systematically across different samples, which reveals measurement problems. 
Consequently, the resulting QALY calculations (and eventually, cost-effectiveness 
ratios) will be different depending on the tools used to describe health states and to 
derive preferences for health states (Nord, 2014).   
These limitations notwithstanding, QALYs have become extensively used in HTA 
processes. Because of their widespread use, Lipscomb et al. (2009) argue for 
improving the estimates underpinning QALYs incrementally, rather than abandoning 
QALYs altogether. Nord (2014) agrees that discussions about the use of QALYs in 
HTA  should be separated from concerns about the accuracy of measures used in 
QALY calculations. He suggests that QALY values should be seen as an indicator of 
the size of health gain rather than the actual utility resulting from a health 
intervention (Nord, 2014). The overall goal of a measure of health gain would thus 
remain unchanged, i.e. to provide a quantitative estimate of value of health 
improvements.  
The second type of  concerns about the use of QALYs are the simplifying 
assumptions that underpin QALY calculations, which are more difficult to dismiss. 
 
2 Preference measurement tools have been developed based on expected utility theory (first developed 
in 1944). Despite criticism and existing alternatives, it dominates normative decision theory.  
3 Experience utility, i.e. patient samples, is preferred by health economists because it is seen as more 
accurate. In practice, most valuations have used samples of general population, also known as 




These refer to  the impact of the use of QALYs on distributional fairness based on its 
assumptions about patient characteristics or  time spent in different health states ( for 
a detailed analysis, see Lipscomb et al., 2009). Put simply, QALY maximisation 
approaches disadvantage people who have lower capacity to benefit because of the 
nature of their disease, age or comorbidity (Nord, 2014). 
There is considerable literature on the ways in which such equity concerns can be 
incorporated in economic evaluation models (Williams, 1997; Nord et al., 1999; 
Farrant, 2009; Cookson, Griffin and Nord, 2014). For the purpose of this work, it is 
sufficient to mention that there are two main ways in which equity principles, 
beyond the ones implied by utilitarian theories that informed much of the economic 
evaluation tools, can be considered as part of HTA. The first approach is to 
incorporate them in economic evaluation.  A second option is to consider equity 
concerns separately and include such principles in the deliberative mechanisms 
incorporated in HTA processes.  
The degree to which each of these methods is used in HTA processes varies 
considerably and has important implications for decision-making. In particular, 
many HTA agencies explicitly state that cost-effectiveness is not an over-riding 
criterion (e.g. Germany). In other cases, for example, in England or France, cost-
effectiveness is used as a minimum criterion, which also includes the analysis of 
evidence of efficacy and effectiveness. Further, many HTA agencies do not take into 
account affordability issues as a criterion or they consider it only in special cases, 
often by a separate organisation (e.g. NICE) (Cairns, 2016).   
To deal with increasing variety in criteria for decision-making, as well as specific 
methodological limitation like the ones regarding QALYs, HTA agencies in different 
countries have started producing methods and process manuals. These guidelines are 
useful because standardising evidence requirements minimise the measurement 
problems mentioned above by limiting variability. Further, they provide 
transparency to the process of decision-making, which is in line with the principles 




The principles of HTA processes 
This section examines the principles and debates around HTA processes, which can 
be generally described as the overall pathway from identifying a policy problem 
(usually a technology to assess) to decision-making on whether that technology 
should be covered and under what conditions. Typically, HTA processes are 
conceptualised as including distinct steps for assessment (evidence generation and/or 
synthesis) and for using its findings to inform the political process of decision-
making (appraisal). These steps have been developed based on the experiences of 
high-income countries. However, existing structuring tools for the HTA processes 
tend to vary.  
For example, Drummond and colleagues (2008) reviewed existing literature of 
practices of HTA and recommended a series of principles for the good process of 
HTA, structured by four proposed elements of HTA: structure of HTA programs, 
methods of HTA, processes for conducting HTA and use of HTA for decision-
making. Other ways in which HTA processes are structured start from the idea that a 
technology is under assessment and propose the following structure:  identification 
of technologies for assessment; prioritisation among technologies; carrying out the 
assessment; appraisal for assessment results, which can include recommendations for 
exclusion, inclusions, or further evidence review; dissemination of results; and 
implementation of decisions (Oortwijn et al., 2013). Others go further and speak 
about systems of market authorisation, HTA and coverage decision-making, each 
with their own processes (Allen et al., 2013). 
The variety in how HTA processes are conceptualised can partly be explained by the 
diversity of HTA arrangements, as well as rapid changed to these arrangements, as 
proposed by Drummond (2008). Another influence could be the purpose of these 
conceptualisations. For example, they can be used to compare HTA processes in 
different countries, necessary since there is such diversity in how HTA processes 
operate.  In some countries, an HTA agency may be charged with multiple parts of 
the process, while in other countries, these steps are undertaken by different 
organisations. In France, for example, the Haute Autorité de Santé (HAS) carries out 




England and Wales, commission HTA reports from independent research bodies 
such as academic departments (Stevens and Milne, 2004). Velasco Garrido et al 
(2008) notes that the term appraisal is used in some countries to indicate 
deliberations on the results of the assessment, whereas in others it might include 
decision-making. This is due to the specific arrangements for HTA that NICE 
coordinates, which has codified this step of a HTA process in relation to the role of 
NICE as decision-maker.  
The way HTA processes are conceptualised also matters because a series of 
normative principles have been developed for ‘good practice’ of HTA. These 
principles are important because they go back to a foundational principle of HTA, 
which is procedural justice. Procedural justice, in particular the accountability for 
reasonableness framework, plays an important role in how good practice for HTA is 
viewed. Good practices for HTA processes refer to inclusiveness - engaging all 
relevant actors as well as all relevant evidence- and transparency -a clearly defined 
link between evidence and decision-making, that is communicated appropriately, and 
possibility to appeal decisions (Drummond et al., 2008). In recent year, more 
sophisticated frameworks for HTA processes were developed, in order to account for 
increasing criteria used in decision-making and ensure their transparency (Oortwijn 
et al., 2017; Angelis, Lange and Kanavos, 2018).  
Organisations mandated with HTA 
A final element of HTA refers to organisations that coordinate HTA processes, often 
referred to as HTA agencies. This thesis focuses on government organisations that 
are mandated with coordinating HTA processes. Other types of HTA organisations 
exist, for example organisations that are commissioned with conducting HTA, but 
are not involved in coordinating appraisal or decision-making processes. These types 
of organisations fall outside the direct scope of this study, which is concerned with 
the reasons why governments adopt HTA for the purpose of informing coverage 
decisions. HTA organisations are usually established by being integrated into 
existing governance structures, for example as a government department, or by 
creating a distinct organisation with some degree of self-governance (e.g. at ‘arm’s 




organisations usually fall into two categories: a) organisations that produce and 
disseminate assessments; or b) organisations that serve either a regulatory function 
(by making binding decisions) or advisory function (by providing recommendations 
to be considered by a separate decision-maker charged with coverage decisions). 
Landwehr and Böhm (2011) argue that the degree of independence of HTA 
organisations is not only a function of their relationship with ministries of health, but 
also depends on their link with bodies mandated with the implementation of the 
decisions, especially payers, service providers, and manufacturers (Landwehr and 
Böhm, 2014). Thus, it is important to consider how HTA organisation relate to 
decision-makers in government, as well as how they ‘sit’ within the existing 
structure of the health system and its governance arrangements.  
The development of HTA organisations are greatly context-specific, and although 
some differences between organisations seem small, they tend to have substantial 
consequences. Two characteristics are particularly relevant for this analysis: the 
degree of independence from policy-makers experienced by HTA organisations (i.e., 
whether policy-makers can influence their agendas); and whether the organisation is 
mandated with decision-making or has an advisory role only.  
Government-based HTA organisations are often called HTA agencies. However, in 
practice, few HTA organisations actually have a ‘agency’ status which would imply 
being a government organisation with a degree of independence and decision-
making power (Barron et al., 2015). Many HTA organisations are institutes at arm’s 
length from government, but most of them have no decision-making power. Others 
are departments of Ministries of Health or part of the administration of a public 
payer. NICE is often seen as an example of HTA agency. However, its position is 
unusual amongst HTA organisations internationally, mostly because it makes 
coverage decisions independently from the Department of Health and Social Care.  
Allen and colleagues (2013) compared HTA systems in 33 European countries and 
developed two taxonomies for HTA organisations: the first establishes whether 
regulatory functions, HTA processes and coverage decisions are undertaken within 
the same organisation; the second looks at the timing and coordination between the 




effectiveness) and the appraisal as part of the decision-making process. In Europe, 
Allen et al (2013) identify ten ‘archetypes’ of HTA organisations resulting from 
combining the two categories. While observing this substantial degree of variation, 
the authors do not attempt to explain how this variation has come about or what has 
motivated policy-makers in different systems to make the choices they have made 
when establishing their approach to HTA-informed coverage decisions.   
Policy scholars recognised the weakness in comparative analyses of HTA bodies that 
did not try to explain the reasons why certain procedural and organisational choices 
were made in some places but not in others. Landwehr and Böhm (2011) compared 
HTA organisations in Austria, Germany, Norway, New Zealand, Sweden and the 
UK based on a series of pre-defined characteristics of the health system - the 
existence of ‘positive’ (inclusion) or ‘negative’ (exclusion) lists for health benefits -  
and of the organisation – degree of delegation and independence; inclusiveness, 
transparency and publicity. Their study shows that both the elements of HTA (in 
particular process elements) and the characteristics of the health system are relevant 
to understand why certain HTA organisations arrive at specific design 
characteristics. Landwehr and Böhm conclude that governments have the option to 
engage in ‘strategic institutional design’ (Landwehr and Böhm, 2014) according to 
political realities and the definition of the policy problem. However, they also 
concede that the ability to design HTA organisations is constrained by existing 
institutions, such as existing practices of defining the health benefit package. 
Some other scholars have attempted to identify how certain institutional traditions 
and cultural values influence the establishment of HTA organisations. For example,  
Torbica and colleagues (2018) compare the influence of public administrative 
traditions in England, Germany and France on the development of HTA. They find 
that the organisation of NICE is highly compatible with the tradition of British 
government administration, which delegates specialised tasks to arm’s length 
organisations with a high degree of independence. By comparison, in France, the 
government delegates specialised tasks, but continues to be in control of decision-
making, by giving the organisation a lower degree of independence. Further, the 




the independence of organisations is typically rated as low. This is mirrored by the 
recommendations  by the Institute for Quality and Efficiency in Health Care 
(IQWiG) not being binding to the decision-maker, the Federal Joint Committee 
(known as G-BA). Countries such as France and Germany, which fund health care 
largely through social health insurance, give lower priority to efficiency concerns 
than, for example, England, which operates tighter budget control (Torbica, 
Tarricone and Drummond, 2018). 
Such differences in country context have also informed the choice of procedures and 
methods of HTA, by embedding certain policy values within health systems and 
therefore influencing the policy goals that are likely to be set. The use of cost-
effectiveness is a pertinent example. Several authors suggest that methods of 
economic evaluation applied by HTA organisations are tightly linked with social 
values prevalent in their country context. In the UK, arguably, the principle of 
fairness of distribution is equally expressed in the foundational values of the 
National Health Service and in the use of QALY gains valued equally (although 
some exceptions are made for end-of-life treatment). In contrast, in the German 
social health insurance system, meeting the individual needs of patients is given 
more weight than distributional fairness (Torbica, Tarricone and Drummond, 2018). 
This finding is also confirmed by Landwehr and Böhm (2014), who link social 
values prevalent in a country’s administration with the characteristics of the HTA 
organisation and their preference of decision-making criteria (Landwehr and 
Klinnert, 2014).  
Other authors have underlined the political nature of decisions informed by HTA and 
the political context of HTA organisations. Wood and Flinders (2014) have shown 
that by delegating decision-making to arm’s length bodies, policy-makers engage in 
a process of de-politicising decisions that are inherently political insofar as they 
affect the interests of different actors (Wood and Flinders, 2014). Wood (2014) noted 
that NICE in the England has successfully resisted pressures from politicians to 
change their decisions because its formalised procedures and scientific authority 




(2013) also argue that NICE’s decisions have been accepted largely because of its 
ability to embed expert knowledge in its organisational structure and procedures.  
Political scientists have theorised  ‘de-politicization’ at governmental level as:  a) a 
way of delegating decision-making to enhance the legitimacy of the decision; b) a 
way to limit the control of politicians with the aim to increase efficiency and leading 
to good governance); and c) a way to shifts blame and blur accountability lines by 
professionalising decision-making, thus de-politicizing essentially political decisions 
(Wood and Flinders, 2014). For instance, in Norway, positive and negative decisions 
regarding coverage of new technologies are split between two levels of governance: 
Parliament retains power for positive coverage decisions, while exclusions from 
coverage are delegated to an independent regulatory body (Landwehr & Böhm, 
2011). Selectively delegating negative coverage decisions to the HTA body provides 
an institutional configuration that creates a distance between the political apparatus 
and a decision that is likely to be unpopular with manufacturers and patient 
organisations.  In England, coverage recommendations by NICE, made at national 
level, are binding on the NHS, with local NHS commissioners being mandated to 
pay for drugs that have received a positive decision. Since NICE does not have a 
budget for the implementation of its decisions, it is removed from resource allocation 
and implementation, which take place at local level (Williams, 2013). Thus, it has 
been argued that NICE contributes to the de-politicization of a controversial mandate 
– the explicit rationing of health care - at central level, while de facto prioritization 
and the management of scarce resources is delegated to the local level, and thus 
more implicit (Landwehr and Böhm, 2011; Williams, 2013; Hammond et al., 2019). 
These local commissioning organisations have experienced a series of repeated 
restructuring reforms in recent years, but local priority-setting has been retained; at 
the same time, NICE’s mandate and size have gradually expanded since its creation 
(Boyle, 2011; Bevan et al., 2014; Checkland et al, 2018).   
A final segment of the policy studies literature sees HTA organisations as an 
illustration of a wider trend of agencification, i.e., the proliferation of bodies that are 
at arm’s length from their respective ministries and perform a public function (Pollitt 




government organisations – agencies - as a way of improving quality of their 
services, restoring trust to citizens and containing levels of expenditures. The most 
common argument  given for agencification is that decentralising hierarchical 
structures of public bureaucracies will lead to increased performance, i.e. improved 
efficiency and better outcomes. Thatcher analyses the diffusion of HTA agencies 
across Europe, and compares their characteristics to the characteristics of agencies in 
other policy fields (Thatcher, 2010). He argues that HTA agencies have been 
promoted by governments for the same reasons as agencies in other public sectors.   
An important characteristic of the phenomenon of agencification is that it transcends 
international boundaries. Moynihan (2006) reviews the literature on agencification 
and draws three important conclusions. First, there is evidence of policy convergence 
across countries towards delegating decision-making to agencies at arm’s length to 
government. Second, national context has influenced the organisational structure of  
agencies considerably. Lastly, national contextual differences are supported by the 
ambiguity of the initial policy idea which allows governments to apply the same idea 
in different ways.  The literature on ‘agencification’ thus highlights the difficulties in 
comparing agencies in different contexts, which follows from the difficulty of 
defining the nature of agencies (Pollitt et al., 2001). For example, variation in public 
law in different countries can explain whether agencies have to fit into an overall 
legislative framework or the legislative framework is specified for each body. 
Comparison is also hindered by the fact that countries have developed divergent 
terminology for agencies, which is adapted to context – the ‘arm’s length’ term used 
in the UK government being a good example. This makes it then difficult to capture 
nuances in translation. Even agencies that seem similar in terms of their legal status, 
often operate differently and interact differently with the institutions and actors of 
the political system in which they are embedded. 
HTA has also been studied as a case of policy transfer. In particular, the model of 
NICE is seen as being particularly influential in informing emerging HTA 
organisations, including in other high-income countries. For example, Hassenteufel 
and colleagues (2017) show that NICE was an important inspiration for the early 




towards this model of HTA led to the development of a German-specific approach, 
which gives less priority to economic analysis. In contrast, the development of HTA 
organisation in France were less influenced originally by the English model, but 
evolved to be similar to NICE than to the HTA processes and bodies in Germany. 
The authors conclude that it is important to understand both the degree to which 
models of HTA were inspired by models from abroad, as well as to identify the 
limits of such transfer and their causes and explanations.  
In sum, to understand how HTA organisations are established, it is necessary to 
clarify the policy goals or the policy problems which HTA organisations aims to 
address, the methods underpinning HTA, the procedures of conducting HTA and of 
using HTA to inform coverage decisions, and the role of the HTA organisation 
conducting or coordinating these processes.  
Establishing HTA in middle-income countries 
This section will discuss the existing literature on establishing HTA organisations in 
middle-income countries and consider its contribution to our understanding of the 
role of HTA in policy-making, the methods of HTA, the processes developed and the 
organisations created to conduct HTA and inform coverage decisions. Taken 
together, these elements make up the path towards institutionalisation.  
The role of HTA in policy-making: HTA and universal health coverage 
In middle-income countries, health policy debates in recent years have been 
dominated by the concept of universal health coverage (UHC), which includes three 
distinct policy goals: expanding health coverage to wider segments of the 
population; improving financial risk protection; and expanding the types of health 
services people receive, while ensuring that basic services are covered (World Health 
Organization, 2010). To be able to achieve this aim, governments and public payers 
have to find a method to determine the coverage of health services that goes beyond 
existing approaches, such as developing and applying essential medicines lists. There 
is an increasing body of work that is dedicated to advising low- and middle-income 




publicly funded health systems and on the likely challenges of making coverage 
decisions  (Chalkidou et al., 2013; Voorhoeve et al., 2017). Such advice often 
presents HTA as a tool for priority-setting, one that is useful to governments as ‘a 
robust process and evidence in order to ensure that the health benefits package [i.e. 
coverage] decisions are systematic, transparent and acceptable to all stakeholders’ 
(Teerawattananon and Luz, 2016, p. 1). The term priority-setting is used widely in 
relation to countries’ move towards universal health coverage (Teerawattananon et 
al., 2016) 
Such advice on how to make coverage decisions, in the context of advocacy for 
UHC, is often produced by international organisations such as the WHO (World 
Health Organisation, 2014). In particular, the WHO convened a consultative group 
on equity and UHC, in which key actors debated approaches to ensuring 
distributional fairness when moving towards UHC. In 2014, the Consultative Group 
published the report ‘Making Fair Choices on the Path to Universal Health 
Coverage’. The premise of the report is that priority-setting, i.e., having a 
mechanism to determine which service are funded and which are not funded, is 
unavoidable on the road towards UHC. The report also posits that, in practice, 
moving towards UHC often happens in ways that are unfair and involves 
unacceptable trade-offs (Norheim, 2015).  It then proposes a framework for ‘making 
critical choices about expanding service coverage, including more people, and 
shifting to prepayment and pooling of funds’ (Voorhoeve et al., 2016, p. 13). The 
Consultative Group propose a three steps strategy for moving towards UHC. First,  it 
proposes to categorise existing services as high, medium and low priority according 
to their cost-effectiveness, the likelihood they affect the worse-off and financial risk 
protection. Second, it recommends expanding coverage to high-priority services first 
and covering these in full. Third, it advises countries to weigh the effects of any 
policy on the worse-off (World Health Organisation, 2014). 
Other commentators look more closely at specific decisions that governments need 
to take as part of the three steps outlined above. For example, Smith and Chalkidou 
(2017) argue that policy options for the expansion of coverage and for reducing 




jurisdictions, and relatively uncontroversial among experts. In contrast, prioritising 
among services to cover would raise specific problems depending on governments’ 
policy goals and are often contested. Based on this rationale, a large part of the focus 
of the advice given to middle-income countries includes developing or adapting 
specific priority-setting tools, such as guides on how to establish an essential benefit 
package (Glassman et al., 2016).   
Other authors, however, have emphasised the enduring tensions between approaches 
to priority-setting and the right to health. In particular, commentators have 
questioned whether considerations of cost-effectiveness of services and their 
affordability to public payers used to define health benefits packages compromises 
the right to health (Ooms et al., 2014; Forman et al., 2016). In response, Rumbold 
and colleagues (2017) have argued that countries can pursue policies aiming to reach 
both goals without these policies undermining each other, if certain conditions are 
met. The first condition is that the right to health should be understood as requiring 
progressive realisation and depends on resource availability. The second condition is 
that decisions on coverage of health services should be made in a manner that does 
not exclusively use principles of utilitarian maximisation of population health, to the 
detriment of other ethical principles, such as meeting the needs of individuals or 
ensuring equal access to healthcare. In order for these conditions to be met, the 
authors advise countries moving towards UHC to clarify the ethical principles that 
should guide their coverage decisions, to institutionalise deliberative processes that 
apply these principles and to revise health budgets in ways that can reasonably 
ensure the realisation of the right to health. Rumbold and colleagues (2017) also 
propose several options for ‘institutionalisation’ of processes of priority-setting. One 
option is to establish organisations to assess single interventions, a role that is 
reminiscent of HTA agencies in high-income countries. Other options are to 
establish processes to debate the best allocation of health budgets more generally, by  
identifying all types of services that should be covered if services are expanded 
and/or by deliberating on the criteria that should be used to inform priority-setting 




In sum, middle-income countries are, perhaps paradoxically, confronted with more 
criteria for decision-making, more sophisticated tools for decision-making and a 
more comprehensive menu of available policy solutions. These tools build on the 
experience of high-income countries. The social values that guide priority-setting in 
healthcare have been given a great importance, in particular with regards to UHC. As 
explained earlier, however, there is no consensus on which ethical criteria should 
primarily guide coverage decisions. As a result, these tools can arguably inform a 
transparent, participative, evidence-informed – thus procedurally fair – process, but 
do not replace the need for creating consensus in-country. Further, rights-based 
approaches appear more frequently among commentators of middle-income 
countries’ road to UHC compared to scholarly debates on high-income countries’ 
coverage policies, where theories of distributive justice have been at the forefront.    
 
Scientific methods used for HTA in middle-income countries 
The need to generate appropriate research evidence and the need for resources to 
support HTA processes is an important concern for middle-income countries wanting 
to establish HTA. As outlined previously, this research evidence includes 
epidemiological studies on burden of disease, efficacy and effectiveness studies of 
health services, as well as routine data to monitor, for example, utilisation rates of 
specific services, the quality of these services or their costs (Gutierrez et al., 2015). 
In particular, the production of economic evaluation and other types of research is 
expected to be lower in countries with more restricted budgets (Vassall et al., 2016), 
in part because there are fewer people trained in health economics at postgraduate 
level and therefore less capacity to conduct research. It has also been observed that 
smaller countries can struggle to afford and staff such research activities irrespective 
of income level (Pitt, Goodman and Hanson, 2016).   
Furthermore, many middle-income countries do not have strong health information 
systems, which means that data on burden of disease and health sector data are 
unlikely to be available or of insufficient quality.  In principle, the absence of such 




similar settings; however, this again requires expertise and funding. Information on 
effectiveness and burden of disease can sometimes be inferred from studies carried 
out in high income countries. Alternatively, global estimates can be used if available. 
However, data that are known to play an important role in estimates of incremental 
cost-effectiveness ratios (costs of both alternatives, effectiveness of comparator) are 
often imprecise – particularly if they based on global rather than national studies – 
and introduce substantial uncertainty (Walker et al., 2010). Therefore, there are 
limits to using extrapolations based on global data in HTA processes.   
Despite the challenges outlined above, middle-income countries are advised to make 
use of the data and research that is already available in order to inform coverage 
decisions that would be otherwise made implicitly.  One example is the global effort 
to estimate the burden of disease, which is taken as a starting point for priority-
setting in many middle-income countries. Other examples are the Disease Control 
Priorities project, now in its third edition (Jamison et al., 2018), which identifies 
interventions for priority conditions, and the WHO-CHOICE project, which aims to 
support the use of cost-effectiveness by low and middle-income countries (World 
Health Organisation, 2019).  
These global studies used often use a single measure valuing health states known as 
disability-adjusted life-years (DALYs). DALYs are readily available and easier to 
use in low- and middle-income countries because they are used in global estimates of 
disease and thus do not require researchers to conduct surveys to elicit preference 
valuation of health outcomes (used to develop QALYs). International donors will 
favour the application of DALYs, while most guidelines in high-income countries 
suggest the utilisation of QALYs. Consequently, some health economics journals 
have different methodological requirements for economic evaluations from low- and 
middle-income countries, on one side, and high-income countries, on the other. 
International and regional collaborations seem to provide an answer to this problem 
as well as to the issues of health economics capacity, potentially supporting 
development of methods and theory around transferability of economic evaluations 




In sum, burden of disease studies have become particularly relevant for informing 
priority-setting at national and international level (the latter, for countries which 
receive development assistance). However, using Global Burden of Disease 
estimates that use DALYs are contested for reasons similar to QALY contestation. 
One aspect of the contestation refers to the validity of the tool. A second aspect 
refers to the ethical principles that underlie it. For example, by not accounting 
separately for severity of disease, DALY-based burden of disease can give a higher 
importance to diseases with high prevalence and low severity (Voigt and King, 
2017). Further, Voigt and King (2017) also criticise the argument that budget 
allocation,  be it by governments or international donors, should use burden of 
disease as a primary criterion for prioritising spending.  
Finally, as was the case in high-income countries, applying the criterion of value for 
money requires establishing a cost-effectiveness threshold. A widespread practice is 
for studies to quote a threshold range of 1 to 3 times the country’s Gross Domestic 
Product (GDP) per capita. This range was first applied to low- and middle-income 
countries by the WHO-CHOICE project to support the use of cost-effectiveness 
analysis with the aim to inform resource allocation in low-and middle-income 
countries (Thokala et al., 2018). However, analyses of the appropriateness of this 
threshold shows that the proposed range is likely to be too high to be affordable for 
many countries. Empirically derived cost-effectiveness thresholds based on available 
budgets (via supply-side methods) have indeed been shown to be at the low end of 
this range (Woods et al., 2016; Robinson et al., 2017). In contrast, cost-effectiveness 
thresholds derived by estimating willingness-to-pay tend to result in estimates that 
are the higher end of the 1-3 times GDP per capita. In this context, value for money 
considerations could easily conflict with affordability concerns.  As explained 
previously, policy-makers in high-income countries often do not tackle the challenge 
of affordability explicitly as part of coverage decisions, or they do so only for 
specific decisions (Cairns, 2016). In sum, despite an increasing evidence base for 
how to establish cost-effectiveness thresholds empirically, balancing value-for-
money and affordability in the context of defining a basic benefit package, as 
advised for middle-income countries, is a difficult political undertaking that is not 




Processes for priority-setting  
The literature on HTA processes in middle-income countries distinguishes itself by 
debates on whether the existing principles usually associated with HTA in high-
income countries will suffice in debates over priority-setting in middle-income 
countries. For example, Daniels and colleagues (2015) confirm the usefulness of 
HTA for countries at all income levels, but worry about HTA being limited in the 
criteria that it applies (safety, efficacy, cost-effectiveness). They suggest that  
expanding its remit to include criteria such as budget impact, equity and financial 
risk protection might be too broad for this single tool (Daniels, Porteny and Urritia, 
2015). In a response, Culyer (2016) argues that much of the criticism directed at 
HTA is based on the methods that it uses but that critics ignore the deliberative 
aspects of HTA. He further argues that HTA should not be replaced by its methods 
and that the ethical principles already underpinning HTA should be recognised, as 
well as its capacity to adapt to the objectives of the policy, as defined by policy-
makers.  
Other commentators have argued that multi-criteria decision analysis (MCDA)  is a 
better fit for middle-income countries, as an addition to HTA or as a replacement to 
it (Youngkong, Tromp and Chitama, 2011; Castro, Moreno-Mattar and Rivillas, 
2018). MCDA is a tool that was developed for use in low- and middle-income 
countries by Baltussen and Niessen (2006). MCDA is a response to the fact that the 
existing tools that aim to integrate evidence in coverage decisions, such as HTA, 
only focus on single criteria. In practice, policy-makers have to consider a variety of 
criteria when making decisions, which may include scientific evidence, as well as 
equity considerations or political aspects. MCDA aims to incorporate a larger 
number of criteria into a single process, which is in line with HTA processes in high-
income countries as well.  
HTA organisations & the overall process of institutionalisation in middle-
income countries 
Middle-income countries have been advised to ‘institutionalise HTA’, including by 




Chalkidou, 2012). Analyses of how lower resource settings should institutionalise 
HTA offer roadmaps based on policy learning from high-income countries. These 
roadmaps take into account configurations of the elements of HTA - policy problem, 
method, process and organisations- as they have developed in high-income countries 
(Chootipongchaivat et al., 2016; Kaló et al., 2016; Wild, Stricka and Patera, 2017). 
As explained previously, however, the question of how high-income countries 
institutionalised HTA and what explains specific configurations of HTA elements is 
only now being explored (e.g., Torbica, Tarricone and Drummond, 2018).  
With regards to establishing HTA organisations in middle-income countries, some 
authors suggest an evolutionary process of HTA organisations, from HTA 
committees for appraisal processes to a ‘public HTA organisation’ or agency (Kaló 
et al., 2016).  However, as noted by social scientists who study the phenomenon of 
‘agencification,’ the term ‘agency’ lacks analytical clarity. Moynihan (2006) argues 
that two  public organisations in two different countries referred to as agencies  can 
be different in form and process if they are governed by a different set of rules.  
For this reason, this study will analyse organisations and HTA processes separately. 
The existing literature often treats the two together, which makes drawing out the 
specific institutional characteristics difficult. This gap in knowledge might explain 
why the existing literature has not reached a conclusion with regards to the question 
of the degree to which bureaucratic traditions influence HTA development 
(Landwehr and Böhm, 2014; Löblová et al., 2019).  
In sum, the establishment of HTA organisations is the most obvious sign of 
institutionalisation and is seen as a desirable step that would ensure a degree of 
rationality to coverage decisions. However, establishing organisations, or HTA 
agencies, is not the full extent of institutionalisation. This thesis will explore the 
question of institutionalisation of HTA, which includes the goals of policy-making 
(i.e., the role of HTA in policy-making) and these goals’ underlying principles; the 
methods used in HTA processes, as well as the organisational structures that 




The following chapter will outline the aims and objective of this thesis, as well as the 





3. Aims, concepts and methods  
Aims and objectives 
This thesis aims to understand how HTA was established in two middle-income 
countries, Thailand and the Philippines. To understand how HTA was established, 
this thesis will analyse comparatively the methods applied for HTA, the principles 
underpinning the selection of methods, the approach to using HTA evidence to make 
coverage decisions for publicly funded health services, and the types of organisations 
that were created by the two governments to commission or conduct HTA. However, 
none of these elements by themselves explain how HTA becomes institutionalised. 
Understanding what decisions are made with regards to the elements of HTA will 
not explain institutionalisation in the absence of an account of how and why such 
decisions are made. Specifically, one might ask about ideas that have shaped 
governments’ interest in HTA, the actors promoting, or opposed to, HTA being used, 
and whose interests are reflected in its application; and how existing structures of 
health system governance have influenced how HTA organisations were established 
and how they function.  This thesis therefore considers the creation of HTA as a 
process of policy change, which will be analysed through three analytical lenses: 
ideas, interests and institutions.   
This understanding of HTA institutionalisation applies equally to middle- and high-
income settings. However, the analysis of this process in middle-income countries 
has a number of additional dimensions. First, while high-income countries also 
experience constraints to their health budgets, government budgets for health in 
middle-income countries are usually even tighter. Second, the interest in establishing 
a mechanism of HTA to inform decisions coincides with, or is embedded in, efforts 
to move towards UHC. As a result, countries are likely to define the policy problems 
to which HTA responds in different ways. For example, a single reimbursement 
decision will pose a different decision-making problem than defining an essential 
benefit package in its entirety. Third, most methods used in HTA have been 




then being applied to address challenges that are different from those that they were 
developed to address. It is therefore important to appreciate the context of the 
development of HTA organisations, processes and methods in middle-income 
countries.   
Aiming to understand how HTA was established in Thailand and the Philippines as a 
process of policy change, this thesis has the following specific objectives:  
▪ To examine how actors conceptualised the policy problem that HTA was 
aimed to solve and whether existing institutions influenced the definition of 
the policy problem; 
▪ To investigate the role of existing institutions in shaping the options for 
establishing an HTA organisation, as well as actor strategies used for 
organisational establishment; 
▪ To explain how choices with regards to HTA processes were made, and how 
actors and existing institutions influenced these choices; 
▪ To compare and contrast the influence of ideas, interests and institutions on 
the development of HTA in both countries, and to derive insights into the 
opportunities and challenges associated with developing HTA in middle-





Conceptual framework  
Scholars of policy studies have proposed a series of variables to explain the drivers 
of policy change. The starting point is that individuals drive social action, but that 
there are constraints to their behaviours stemming from external factors. However, 
there is enormous variation in how scholars explain which of these variables is the 
primary driver of policy change. Depending on the school of thought, the individual 
actor, the social groups to which they pertain or the sources of constraints on 
individuals’ behaviour are proposed as the primary explanatory variables of policy 
change. Scholars who propose one of these factors as the primary variable have 
developed theories trying to explain the mechanisms by which policy change occurs. 
These theories often include an account of the interaction between one primary 
driver of policy change and all or some of the other elements.  
 
Actors’ interests – whose interests are reflected in HTA institutionalisation? 
Scholars who propose individual actors as the primary drivers of policy change tend 
to conceptualise them as rational actors with clear preferences for a given policy 
based on self-interest. Actors form coalitions based on shared interests and use their 
resources to exercise power in order to change policy accordingly (John, 2013c). 
Interests have traditionally been defined as material interests, often stemming from 
socio-economic positions of actors (e.g. as representatives of an industry or of the 
workforce) (Hall, 1996). This traditional view stems from the assumption that policy 
actors are individuals who aim to attain maximum benefit, given their specific 
preference (that can be exogenously defined), and that this benefit is achieved by 
strategically weighing all possible courses of actions (Hall and Taylor, 1996). While 
many policy scholars have relaxed these assumptions, the fact that actors’ policy 
preferences are determined by interests (whether perceived or independently 
determined) remains relevant for the study of policy change (Hall and Taylor, 1996; 




In the case of HTA, accounts of actors’ interests as drivers of political behaviour are 
important because the use of HTA to make coverage decisions has frequently 
generated opposition from certain categories of actors. These actors’ policy 
preferences have often been in line with interests that are relatively straightforward 
to identify (Banta, 2003; Hauck and Smith, 2015). Relevant actors include policy-
makers (civil servants and politicians); manufacturers of technologies such as 
pharmaceuticals or medical devices (who have an interest to sell their products to the 
most people, at the highest price); physicians (whose clinical practice is likely to be 
influenced by HTA decision-making, which in some cases might also influence 
provider revenues) (Mills and Hsu, 2014); patients (who might oppose HTA when it 
leads to negative coverage decisions which limit the types of health services they 
receive); civil society advocates (who advocate on behalf of specific categories of 
patients and might disagree with coverage decisions that affect these groups); and the 
general public (who receives information on coverage decisions based on HTA 
processes through mass and social media and might react negatively to the idea that 
access to health care is being limited). Furthermore, while often ignored, researchers 
such as health economists or clinical epidemiologists are likely to have an interest in 
producing – and being compensated for - the evidence that is to be used in HTA 
processes (Banta, 2003).  
The interests of policy-makers have been the topic of extensive study (John, 2013c; 
Flinders and Wood, 2014). With regards to HTA, it is often assumed that policy-
makers might be particularly responsive to value for money or cost-containment 
considerations (Banta, 2003). They may also avoid unpopular coverage decisions 
based on strategic considerations about electoral support or a desire to maintain 
power and access to resources (Hauck and Smith, 2015). In addition, policy studies 
scholars have extensively explored the question of why policy-makers are willing to 
delegate, and therefore relinquish, decision-making power to independent expert 
bodies, or agencies. The proliferation of expert bodies has been described as 
‘agencification’ (Pollitt et al., 2001). One explanation comes from the literature of 
depoliticization (Wood and Flinders, 2014), which suggests that the benefits of 
relinquishing responsibility for unpopular decisions comes with political gains by 




agencification which argue that interests cannot satisfactorily explain the increase in 
the number of these government organisations. Instead, these accounts focus on the 
changing nature of government and on the importance of ideas of expertise, 
efficiency or regulation (e.g., Majone, 1998; Hoppe, 2009). 
Interest-based explanations can explain specific policy preferences, but there are 
limits to their explanatory power.  As discussed in the previous chapter, establishing 
HTA is likely to be the result of a sequence of decisions made at different points in 
time. The policy preferences of individuals involved in these decisions will likely be 
impossible to disentangle at each stage. In addition, it seems likely that some policy 
preferences will be caused by reasons other than self-interest (John, 2013c). For 
example, some actors such as patients’ groups or physicians might argue that 
coverage decisions based solely on cost-effectiveness are discriminatory. These 
actors will have identifiable interests, but might equally have a deeply held belief 
that care should not be denied in any circumstances. As shown in the previous 
chapter, tensions between different principles will not be resolved by more evidence 
because these disagreements stem from different ethical positions on what principles 
should guide coverage decisions.  
A perhaps more informative approach to understanding how actors influence policy-
making comes from studies of policy networks (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Shearer et 
al., 2016). Scholars adopting this approach have shown that policy networks are 
particularly influential when advocating for, as well as resisting, policy change.  
These patterns of influence are particularly visible in specific policy fields, such as 
health policy.  
Rhodes and Marsh (1992) suggested that types of policy network can be identified 
based on the nature of relationships between its members and developed a typology 
of policy networks placed on a continuum from ‘policy community’ to ‘issue 
network’ (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992). While there is increasingly sophisticated work 
on the role of policy networks in policy change, including some application to health 
policy in low and middle-income countries (Jessani, Boulay and Bennett, 2016; Foli, 




primary factors in policy change (Shearer et al., 2016). As suggested by Shearer and 
colleagues, policy networks can ‘help visualise how interests, embedded in nodes, 
are structured in the policy process  and how network structure changed as actors 
form and dissolve relationships’ (Shearer et al., 2016, p. 1202).   
In sum, considering the interests of policy actors when exploring HTA 
institutionalisation is necessary, but not sufficient.  It is important to clarify who are 
the actors that have an interest in the establishment of HTA (and whether that results 
in a position of advocacy, opposition or neutrality). Further, identifying policy 
networks will be relevant for this analysis, because when present, they structure the 
way actors express interests during the process of policy change.  
However, other reasons exist to support or oppose HTA beyond actors’ interests and 
the manner in which policy networks structure these interests. First, actors will have 
deeply held beliefs about policy improvement and the actions that they think will 
produce this outcome. Second, interest-based accounts do not seem to cover the 
complexity resulting from the fact that the actions of policy actors are not only 
determined by their interests, but also by the rules that shape how government 
operates. How governments go about establishing HTA remains unclear. The fact 
that policy-makers might benefit from delegating tough decisions and avoiding 
blame that might engender loss of power is relevant, but what guides the specific 
limits put on HTA decision-making? Why are some HTA bodies more independent 
than others? What guides the specific placement of HTA bodies within heath system 
governance? These questions will be explored in the following sections, focusing on 
accounts that centre ideas and institutions, respectively, as primary explanatory 
variables for policy change. 
Ideas – what is being institutionalised?  
Policy change is often seen as an attempt to improve policy and policy outcomes. To 
argue for improvement, actors have to express what problems they are trying to solve 
and what they propose as a solution to the problem. Actors will also develop causal 




policy studies, these accounts are collectively referred to as ideas. Importantly, 
whereas policy problems are at times treated as independent from the policy process, 
or externally determined, policy scholars such as Bacchi and Goodwin (2016)  
suggest that causal accounts of problems and their solution reflect deeply held beliefs 
about how the world works, the values at the core of individual and collective action. 
These ideas are selectively used when representing the problem (Bacchi and 
Goodwin, 2016).   
Scholars have argued that advocacy for specific ideas, which is often undertaken by 
policy networks, can explain policy change. For example, Haas (1992) has 
developed the concept of epistemic communities to refer to groups of professionals, 
often within multi-disciplinary networks, that produce policy-relevant knowledge 
about complex policy problems. Members of these epistemic communities share 
normative beliefs, beliefs about causality and scientific knowledge, as well as a set 
of  practices proposed for policy improvement (Haas, 1992). Epistemic communities 
are particularly relevant for ideas that cross borders and are adapted in different 
contexts. Thus, ideas (and not only interests) can be the reason why certain types of 
coalitions are formed.  Further, policy networks have been shown to influence the 
adoption of specific health policy solutions in the health sector of low-and middle-
income countries (Shearer et al., 2016; Béland, Howlett and Mukherjee, 2018), 
including as part of global health initiatives (Hanefeld and Walt, 2015).  
Studies of policy transfer have explored how actors from different policy sectors 
engage in policy learning (Dolowitz and Marsh, 2000). Such work has discussed 
how and why policy transfer happens, and the key role of policy networks in this 
process. However, questions about the extent of policy transfer remain, as policy 
rarely stays in the same shape as transferred, and is likely to evolve once in place 
(Benson and Jordan, 2011). It is sometimes expected that policy transfer will lead to 
convergence between countries. However, such findings tend to reflect 
developments at a certain point in time and the selective interpretation of the analyst. 




Some scholars have argued that, as cognitive processes, ideas are not externally 
determined but have a life of their own. This means that debate and advocacy are 
variables that determine policy change independently (e.g., Majone, 1998). Such a 
perspective has a bearing on empirical research, because empirical findings are based 
on a set of ideas about what is and how what is can be known. If these are 
challenged, such accounts necessarily step into the realm of philosophy (John, 
2013a).  Taken to its logical conclusion, this view suggests that rational judgements 
about causality, efficacy – which are at the basis of scientific evidence - are merely 
part of the discourse that constitutes political life. However, for the purpose of this 
study, ideas are conceptually useful if a narrower operationalisation is used.  
We operationalise ideas as actors’ ability to formulate policy problems, find policy 
solutions and act within policy paradigms, as proposed by Smith (2013).  
Specifically, policy actors identify problems to which they believe HTA is able to 
provide a solution. This operationalisation of ideas allows to identify causal and 
normative beliefs underpinning the policy solution (in this case, HTA), to do the 
same for policy problems to which the solution responds, and to identify whether 
either the problem or the solution can be linked to ideological and moral claims 
expressed by actors involved in establishing HTA in their country. For example, 
economic evaluation that may be used as part of HTA methods is underpinned by a 
social ethics of maximising population health. When they inform decision-making, 
economic evaluation findings are likely to have to be balanced against the individual 
ethics of non-discrimination or meeting the needs of individuals. The manner in 
which such trade-offs are done as part of HTA processes is often based on 
procedural ethics, which some argue can ensure fair decision-making and increase 
legitimacy of HTA. Further, it is particularly important to understand how the policy 
problem came about and what kind of assumptions are made about its origins, as 
well as the kind of facets of the problem that are given less representation (Bacchi 
and Goodwin, 2016). For example, if HTA emerges as part of a country’s attempts to 
establish UHC, the specific problem to which HTA responds will emerge as part of a 
political process of selecting certain policy problems over others and framing these 




There is therefore conceptual overlap between interests and ideas. Actors will 
express policy preferences and argue for the usefulness of the solution by expressing 
ideas. Thus, the study of interests is equally relevant for the identification of ideas. 
The two variables often have a symbiotic relationship which has proven difficult to 
unravel (John, 2013a).  An important distinction can be made between ideas that are 
used to forward actors’ interests and ideas that are based on core normative beliefs, 
which highlights the role of ideas, independently from interests. As an explanatory 
variable, ideas are particularly useful to investigate how policy agendas are set and 
why actors advocate for certain policy solutions, such as HTA.  
As was the case with interests, a focus on ideas is not sufficient to explain how HTA 
becomes established, even if this perspective is combined with an analysis of 
interests. In particular, the concept of ideas is not as useful in explaining the limits to 
policy implementation and the directions in which HTA developed over time in 
different country settings. To understand how HTA becomes embedded in a system 
requires an additional layer of analysis, to explain why and how the same idea of 
HTA has resulted in different choices for organisations, processes and methods in 
different jurisdictions.  
 
Institutions – how does HTA get institutionalised?  
Institutions are defined as the ‘formal and informal procedures, routines, norms and 
conventions embedded in the organizational structure of the polity or political 
economy’ (Hall and Taylor, 1996, p. 96). Political systems operate by these rules and 
procedures which are most often expressed in the operation of formal organisations.  
Institutionalists study how these rules and procedures determine how policy-making 
happens.  Historical institutionalists in particular are interested in understanding how 
past ideas and decisions structure current policy-making. This often involves 





Other, less formalised rules create political norms that also influence how policy 
decisions are being made and which actors are involved in the process (Tuohy, 1999; 
Tsebelis, 2000; Béland, 2010).  New institutionalists have different propositions for 
the manner in which institutions influence policy change. For example, some 
institutionalists have suggested that institutions influence individuals’ behaviour by 
shaping ‘values, norms, identities and beliefs’ (March and Olsen, 1984) or 
‘identities, resources, values, norms, and rules’ (March and Olsen, 1998). As such, 
institutions would also include belief systems and habits of decision-making through 
which new policies are filtered and interpreted. This ‘logic of appropriateness’, 
coined by March and Olsen (March and Olsen, 1998), encourages certain patterns of 
behaviours and discourage others. Institutions influence how ideas are taken up and 
affect the ability of actors to access and influence policy-making (John, 2013b). In 
other words, actors internalise ideas embedded in institutions, and this is the 
mechanism through which institutions influence actors’ behaviours.  
There is agreement among institutionalists that institutions constrain the behaviours 
of policy actors. This study adopts this understanding and operationalises institutions 
as formal and informal rules and practices that actors identify as ‘the way of doing 
things’, as opposed to merely an individual’s choice of behaviour, irrespective of the 
consistency of this behaviour. This operationalisation is informed by Hall and 
Taylor’s concept of standards operating procedures (Hall and Taylor, 1996), which 
refers to specific rules of behaviours that are agreed upon and generally followed by 
individuals. When formal and informal rules of behaviour are broken, this is where 
actors’ interests or ideas can be identified as more dominant in determining 
behaviour (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013b).  
In the case of HTA, institutions are important in two ways. First, the concept of 
institutions helps analyse the process of institutionalisation as the establishment of 
rules and procedures that reflect the ideas associated with HTA (e.g. ideas about 
distributional justice, legitimate decision-making, and the choice of scientific 
methods and the principles underpinning them, such as value for money). 
Furthermore, using institutions as an analytical lens can explain why core concepts 




jurisdiction in which they are applied. There are therefore different types of 
institutions that will be relevant for the study of HTA institutionalisation. First, this 
study is interested in analysing the institutions associated with HTA as a tool (e.g. 
rules and procedures established as part of HTA). Second, institutions such as the 
rules and procedures of Ministries of Health and health insurers are also expected to 
inform how actors conceptualise the policy problems. Distinguishing between the 
two can help separate between the ideas embedded in HTA as the solution to a 
policy problem and the ideas embedded in existing institutions in the context in 
which HTA is being established. Thus, institutions can help explain how a country’s 
institutional context influences the creation of HTA organisations and processes - 
and thus the institutionalisation of HTA.  
The 3Is – ideas, interests and institutions 
Figure 3.1 outlines the operationalisation of ideas, interests and institutions and their 
associations with each of the specific objectives of this study: explain how HTA 
emerged on the policy agenda, how organisations and processes were developed and 
how the organisations and processes operate in practice. 
The conceptual framework outlines how the three core concepts were operationalised 
for the specific objectives of this research. With regards to ideas, the analysis will 
identify the manner in which policy problems associated with HTA are defined, as 
well as the exact characteristics of HTA as the policy solution proposed or put in 
place. Institutions are operationalised in three ways: a) existing institutions that 
might be relevant for the definition of the policy problem, specifically who the 
decision-makers are and what standard procedures they follow; b) the existing 
decision-makers or procedures that influence strategies and options for the 
establishment of organisations; and c) existing decision-makers and procedures that 
are developed as part of HTA establishment.  Interests are operationalised as 
advocates and reactive actors to HTA, as well as the strategies through which these 
actors purse their interests. It is expected that these concepts will interact with each 
other in relation to each of the specific objectives of this study. For example, 




which actors put the problem on the agenda and had an interest in the manner the 
problem was defined, as well as indicating the decision-makers or the procedures 
employed to make decisions regarding the specific problem.  
 
Figure 3.1. Institutionalisation of HTA: conceptual framework. Source: own figure.  
The following sections explore how this conceptual framework informed and guided 
the study design and the methods used for data collection and analysis.  
Methods  
This study uses a comparative case study design to understand the process of 
establishing HTA in two middle-income countries, Thailand and the Philippines. 
Case studies are particularly suited for the ‘comprehensive, holistic, and in-depth 
investigation of a complex issue (phenomena, event, situation, organization, program 
individual or group) in context, where the boundary between the context and issue is 
unclear and contains many variables’ (Harrison et al., 2017). It is for this reason that 




process of policy-making that is emergent, situational and changing over time. 
However, case studies are defined differently depending on the epistemological 
position of the researcher, with some authors disputing case studies as a study design 
entirely, and instead seeing case study analysis either as a method or a phenomenon 
to be studied (Creswell et al., 2007). Harrison et al. (2017) argue that the first step in 
identifying the appropriate approach to case study analysis should be clarifying the 
researchers’ epistemological position, as well as the nature of the phenomenon and 
the research questions that the research aims to answer.  
This study takes a pragmatic constructivist view, as proposed by Merriam (2010). 
This perspective sees reality as being constructed intersubjectively, as a result of 
experiences and understandings that are social, but posits that this results in a shared 
reality that can be studied.  The pragmatic constructivist approach suggests that the 
selection of cases should reflect their potential to illustrate the phenomenon of 
interest effectively. For this study, case selection was done with a view of expanding 
our understanding of the process of institutionalising HTA, defined as embedding 
HTA in health system governance, in middle-income counties. Two country cases, 
the Philippines and Thailand, were identified on the basis that they began using HTA 
relatively early compared to other middle-income countries. This study examines the 
development of HTA in both countries over a period of approximately 20 years, 
from the early 1990s - when researchers and policy-makers first became interested in 
HTA - to 2016, the year in which the interviews were conducted. The appropriate 
duration to effectively study a policy cycle was first proposed by Sabatier (1988) as a 
time span of a decade or more, and was subsequently confirmed by empirical 
research (Weible et al., 2012).  
The comparative design allows a detailed examination of the complex drivers of 
HTA establishment and how the factors identified as relevant play out in different 
settings. Both countries are middle-income countries, as defined by the World Bank, 
that have a long history of engaging with the idea of HTA. Policy actors in Thailand 
discussed a proposal for HTA in as early as 1997, whereas in the Philippines, the 
legal mandate for HTA dates back to 1995. In addition, both countries were exposed 




However, case selection was also informed by the differences between the two 
countries. The first set of differences was about the outcomes of attempts to establish 
HTA. Thailand is widely seen as a success story for HTA in Southeast Asia and 
beyond (Culyer, Podhisita and Santatiwongchai, 2016). In contrast, as of 2016, 
efforts to establish HTA in the Philippines were perceived as not having achieved a 
comparable level of success with no HTA organisation established.  
The two countries also differ with regards their economic development, political 
systems and cultures. At the time when HTA emerged, both countries were classified 
by the World Bank in the lower middle-income group (using 1995 as a reference 
point). However, Thailand’s economic development progressed faster than the 
Philippines’. In 2016, Thailand had been re-classified as upper middle-income, 
whereas the Philippines continued to be classified as a lower middle-income country. 
In terms of political systems, Thailand is a constitutional monarchy, with a 
parliamentary system. Between 2014 and 2019, Thailand was ruled by a military-
appointed National Council for Peace and Order (NCPO) which also nominated the 
Prime Minister. The NCPO replaced the role of the Cabinet, which had previously 
been appointed by an elected Prime Minister. A National Assembly was also 
appointed by the military after the elected Parliament was dissolved in 2014. The 
Philippines, in contrast, has a presidential system of government, in which the 
President is elected every six years as the head of the executive branch, while the 
bicameral legislature - the Senate and the House of Representatives - are elected 
separately every three years.  The two countries are also different with regards to 
their cultures, as well as the manner in which they were affected by European 
colonial powers. The Philippines was a Spanish colony between the 16th to19th 
century, followed by becoming a colony of the USA, before achieving independence 
in 1946. The colonial influence can be seen in the dominance of the Catholic religion 
in the country, as well as its system of government reminiscent of the political 
system in the USA.  In contrast, Thailand was the only Southeast Asian country that 
has never been colonised by a European power and has always remained an 
independent kingdom. The Buddhist religion is an important part of Thai identity, as 




The two countries have also developed different health system structures with 
different approaches to health system governance. In Thailand, three  public health 
insurance schemes (two tax-based and one social health insurance scheme) account 
for the majority of health care expenditure in the country, with private health 
insurance and out-of-pocket expenditure contributing 4.7% and 11.6% of total health 
expenditures (2012 figures), respectively (Table 3.1) (Tangcharoensathien, 2015). In 
the Philippines, out-of-pocket spending is significantly higher (55.8% of total health 
expenditure in 2014), as is private health insurance (8.6% of total health expenditure 
in 2014). Social health insurance accounts for 14.2% of total health expenditure (in 
2104 figures), while other government spending reached 17.4% of total health 
expenditure (Dayrit et al., 2018). In Thailand, more that 80% of health facilities are 
owned by the government, of which 70% are under the administration of the 
Ministry of Public Health (MoPH) (Tangcharoensathien, 2015). By comparison, 
health facilities in the Philippines are approximately equally split between the public 
and private sector (Dayrit et al., 2018).  
Table 3.1. Key health system indicators. Source: Tangcharoensathien, 2015; Dayrit 
et al., 2018.  
 Thailand Philippines 
Government general expenditure (% out of total 
health expenditure) 
68.4 17.4 
Social Health Insurance (% out of total health 
expenditure) 
7.3 14.2 
Private insurance (% out of total heath 
expenditure) 
4.7 8.6 
Out-of-pocket payments (% out of total heath 
expenditure) 
11.6 55.8 
Other (e.g., employer benefits, development 
assistance; % out of total heath expenditure) 
8 4 
 
Governments of both countries have expressed as a policy goal achieving UHC; 




success story in moving towards UHC, having achieved near universal population 
coverage to services in 2002. Initially, the Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) was 
designed to include a co-payment of 30 Bhat, which was removed in 2006, but re-
instated on 2012. As a result, the UCS is  also known by the name of the ’30-baht 
scheme’ (Thaiprayoon and Wibulpolprasert, 2017; Tangcharoensathien et al., 2018). 
Some commentators have argued that the success of this Thai policy reform has 
contributed to the raising prominence of UHC as a policy aim and it becoming a 
global policy movement (Harris, 2015). In contrast, the Philippines have moved 
towards UHC more slowly. The country took a different approach compared to 
Thailand. Specifically, the Philippines used its social health insurance scheme, the 
National Health Insurance Program (NHIP), established in 1995, to gradually expand 
population coverage. In parallel, it gradually expanded services offered through this 
social health insurance programme (Obermann, Jowett and Kwon, 2018). By 2016, 
the Philippines government claimed that 92% of the population had access to 
publicly funded health services. However, more detailed analysis indicates that the 
level of out-of-pocket spending has continued to remain high, suggesting that the 
high population coverage masks a deficit in service coverage which may undermine 
the financial risk protection role of the NHIP (Dayrit et al., 2018). However, UHC 
has remained an important part of the policy agenda (Obermann, Jowett and Kwon, 
2018), and culminated in a UHC bill passed in 2018 and signed into law in 2019.  
This study will compare the process of HTA institutionalisation in the Philippines 
and Thailand, two middle-income countries that were early adopters of HTA in their 
region, but that contrasted with regards to their progress of establishing HTA and the 
economic, political and cultural context in which HTA became established. The 
value of comparing the two countries is twofold. First, the comparison allows for an 
analysis of the factors that have influenced the establishment of HTA that derive 
from their differences in context. Second, processes of HTA establishment were 
selected based on having led to different outcomes, as opposed to selecting cases 
where HTA was considered successfully established. The rationale for doing so was 
that this would offer a richer understanding of what are the opportunities and 




Data collection methods 
Data collection for this study was done through two methods: document review and 
key-informant interviews. Document review was used to gather background 
information on both countries’ health systems and procedural knowledge on HTA. 
Interviews were used to identify how decisions that have led to the establishment of 
HTA organisations and processes were made.  
Document review 
In this study, documents were used extensively and for a variety of purposes. These 
were:  
a) To collect background information about the health system of each country 
and the overall context in which interviewees’ accounts should be 
understood;  
b) To collect data describing the development of HTA and of the procedural 
aspects of HTA; 
c) To identify supplementary questions to be explored in interviews; 
d) To substantiate interview data. 
Documents were identified at the stage of case study selection, through 
recommendations from advisors to this study, through being mentioned in key 
reports, as well as through Google Scholar searches. Other documents were 
recommended by interviewees. Unpublished documents, such as meeting minutes, 
were provided by interviewees and consent to use these documents was obtained. 
Reports or journal articles that provided background on the health system contexts 
were identified through Google searches, as well as by searching local databases, for 
example the HSRI Knowledge Library (Thailand) or Philippine Institute for 





A variety of types of documents were identified and used to guide data collection 
and analysis. These included: 
- Journal articles; 
- Books;  
- Research reports (e.g., published by independent organisations); 
- PhD dissertations and master theses; 
- Project reports (e.g., of research projects that were relevant for HTA 
development);  
- Annual reports of key government organisations (e.g. payers); 
- Administrative documents (e.g. administrative orders, meeting minutes, 
memoranda); 
- Government websites/databases (e.g. FDA registration information); 
- Legislation (passed or drafted). 
A list of the documents that were used in data analysis is provided in Appendix 1.  
For Thailand, documents identified were limited to those published in English. The 
language barrier was offset by the fact that there was extensive literature published 
in English, both about the overall health system context and about the development 
of HTA. These research articles and reports were used in lieu of official documents 
published in Thai, which were not accessible to the researcher. In the Philippines, all 
policy documents were available in English. As HTA in the Philippines has not yet 
been studied as frequently as in Thailand, there were fewer research articles 
available about the development of HTA in the Philippines.  
Documents were scanned and those considered highly relevant were read in their 
totality. Those considered less or only partially relevant (e.g., legislation, wide 
ranging reports, PhD theses on broader health system topics) were searched for 
relevant passages using keyword searches. The authorship of the documents was 
noted, including individual authors and organisations, in order to understand the 
origins of the document and the context of its production.  For example, policy 
documents were treated as a primary source of data that could be analysed in similar 




about the establishment of HTA were more directive, and their analytical findings 
were considered in the context of alternative explanations emerging from this study. 
Document were analysed in four steps. First, documents were used to compile an 
initial overview of the case study countries, particularly with regard to the 
description of the development of HTA, and how this was linked to other major 
policy developments, to provide background knowledge (e.g. step-wise descriptions 
of HTA processes in Thailand). This first overview informed the development of the 
topic guide for interviews and the conceptual framework.  
Second, documents provided background information about individual interviewees, 
such as information about the research interests and expertise of researchers involved 
in HTA. Further, documents helped identify supplemental questions for specific 
interviewees. In addition, information from documents was used to allow the 
interviewer to focus on specific questions during interviews, instead of asking for 
information that could have been obtained elsewhere.  
Third, information that explained specific points about why and how HTA was 
established was analysed alongside the interview data. Specifically, relevant 
passages in documents were coded and then assigned to the analytical themes used 
for the analysis of the interviews. However, most information collected from 
documents was descriptive and had to be supplemented by interview data as the 
information was not specific enough.  
In a fourth step, documents were used to verify and contextualise interview data. 
Some specific information, such as dates, was checked in documents to minimise the 
risk of recall bias in interviews. In addition, documents were a rich source of 
information about specific episodes of policy-making that interviewees mentioned as 
relevant. A number of debates on specific pieces of legislation and important 
episodes in which coverage decisions were contested, had already been examined in 






The second method of data collection consisted of  used semi-structured interviews 
with policy actors involved in the process of establishing HTA in both countries. 
Interviews were used because of their usefulness in drawing out ‘detail, depth and an 
insider’s perspective’ (Leech, 2002, p. 665), while also allowing for some degree of 
control and replicability of data collection, which is particularly useful in this type of 
comparative research.  
HTA as a tool to inform coverage decisions typically involves actors in senior policy 
decisions, including at the highest level of government. This is mirrored by the 
seniority of business, academic and professional actors and representatives of civil 
society movements who have an interest in how health coverage decisions are made. 
Interviews for this study can therefore be regarded as ‘elite’ interviews, as most 
interviewees were in positions of seniority and elevated social status (Harvey, 2010).  
The interviewees were identified based on their involvement in, and knowledge of, 
the development of HTA in Thailand and the Philippines. As the literature indicated, 
the main actor categories are broad and include policy-makers (such as politicians 
and civil servants), researchers (including in government or academia), physician 
professional groups, and civil society groups such as patient advocacy groups. A 
final relevant actor category included representatives of international organisations 
active in global health which had an influence on policy-making in each country, 
although this only relates to the Philippines. No representative of an international 
organisation was interviewed in Thailand, as international organisations were not 
seen as relevant at the time of the interviews. International organisations and experts 
had been relevant in earlier initiatives, but these actors were difficult to access at the 
time when the interviews for this study were conducted. Nonetheless, the most 
relevant actors for the establishment of HTA in Thailand were national actors. The 
number of actors interviewed in each category is listed in table 3.2.  
Influenced by these considerations and the conceptual framework for this study, 




about the decisions that led to HTA becoming embedded in both countries. 
Interviewees were selected based on two criteria: a) the overall categories or relevant 
actors, and b) participation in different stages of HTA establishment. However, the 
interviewees’ position was also assessed to understand their likely status and 
normative power, which went beyond the power stemming from their knowledge and 
capacity to explain phenomena (Littig, 2009).  
Table 3.2. Distribution of interviewees per actor category.  
Actor category Thailand Philippines Total 
Policy-makers 5 4 9 
Civil service 6 5 10 
Academia 6 5 11 
Pharmaceutical industry 3 3  6 
Physicians 1 2 3 
Civil society 2 2 4 
International  0 1 1 
Total 23  22 55 
 
In both countries, there was a preponderance of policy-makers such as members of 
the civil service, which was due to the fact that these were the players that were most 
directly involved in advocating for and establishing HTA. However, a diversity of 
perspectives was sought, encompassing both proponents and opponents of HTA. 
During this process, conflicting perspectives were identified based on the likely 
interests of different categories of actors. For example, in Thailand, opposition to the 
universal coverage reforms from policy-makers or civil servants was often, although 
not always, a good indicator of opposition to HTA.   
The interviewer’s access to key actors in both countries was facilitated by the fact 
that one of the advisors for this research project was the director of the former 
international branch of NICE, the most prominent HTA agency in the UK. NICE 
International had existing collaborations with key actors involved in establishing 




organisation offered technical advice to low- and middle-income countries 
attempting to establish HTA. Some of the same activities are now carried out 
independently from NICE, through the International Decisions Support Initiative 
(iDSI). These links allowed for a preliminary identification of two to three 
interviewees in each country and provided the interviewer with a point of contact 
during fieldwork. The interviewer spent three months in each country, February-
April 2016 in Thailand, and April-July 2016 in the Philippines. During the time 
spent in Thailand, the researcher was hosted by HITAP, the Thai HTA organisation. 
This was helpful as it enabled informal conversations, and provided an opportunity 
to observe meetings and the day-to-day operation of the organisation. However, the 
interviewer was independent during this time and advice on interviewees was 
gratefully received and used, but it did not determine who was contacted for an 
interview or why. In contrast, while key contacts were available in the Philippines, 
the interviewer had no permanent base during the time spent in the country. 
As indicated, access to interviewees was enabled by existing contacts, in the first 
instance. This initial introduction to potential interviewees was subsequently 
expanded both in terms of actor category covered and the perspectives on HTA that 
interviewees were able to contribute. Each interviewee was asked at the end of the 
interview to recommend other individuals for interview, which had a snowballing 
effect on identifying and recruiting additional interviewees.   
Most interviewees were contacted via email, which included an information sheet 
and a consent form (see details on obtaining informed consent in the section on 
ethical considerations). In some cases, the interviewees were approached via 
personal introductions by contacts in the country. Some interviewees asked to see the 
list of questions before agreeing to the interviews, in particular pharmaceutical 
industry representatives, who in some cases reviewed the questions with help with 
their legal departments. Three interviewees declined to be interviewed in Thailand, 
and one in the Philippines. They were representatives of groups who likely had their 
interests affected by the use of HTA to inform coverage decisions. In Thailand, 
convincing physicians to participate in an interview proved to be difficult, and only 




of a pharmaceutical company refused to be interviewed. However, it was possible to 
carry out three interviews with industry representatives in each country.  
In total, 55 interviews were conducted, of which 22 were carried out in the 
Philippines, and 23 in Thailand. Interviews lasted between 35 and 140 minutes, with 
75 minutes being the average duration.  This resulted in 56 hours of interviews in 
total, which were professionally transcribed.  
 
Conducting interviews 
A topic guide was developed based on the literature reviewed for this study and the 
conceptual perspectives chosen for analysis, focusing on ideas, interests and 
institutions. The topic guide is presented in Appendix 2. A flexible approach was 
taken, whereby the topic guide was adapted for each interviewee. Further, the 
interviewer used the topic guide as a structuring tool rather than a blueprint. This 
enabled the interviewer freedom in the progression of the interview, with the goal 
being to examine the roles, interests and subjective perceptions of the process of 
HTA establishment rather than impose certain assumptions of what happened.  
Interviewing elites raises a series of methodological issues, which include difficulty 
in access to relevant actors, as well as power and knowledge imbalance between the 
interviewer and interviewees (Harvey, 2011; Mikecz, 2012). Some social scientists 
have challenged the term ‘elite’ and its implication of higher status, as well as the 
definition of what separates elites from non-elites (Cochrane, 1998; Desmond, 2004; 
Smith, 2006). For example, Smith (2006) argues that the difficulty of access to 
information gathered in interviews with members of an ‘elite’ is not confined to 
powerful or high-status groups, but can also be associated with individuals that 
belong to marginalised groups. In addition, the terms ‘elites’ and ‘experts’ are 
sometimes used interchangeably, although this may differ in different research 




elites and whether they are defined with regards to their status, their position (in the 
organisation they represent) or the knowledge they possess.   
Pre-interview preparation involved considering the interviewee’s knowledge of the 
process or their position and adjusting the topic guide accordingly. To adjust the 
topic guide, the involvement of each interviewee in the process of establishing HTA 
was assessed before making contact, based on documents, reading papers by or about 
the interviewee or existing professional histories or accounts from other 
interviewees, if they were recommended. The professional role of the interviewees at 
the time of data collection was relevant, but its informative value was not without 
limits because interviewees’ positions changed over time, with some actors moving 
to new professional roles, including those that this study would classify as a different 
‘actor category’ (e.g. an industry representative taking on a job as a government 
official). Knowing about these changes informed the assessment of the interviewee’s 
status and degree of influence over the development of HTA, and the position they 
took with regards to HTA. For example, the move of an industry official to a 
government position was kept in mind as a potential case of conflicts of interest. 
During the interview, the researcher sought clarification on statements that seemed 
unclear or that contradicted information collected earlier. Contradictions in 
interviewee accounts were explored in subsequent interviews and informed the 
ongoing development of topic guides. As mentioned earlier, questions were adjusted 
to each interviewee to maximise the information that she or he would be able to 
contribute, given their different experiences of the process of HTA becoming 
established. For example, interviews with less senior civil servants were particularly 
helpful in questioning an already established narrative, which younger civil servants 
tended to do.  
Researcher positionality in elite interviews is important, as it speaks to the 
relationship between interviewer and interviewee (Mikecz, 2012). The interviews for 
this study confirmed that this positionality is not fixed, which has been identified as 
a common characteristic in elite interviews. With the researcher being a student, 




coming from a reputable organisation such as London School of Hygiene and 
Tropical Medicine (LSHTM), and the association with NICE International, enhanced 
the status of the researcher.  
It is also likely that most interviewees perceived the interviewer as an outsider. On 
the one hand, this outsider perspective was advantageous, as it allowed the 
researcher to conduct interviews in a manner that was not influenced by existing 
preconceptions. On the other hand, it is also likely that the researcher has a more 
limited understanding of context; however, meticulous preparation was aimed to 
mitigate this shortcoming.  
All interviews were conducted in English. In the Philippines, English is an official 
language of the government. In Thailand, most interviewees were experienced in 
communicating in English due to their professional requirements. The fact that the 
interviewer was able to have exposure to the Thai language as well as English 
spoken by Thai speakers helped with any difficulties in understanding, including 
differences in pronunciation. One interviewee asked to have a Thai speaker present 
although they were able to communicate in English.  
There was also an element of cultural learning involved in conducting the interviews. 
In Thailand, the interviewer had to appreciate some cultural norms such as respect 
for seniority and the reluctance of interviewees to refuse to meet. The latter required 
some adjustment, in particularly with interviewees who agreed to be interviewed but 
were slow in scheduling an appointment. Belatedly, it became clear that some 
interviewees were unwilling to be interviewed but did not want to decline the 
invitation outright. It was more difficult to schedule interviews in Thailand than in 
the Philippines; however, in the end, a sufficient number of relevant individuals were 
interviewed in both countries. 
Data analysis  
The data collected for this study was analysed thematically, which is a method for 




Clarke, 2008, p. 79). These patterns of meaning were identified as part of an iterative 
process that started during data collection, when some emerging themes were 
pursued either by investigating them in documents or during interviews. Similarly, 
data analysis and writing were also not strictly separated, rather there was an 
alternation between analysis and writing. Existing guidance, particularly Braun and 
Clarke’s (2008) step-wise conceptualisation of thematic analysis and more general 
overviews of the qualitative data analysis process (Ritchie, Spencer and O’Connor, 
2014a; Spencer, Ritchie and O’Connor, 2014b), informed the steps of the analysis, 
but did not provide a strict pathway for the analysis.  
Interviews were read for familiarisation with the data and re-read for deeper analysis 
and coding. Because the interviewees in Thailand were not native speakers of 
English, the transcriptions had to be checked with the audio recordings. An 
analytical framework was developed based on this initial reading of the data, as well 
as being informed by the conceptual framework for this study. This analytical 
framework was developed via a hybrid, instead of a purely deductive/inductive, 
approach. Specifically, the conceptual framework and the research questions 
determined the broad categories of the analytical framework (e.g., emergence of 
HTA as a policy idea; establishing organisations; developing HTA processes). 
However, emerging themes were also refined during the reading of the data, instead 
of being purely determined by the conceptual framework. 
Data management involved the use of NVIVO version 10, a computer-assisted 
qualitative data analysis software, which was used because of the large quantity of 
interview data. Because of the complexity of the data, coding was carried out at two 
levels of abstraction. This approach is in line with the separation between indexing 
(and sorting) and categorisation (or coding) proposed by Spencer et al. (2014), 
whereby indexing refers to signalling where to find specific ‘topics’, and 
categorising refers to assigning labels to signal the range of what was said in relation 
to a particular ‘topic’. The first level of abstraction consisted of sorting data based on 




As a second step of categorisation, all text coded under one topic was reviewed and 
categorised in themes and sub-themes. The topics for which this level of 
categorisation was done were selected based on relevance to the research aims and 
specific objectives. This step involved the analysis moving from description to 
interpretation, as it also included identification of overarching themes. The 
interpretative work also included a re-reading of the interviews to check 
understanding and interpretations with alternative explanations, including by 
returning to documents.  If there were discrepancies, more documentary data or 
clarifications from interviewees were sought.  
This analysis was done by splitting data in two datasets covering the Thailand and 
Philippines cases, respectively. The identification of themes and sub-themes were 
done for each country separately, followed by an analysis of each theme in 
comparison. During the earlier stages of analysis, written accounts of the two 
country case studies were produced, which examined how each theme contributed to 
HTA institutionalisation in each country. However, it was found that writing 
comparative sections on specific elements of the process of institutionalisation, 
informed by the research objectives, was more amenable to comparing the themes 
that were produced for each of the two cases.  
Ethical considerations 
Ethical approval was granted by the LSHTM Research Ethics Committee (reference 
number 10472, 21 December 2015), the Institute for the Development of Human 
Research Protections (IHRP) in Thailand (granted February 23, 2016), and the 
Research Institute for Health Sciences Ethics Review Committee in the Philippines 
(reference number 273/E/O/16/15).   
The most important ethical concern with regards to this study was to ensure 
anonymity and confidentiality of interviewees. Before each interview, interviewees 
were sent a consent form that allowed them to choose the level of anonymity with 
which they were comfortable (see Appendix 3). The existing choices ranged from 




verbatim quotes, to allowing the researcher to fully disclose the identity of the 
interviewees. Additional information and an opportunity for discussion was provided 
before the start of the interviews. Some interviewees asked to sign at the end or 
decided to return the consent form after further consideration. They were also 
reminded that they were free to indicate if they did not wish for any specific 
information to be quoted. 
Among the 55 interviewees, there was a variety in choices with regards to the level 
of anonymity they preferred. In general, senior officials were more likely to indicate 
that they could be identified by name. Interviewees who were less senior were more 
likely to prefer higher levels of anonymity. Because of the variation of choices and 
acknowledging the difficulty of maintaining anonymity of interviewees, a choice 
was made to anonymise quotes by using a country identifier, the number of the 
interview and the actor category (e.g., I3TH_civil service). These identifiers are used 
in this thesis when quotes are reproduced verbatim. 
Maintaining anonymity of other interviewees was found to be difficult during the 
interviews themselves.  Interviewees often asked about those who had already been 
interviewed. In those cases, only those interviewees who had agreed to be named 






4. Description of cases 
This chapter presents an overview of the decades-long processes of HTA 
establishment in Thailand and the Philippines. It indicates the main policy 
developments to which HTA was linked, as well as the key organisations and 
processes that were established over the period under consideration. Their 
development will be analysed in detail in subsequent chapters.  
Thailand 
HTA rose to prominence in the context of two major policy developments that 
punctuated a long-term movement for health system reform. The first was the 
introduction of the Social Security Scheme in 1990, and the second was the 
establishment of a Universal Coverage Scheme (UCS) in 2001. Both reforms 
resulted in a new configuration of health system governance, which included new 
arrangements on how funds were allocated, what services were included in the 
benefits package and how these services were provided and regulated. These new 
governance arrangements also played a key role in how HTA developed.   
The emergence of HTA as a policy idea among Thai health policy-makers can be 
traced back to at least 1987. Previous studies of the historical evolution of HTA in 
Thailand outline a complex, incremental process (Tantivess, Teerawattananon and 
Mills, 2009; Teerawattananon et al., 2009; Culyer, Podhisita and Santatiwongchai, 
2016). A brief account of the development of HTA in Thailand is presented below, 
which draws on these studies and the interviews conducted for this thesis.  
The establishment of HTA in Thailand can be described in three main stages. The 
first stage involved a number of small research projects that either referred 
specifically to HTA or generated evidence that can be used for HTA, such as 
economic evaluation and epidemiological research on priority conditions. This 
preparatory stage is characterised by research projects that were jointly coordinated 
and funded by Thai government organisations and international funding agencies.  




(I1TH_civil service), was the Technological Assessment and Social Security in 
Thailand (TASSIT) project. TASSIT was established in 1993 as a collaboration 
between Karolinska Institutet, Sweden, and a Thai independent public organisation, 
the Health System Research Institute (HSRI)4. It was co-financed by the HSRI and 
the Swedish International Development Agency and was discontinued in 1999. The 
programme was aimed at generating evidence to inform the management of the 
newly established Social Security Scheme, a social health insurance programme for 
employees in the private sector. It included a series of related projects, such as a 
proposal for a national HTA mechanism, technical assistance for cost analyses in 
hospital management, a health financing and equity study, and an international 
training programme for Thai researchers (Tomson and Sundbom, 1999b).  
This first stage of establishment also included research programmes that generated 
evidence associated with HTA without advocating specifically for HTA 
establishment. In 2000, the first Thai burden of disease estimates were produced 
under the coordination of the Thai Working Group on Burden of Disease. This 
working group was co-financed by the WHO Country Office and the Australian 
Agency for International Development and received technical support from 
academic bodies in Australia.  In Thailand, it was housed by the International Health 
Policy Programme (IHPP), a research office of the Thai Ministry of Public Health 
(MoPH) (Bundhamcharoen et al., 2016). As a result of the success of the first study, 
the Wellcome Trust in the UK and the University of Queensland in Australia co-
financed a research programme on Setting Priorities Using Information on Cost-
Effectiveness (SPICE), established in 2004.  This research programme contributed to 
the second Thai Burden of Disease study. It also carried out a series of economic 
evaluations and epidemiological research on disease priorities and associated 
interventions in Thailand (e.g. anti-retroviral treatment, rotavirus vaccinations, 
mental health interventions, cardiovascular disease and diabetes, road traffic injuries 
prevention).   
 





A second stage in the development of HTA was characterised by the creation of 
research bodies within the structures of the MoPH, with no identifiable international 
involvement in terms of funding or initiative. In 2002, a Health Technology 
Assessment Unit was established in the Department of Medical Services (DMS) in 
the MoPH. Its activities were focused on standards of care and quality improvement 
in the country’s top hospitals. In 2007, the unit was strengthened, and became the 
Institute of Medical Research and Technology Assessment (IMRTA). The IMRTA 
specialised in the development of clinical practice guidelines, including by using 
elements of economic evaluation. Also in 2007, the Health Intervention and 
Technology Assessment Programme (HITAP) was established as a 3-year research 
programme funded by the Thai Health Promotion Foundation5 (ThaiHealth). Over 
time, HITAP developed into a de-facto HTA agency in Thailand. However, there 
have been few direct links or cooperation between IMRTA and HITAP, despite the 
fact that both bodies are mandated to carry out HTA – albeit with different focuses.  
A third stage of HTA establishment included the development of two distinct 
decision-making processes for HTA. These two processes support a) coverage and 
pricing decisions for essential medicines, and b) new inclusions to the benefits 
package for the largest public insurance scheme in Thailand, the UCS  HITAP 
played a major role in the development of these two processes. In 2008, it published 
the first Thai economic evaluation guidelines, which were endorsed by the 
committee in charge of the development of the country’s National Essential 
Medicines List (NLEM) (Wibulpolprasert and Subcommittee for Development of the 
National List of Essential Drugs, 2008). In 2009, a similar endorsement was given 
by the Subcommittee for the Development of the Benefits Package and Service 
Delivery (SDBP) under the Universal Coverage Scheme. Since then, HITAP has 
provided the secretariat for these two HTA processes and has been involved in 
subsequent changes to their procedures. For example, a second edition of the Thai 
economic evaluation guidelines was published in 2013, for which HITAP carried out 
work on estimating willingness-to-pay (i.e. cost-effectiveness) thresholds for 
 
5 Also known as Thai Health, the Foundation was created in 2001 and was charged with allocating 




publicly funded services and the development of methodological approaches for 
economic evaluation of health promotion interventions in Thailand. Such 
developments were ongoing in 2016, when the interviews for this study were 
conducted. 
The Philippines 
There are comparatively fewer existing accounts of the development of HTA in the 
Philippines. A notable exception is the work of De Rosas-Valera (2009), which 
informs the brief description below, alongside the interviews for this study. 
As in Thailand, the emergence of HTA was part of health system reforms which 
significantly re-organised the governance of the Philippines health system. The 
National Health Insurance Act of 1995, and its revisions in 2004 and 2013, directly 
contributed to the establishment of HTA as part of system governance, as did a UHC 
Act promulgated in 2019.  The 1995 Act mandated the establishment of the NHIP, a 
social health insurance scheme that was envisioned to gradually expand towards 
reaching universal health coverage. The UHC Act of 2019 built on this goal and 
directly mandated the creation of a HTA Council that would guide coverage 
decisions for the NHIP, as well as the Department of Health (DoH). 
As was the case in Thailand, before the concept of HTA emerged, a number of 
international organisations promoted the use of economic evaluation in informing 
decisions on specific health programmes and evaluating their performance. For 
example, the WHO Special Programme for Research and Training in Tropical 
Diseases (WHO/TDR), in collaboration with the World Bank and the United States 
Agency for International Development (USAID), supported the use of health 
economics in studies on disease control, particularly on malaria (Herrin and 
Rosenfield, 1988). Other WHO units and programmes supported the same tools of 
economic evaluation for the prioritisation of investment in key development areas, 
such as nutrition (Popkin et al., 1980; Fowler, 1982). In addition, the World Bank 
and USAID supported the wider development of health economics, but with a focus 
on health financing and demand-side economics research. For example, the USAID 




Development Project, which informed the design of the 1995 Act that established the 
NHIP.   
The beginnings of HTA in the Philippines date back to the 1990s and, similar to 
Thailand, can be analysed in three stages. However, in contrast to Thailand, the 
earliest stages of HTA development already included establishing HTA processes at 
national government level.  
The first stage linked HTA establishment with the National Health Insurance Act 
passed by Congress in 1995. The Act set out the details of the NHIP, with the goal of 
gradually increasing coverage to ‘constitute one universal health insurance program 
for the entire population’ (National Health Insurance Act of 1995 - Republic Act No. 
7875). This act stated that ‘health care providers shall take part in programs of 
quality assurance, utilization review, and technology assessment’, thus announcing 
the government’s intention to establish HTA (National Health Insurance Act of 1995 
- Republic Act No. 7875). The provision to develop HTA was put into practice in 
1999 when a HTA Committee was created within the Philippines Health Insurance 
Corporation (PhilHealth), a government corporation created to implement and 
govern the NHIP. This HTA committee was in place from 1999 until it was 
disbanded in 2009 following Presidential elections and a change of administration, 
which also replaced the leadership of PhilHealth. 
A second stage of HTA development includes establishing a HTA process under the 
DoH that focused on new medicines included in the country’s essential medicines 
list, the Philippine National Drug Formulary (PNDF). Again, this process was 
established alongside landmark legislation that was wider than HTA. Specifically, in 
2008, the Philippines Congress passed the Cheaper Medicines Act, which 
empowered the government to regulate the price of medicines. In 2010, the Secretary 
of Health established a new advisory body to the DoH, the National Center for 
Pharmaceutical Access and Management (NCPAM), mandated with the 
implementation of the Cheaper Medicines Act. NCPAM’s tasks included 
coordinating the PNDF and the inclusion of new medicines in this list.  In this role, 




included cost-effectiveness, as well associated procedures for the generation and 
appraisal of this evidence.  
A third stage of establishing HTA was marked by parallel efforts to develop HTA 
processes at the DoH and PhilHealth. At the DoH, these efforts consisted in changes 
to the existing process to include new medicines into the PNDF, including  by 
commissioning a methodological manual for economic evaluation and repeated 
process revisions (e.g., changes to submission timelines, clearer prioritisation and 
decision-making criteria). At PhilHealth, the interest in HTA focused on applying its 
principles to the development of condition-specific health benefits packages.  In 
2016, a Subcommittee for Benefits Package Development endorsed a plan for 
developing a guaranteed benefits package of publicly funded health services for 
PhilHealth. This plan included epidemiological analyses to map the burden of 
diseases in the Philippines and cost-effectiveness studies to identify the interventions 
that offered the most value for money for priority conditions. These parallel efforts 
were linked to efforts to ensure UHC. In October 2018, the Philippine Congress 
passed UHC Bill that mandated the establishment of a HTA Council to make 
coverage decisions for medicines and health services. The Philippine President 
signed into law the ensuing UHC Act in 2019.  
Structure of analysis 
The outline of HTA development in the two countries identifies the main types of 
initiatives related to HTA. However, these descriptive overviews do not reveal the 
reasons for establishing HTA or how decisions were made in favour or against 
options to build the organisational structures coordinating HTA or the processes of 
HTA.  Similarly, the outline of the initiatives related to HTA do not provide insights 
about the actors involved in initiating and sustaining the process of HTA 
institutionalisation. The next chapter explores, comparatively, the role of the actors 
involved in establishing HTA and their interests, as well as the ideas that formed and 
transformed during this process. Chapter 6 will analyse the establishment of HTA 
organisations, while process development will be explored in chapter 7. Finally, 




5. Emergence of HTA in Thailand and the 
Philippines 
The process of establishing HTA in Thailand and the Philippines spanned over 
twenty years and involved multiple setbacks and advances. It also included an 
evolutionary process of what was understood to be HTA. This chapter will present 
an overview of this evolutionary process, by following the policy problems for 
which HTA was presented as a solution. Following the ideas, or what gets 
institutionalised, enables a look at what elements get transferred from other settings, 
how ideas are influenced by country institutions, as well as what actors are relevant 
for the emergence of HTA on the policy agenda. 
This chapter is structured in three parts: the first two parts present the country 
analyses of the evolution of the policy problems to which HTA was aimed to 
respond in Thailand and the Philippines. The third part includes a comparison of 
these analysis between the two countries. Subsequent chapters will examine the 
design of HTA. Specifically, chapter 6 focuses on establishing organisations 
mandated with conducting HTA; chapter 7 analyses the process of conducting HTA. 
Chapter 8 will identify ongoing challenges to institutionalisation.  
The development of HTA as a policy idea in Thailand 
Interviewees placed the emergence of HTA as a policy solution in the context of 
wider efforts to strengthen the country’s health research system and the use of 
evidence in health policy-making, dating back to the 1980s. While efforts to 
strengthen the use of evidence in policy-making provided a context and some of the 
paths through which HTA emerged, interviewees also highlighted specific policy 
problems that HTA responded to: high cost technology; medicines reimbursement;  
and coverage decisions on all services, in the context of pressure on the UHC 




Interviewees also identified the key actors that pursued these efforts as a network of 
academics and civil servants, known as the Rural Doctors’ Society (RDS). The RDS 
collaborated with national and international actors and were effective in accessing 
national and international funding to support their priorities. The members of the 
initial RDS, founded in the 1978, were medical doctors educated in the country’s top 
medical universities who chose to practice in remote rural areas of Thailand instead 
of pursuing careers in urban medical centres. Many of them were involved in student 
political activism in the 1970s and founded a first version of the RDS named the 
Rural Doctor’s Federation in 1976. This network took shape around the recognition 
of the problem of inequitable access to health service in Thailand, with urban centres 
being favoured to the detriment of rural facilities. The latter served a much larger 
and more vulnerable population. In time, many of these doctors, who were employed 
in government hospitals and therefore were part of the civil service took up positions 
within the bureaucracy of the MoPH.   
Key-informants described the members of this network as ‘reformists’, ‘technocrats’ 
or ‘technocrats-activists’, being ‘outside the MoPH and still inside it’, and ‘wearing 
many hats’ as both members of the bureaucracy and of civil society (I1TH_civil 
service, I3TH_civil service, I4TH_academia). Other scholars of health reform in 
Thailand described them as ‘reformist bureaucrats’ (Harris, 2015) or ‘health 
reformists’ (Pitayarangsarit, 2004; Naidoo, Nhavoto and Reddi, 2005). As a policy 
network, the Rural Doctor’s Society is small in comparison to the bureaucratic 
apparatus of the MoPH. However, it can be treated as a category of actors with 
considerable influence and power. In fact, some accounts of the Thai health system 
reform effort separate the entire MoPH bureaucracy in two categories: the 
‘reformists’ and the ‘conservatives’ (Health Insurance System Research Office, 
2012).  
The emergence of HTA was also initially associated with international actors 
supporting evidence generation that is useful in HTA processes. Multilateral 
organisations active in global health, particularly the WHO and the World Bank, 
supported the generation of evidence and some supported the development of in-




that would become relevant for HTA, namely clinical epidemiology and health 
economics. For example, organisations such as WHO and World Bank played an 
important role in producing economic evaluations to make the case for more 
investment in disease control or to evaluate the implementation of internationally 
funded programmes (Mills, 2014). As a case in point, the first economic evaluation 
study in Thailand was carried out with support from the WHO/TDR programme and 
aimed to ‘apply economic concepts and tools to the monitoring and evaluation’ of 
malaria control programmes in Thailand (Kaewsonthi et al., 1983: v). Continuing 
support from the WHO/TDR programme led to the establishment of a Centre for 
Health Economics at the Faculty of Economics of the Chulalongkorn University in 
1990. In addition, WHO/TDR financed 50 scholarships for researchers in tropical 
disease control at Mahidol University and Chulalongkorn University. In parallel, the 
Rockefeller Foundation supported the development of clinical epidemiology groups 
that they envisioned would create a bridge between clinical medicine and public 
health as part of an International Clinical Epidemiology Network (INCLEN) 
initiative. Another USA-based foundation, the Pew Charitable Trust, made 
investments a programme named the International Health Policy Program. Both 
INCLEN and the International Health Policy Program were initiatives that worked 
by building in-country research teams that carried out studies on high priority health 
issues and that could respond to policy needs.  
The RDS preferred a more country-driven approach to prioritising evidence 
generation. In the late 1980s, some RDS members were involved in discussions with 
the WHO Country Office and the Rockefeller Foundation – the more influential 
international actors - about associating funding for research from these organisations 
with a prioritisation of policy problems. The rationale for these discussions was to 
ensure that the country budget of these organisations funded research on Thai 
priorities and was informed by the country context, as opposed to being informed by 
international priorities. Some national actors who believed that the WHO country 
budget did not correspond to in-country priorities proposed to develop, in 
collaboration with the WHO Country Office, a better aligned funding structure. 
Plans included the establishment of teams of civil servants and university researchers 




‘significant control over how the WHO country budget was allocated’ (Sitthi-Amorn 
et al., 1997: 12). Although this effort was short-lived, the WHO Country Office 
provided funding for a Thai Health Assembly, organised in 1987 and modelled after 
the World Health Assembly. Part of these funds were used to commission reviews 
on a series of priority policy problems and associated policy solutions, one of which 
was HTA. Furthermore, the idea of a Thai Health Assembly will continue to be 
supported by RDS members and will inform the establishment of a public 
organisation named the National Health Commission Office, in 2008. Despite being 
short-lived, these initiatives show the capacity of policy actors, including the RDS, 
to establish links with international organisations in order to achieve their goals. In 
the case of the RDS, these goals included local generation of evidence relevant for 
health policy-making.  
The interest in evidence use in policy by the RDS was also manifested in a desire to 
establish national funding for health research. They expressed this preference in 
discussions with the Rockefeller Foundation about the establishment of a ‘country 
advisory board which creates conditions for undertaking high priority public health 
research’ (Sitthi-Amorn, Chunharas, & Chooprapawan, 1997: 14). The resulting 
National Epidemiology Board of Thailand (NEBT) was established as part of the 
MoPH but received its funding from the Rockefeller Foundation. In line with the 
desire to prioritise the most pressing research needs, one of the first activities of the 
NEBT was to conduct a prioritisation of health problems in Thailand, with the aim of 
commissioning research on these priorities and subsequently enabling the 
implementation of the resulting recommendations. This was an early lesson for Thai 
civil servants who supported evidence-informed policy-making about the difficulties 
of such a process, as well as of the key role of policy researchers in linking evidence 
and policy-makers.  
During the time of the National Epidemiology Board of Thailand, we used to 
try to interview policy-makers - like civil servants, the Permanent Secretary - 
for priority health research, but no one had the wisdom to tell you what 
should be priority health research. So, we learned that research prioritisation 
through asking the policy-makers doesn’t work. That’s why we need another 
group of people we call policy advocates, or policy elites, who understand the 
technical part of the evidence, at the same time they understand the political 




that these policy advocates or these policy elites do not do research. They 
themselves are sometimes involved in doing research, but research is not 
their main interest. They are not pure researchers. (I10TH_civil service) 
However, the NEBT was also short-lived and was terminated in 1990 by an 
incoming Minister of Health, following a political crisis that led to a change in 
government.  
Then later on, this NEBT was abolished due to a political conflict. There was 
a political conflict back in early 1990. Some people, young people [in the] 
NEBT used the facilities to support this political movement. Then, a new 
minister [...] came in and he felt that this is ... He didn’t like it, so he abolished 
the NEBT, and that was one of the pushes for the seniors to establish two things 
at the same time, in parallel. One is an non-governmental organisation called 
the National Health Foundation, and the other is an independent public agency, 
which is the Health System Research Institute. (I10_civil service) 
The RDS was effective in mobilising national funds as well, particularly as some of 
its members had links with or became senior MoPH officials. These connections 
between key RDS members and senior health officials led to the establishment of the 
HSRI in 1990. The HSRI was endowed with core national funding for health 
research and took over some of the initiatives of the NEBT, whereas the Rockefeller 
Foundation re-directed some of the funds of the NEBT to the National Health 
Foundation, a new non-governmental organisation established by members of the 
RDS, still functioning in 2016. These early examples of civil servants attempting to 
establish research bodies within the bureaucracy will be mirrored at the 
establishment of HITAP (2007).   
The HSRI took over efforts to increase the capacity to produce policy-relevant health 
research, including by strengthening the country’s health information system as well 
as providing in-country support for health policy and system research. One of the 
HSRI’s first projects was another attempt at informing policy priorities based on 
burden of disease. 
At that time, I think they used only YLL [years of life lost] or something, not 
DALY or anything, at that time. There was a report coming out, maybe in 
1994, if my memory is correct, […], about the prioritisation of health 





The HSRI became an important actor that invested in research ‘capacity’, a role 
which heretofore had been occupied mostly by international organisations. 
Interviewees suggested that a key aspect of this support from HRSI a scholarship 
programme co-financed by HSRI, other Thai government agencies and the WHO 
Country Office, with specific focus on health systems and policy research (e.g., 
health financing, health economics). The award recipients were often civil servants 
and were required to return and work within Thai the civil service or academia. The 
two future founding leaders of HITAP benefitted from this programme, having 
completed their PhDs at the LSHTM and the University of East Anglia.  
These efforts towards strengthening the country’s research system provided the 
background for the establishment of HTA. These early initiatives are important 
because many of the actors presented here became HTA advocates and are part of 
efforts to establish HTA.  
The transfer of HTA as a policy solution with broad potential applications  
The HSRI leadership strongly supported the idea of HTA and used its role as a 
research funder to finance HTA-related projects, showing support for HTA as a 
policy solution with broad potential applications. Between 1992 and 1999, the 
HSRI’s support for HTA included both national and regional or international 
activities. First, the HSRI participated in an internationally-funded project, TASSIT, 
which ran from 1993 to 2002. TASSIT was initially a Swedish initiative aimed at 
generating evidence on health financing and care provision for the Social Security 
Scheme, but also had a specific focus on HTA. Second, in the mid-1990s, the HSRI 
organised and/or participated in a series of workshops and regional meetings on 
HTA, with the aim to promote the idea of HTA among policy-makers in Thailand, 
and to establish a regional network for HTA in South-East Asia. Third, the HSRI 
established a technical committee and associated research and development 
programme on HTA in Thailand. Between 1997 and 2002, this committee 





The four priorities of the HTA committee (i.e., the characteristics of the policy 
solution) were:   
(1) Establishing an information centre and international linkages on HTA;  
(2) Assessment of priorities (i.e., both prioritisation of technologies and 
assessment of individual technologies identified as priority), establishment of 
a mechanism for hospital accreditation, and a national mechanism for HTA;  
(3) Develop evidence-based medicine and clinical practice guidelines (seen as a 
separate activity that should be carried out by actors who were interested in 
clinical decision-making, e.g., Royal College of Physicians);  
(4) The rational use of medicines, specifically the generation of pharmaco-
economics evidence (Tomson and Sundbom, 1999b).   
Some of these would not typically be associated with HTA directly, but they were 
likely influenced by HSRI priorities. For example, the hospital accreditation 
mechanism was born out of a project on quality improvement that HSRI established. 
This project was the basis for the subsequently creation of an independent public 
institute to coordinate quality assurance and hospital accreditation. The rationale for 
the creation of this body was to remove a conflict of interest from the MoPH, which 
both owned public hospitals and accredited them, as well as enabling the 
participation of private hospital in public insurance schemes. Thus, HSRI saw both 
HTA and hospital accreditation as specialised tasks that would be carried out by 
independent bodies.  
The HRSI HTA committee consisted of two part-time staff and a wider network of 
relevant actors, such as researchers, civil servants from the Bureau of Policy and 
Planning, the MoPH, including the DMS and the Thai Food and Drug 
Administration (FDA), and physicians working in public tertiary hospitals under 
MoPH administration.   
The HSRI HTA committee used a broad definition of HTA, as seen by its four areas 
of work. This broad areas of work also reflected the interests of the early advocates 
for HTA - civil servants and academics many of whom were members of RDS. 
Some of these early advocates who were members of the RDS took an approach to 




took an understanding of HTA as a policy solution that focused in effectiveness 
evidence, clinical practice guidelines and the quality of health services. This is 
reflected in two failed attempts at regulating investment in expensive medical 
technology, and a second, comparatively successful, establishment of a HTA 
institute under the MoPH whose main approach to HTA includes effectiveness 
evidence and the development of clinical practice guidelines. These initiatives will 
be explored in chapters 6 (organisations) and 7 (processes).  
 
Investment in medical equipment  
Among RDS members, the initial policy problem that was associated with the 
emergence of HTA, named as such, was the uncontrolled diffusion of novel, high-
cost technologies among urban health providers, particularly private hospitals.  The 
diffusion and perceived irrational use of innovative medical equipment was of 
importance to these civil servants because of a lack of effective means for the MoPH 
to keep track of the fast growth of private hospitals, brought about by the economic 
boom in the 1980s and early 1990s. Expectedly, actors who were involved in these 
early discussions about the usefulness of HTA in Thailand highlighted the conflict of 
interests that physicians and providers had of using innovative technologies as a 
source of revenue (TH_I11_physician).  
This initial policy problem mirrors the emergence of HTA in other contexts. 
However, there was a specificity to how the policy problem was defined in the Thai 
context.  This specificity was linked to the establishment of the Social Security 
Scheme, its governance arrangements and the lessons learned from its first decade. 
The 1990s saw a fast increase in the volume of services provided in private hospitals 
partly due to the expansion of coverage to the employed sector after the 
establishment of the Social Security Scheme (1990), as well as partly because of 
increased demand in affluent urban centres. The Social Security Scheme 
commissioned a benefits package including inpatient care and some outpatient 




indicated that the benefit package was not defined further because policy priorities at 
the time were focused on expanding population coverage 
 
So at that time we focused on policy, focused on expanding [health] protection 
schemes to the population.  Not much [focus] on creating a benefits package, 
or its cost-effectiveness. So, [we wanted to] get things done, expand population 
coverage in 1990s. (I12TH_civil service) 
While the health benefit package was not given more attention, policy-makers 
considered it important to design a mechanism for cost-containment 
(Nitayarumphong, 2006). As a result, the choice of payment mechanism was 
designed to incentivise providers to contain their costs.  Specifically, the Scheme 
paid private providers through a capitation budget allocated per registered member.  
The Social Security Scheme attracted attention of health systems researchers, who 
conducted a series of studies about its functioning (Tangcharoensathien, 
Supachutikul and Lertiendumrong, 1999; Mills et al., 2000). Evaluations of the 
scheme indicated that the cost-containment incentives had been effective in 
maintaining the financial health of the scheme, but there was also evidence of 
hospitals providing lower quality of care to Social Security patients compared to 
patients who paid privately at the same facilities (Tangcharoensathien, Supachutikul, 
& Lertiendumrong, 1999), overall low utilisation rates and evidence of directing 
complicated cases to public facilities (Mills et al., 2000). These studies also 
highlighted an ‘immense’ growth in high-cost medical equipment in these private 
hospitals (Tangcharoensathien et al., 2000). Specifically with regards to medical 
equipment, the Scheme incentivised providers, alongside existing tax incentives for 
import of medical equipment, to invest in more innovative and costly medical 
equipment. Further, chains of private hospitals that catered to Social Security 
patients were established in already well served urban settings. These chains invested 
in well-equipped ambulatory departments which further attracted patients to private 
care (Tangcharoensathien et al., 1999). Researchers concluded that  revenues from 
the Social Security Scheme were re-invested in high-cost, technology-intensive 
equipment (Tangcharoensathien, Supachutikul and Lertiendumrong, 1999). Studies 




health insurance scheme (inpatient care compared to health promotion) and within 
these services. For example, health promotion through ‘physical check-ups’ in a 
hospital setting were described as the ‘least cost-effective’ means of preventative 
care, and yet these services were prioritised by the Social Security Scheme 
(Tangcharoensathien, Supachutikul and Lertiendumrong, 1999, p. 921). 
The inefficient use of resources was a problem both in the public and the private 
sector of the health system. Members of the RDS consistently carried out research 
that showed disparities between allocation of MoPH health budgets to urban and 
rural areas, and between more developed and less developed provinces in the country 
(Nitayarumphong, 2006). Other evidence generated by health systems researchers 
who were HTA advocates highlighted the uneven geographical distribution of high-
cost medical equipment - such as magnetic resonance imaging (MRI), computerised 
tomography (CT) and positron emission tomography (PET) scanners. An example 
often cited at the time and remembered by key informants refers to a Thai study 
indicating that there were more CT scanners in Bangkok than in the entirety of the 
UK (TH_I10_civil service) (Tomson and Sundbom, 1999b).  
The RDS had a longstanding interest in budget allocation for the health sector 
(I20TH_NGO). In 1998, the RDS publicly drew attention to irregularities in the 
procurement of medical equipment and medicines at provincial levels. Specifically, 
the MoPH leadership (Minister and Deputy Minister) put pressure on Provincial 
Chief Medical Officers to procure medical equipment and medicines from pre-
selected suppliers (Nitayarumphong, 2006). These Officers had considerable 
freedom of budget allocation due to previous efforts at decentralisation. However, 
decision-making by the Provincial Chief Medical Officer and MoPH remained in the 
hands of individuals - civil servants and political appointees (Pungprawat, 2009).  At 
central levels, the MoPH negotiated its budget allocation with the Bureau of Budget 
in the Ministry of Finance every year. Next, the Office of the Permanent Secretary of 
the MoPH allocated funds centrally for the Bangkok area and transferred funds for 
provinces to Provincial Chief Medical Officers. Behind the scenes, a member of the 
RDS described how they lobbied the Bureau of Budget to apply more equitable 




Secretary of the MoPH, who favoured the existing historical patterns of budget 
allocation that concentrated investment in urban, more developed areas 
(Nitayarumphong, 2006). 
As a result of this accumulation of knowledge and links within the civil service, 
particularly among the members of the RDS and the health system reform 
movement6, there was a growing recognition that the Social Security Scheme was an 
important source of revenue for private and urban government hospitals which had 
created incentives for even more investment in profit-making high-cost technologies. 
The proliferation of high-cost technology in urban centres was criticised as an 
example of the inequitable distribution of health system resources and used as an 
argument for the need of health system reform.  The diffusion of high-cost 
technologies was highlighted as a major cause of waste of resources in the health 
system and an indicator of inefficient resource allocation.  RDS members contrasted 
the large investments in expensive medical technologies with the underinvestment 
and lack of access to basic health services in rural areas. They argued that this 
concentration of medical equipment in already well-served urban settings was an 
inefficient use of resources and was inequitable as it disadvantaged rural populations.   
 
HTA and universal health coverage  
The policy problem evolved considerably after 2000, as a result of the policy agenda 
becoming dominated by the universal health coverage reforms and the institutional 
changes brought about by the establishment of the UCS. The evolution of the policy 
problem had two facets. On one hand, it consisted of continued interest in budget 
allocation for high-cost specialised care, which included investment in medical 
equipment. On the other, a new policy problem emerged, specifically making 
explicit coverage decisions for the newly established scheme. Both these problems 
 
6 The health system reform movement who were the most influential in policy-making– and were also 
member of the RDS – are sometimes referred to as the Rose Garden group, by the name of the hotel 




are best understood in the context of new institutional arrangements brought about 
by the UCS reforms, and the power struggles their establishment engendered.  
The quality of service provision included in the UCS as well as the budget allocation 
for these services emerged as a policy problem during the discussions about the UCS 
and became associated with HTA. In particular, medical professionals criticised the 
UCS scheme as providing ‘second class’, low-quality services to people on low 
incomes (Nitayarumphong, 2006: 107). For its advocates, HTA was seen as a 
response to making decisions about which innovative medical technologies and 
services should be provided in these hospitals.  
However, a deeper fault line hidden behind such debates was about budget 
allocations for these top public hospitals and for the entire newly established scheme 
(Hughes & Leethongdee, 2007; Hughes, Leethongdee, and Osiri, 2010). In the first 
years of its existence, the UCS budget was administered by the MoPH and there 
were attempts by MoPH actors to influence how much of the budget would be 
pooled at central level, under the authority of the MoPH. The MoPH wanted to 
allocate budgets for high-cost, specialised care and capital investments for its large 
network of public facilities. In 2005, after protracted negotiations on this issue, the 
UCS budget was transferred to the newly-created National Health Security Fund, to 
be administered by a National Health Security Office (NHSO). Consequently, the 
MoPH’s budget allocation power decreased substantially (Pitayarangsarit, 
Limwattananon, Tantivess, Kharamanond, & Tangcharoensathien, 2008).  
Civil servants interviewed for this study suggest that this reduction in its budget 
allocation power was the cause of consistent dissatisfaction among the MoPH 
leadership and civil service that were opposed to UCS reforms, as well as physicians 
in specialised public hospitals (I8TH_civil service; I10TH_civil service). In 
particular, officials at the MoPH were unhappy with the budgets for capital 
investment and infrastructure development it received from the NHSO 
(Tangcharoensathien, 2015). According to interviewees, the relationship between the 
MoPH and the NHSO with regards to both budget allocation and the alignment of 




the academia summarises the ensuing relationship between the NSHO and MoPH, 
suggesting that the loss in financial power did not mean equal loss in political power. 
NHSO is the manager of Universal Health Coverage, and normally, they 
have only money, not authority. So, for healthcare providers - many 
healthcare providers are under Ministry of Public Health – they have 
authority, but they don’t have money. (I6TH_academia) 
Besides the MoPH civil servants that were opposed to UCS, sometimes referred to as 
the ‘conservatives’ within the bureaucracy, there was opposition to the reforms 
coming from physicians. Specifically, the Thai Medical Council, the leading 
physicians’ association in Thailand, showed strong opposition to universal coverage 
reforms. Interviewees made a distinction between rural physicians, including the 
RDS and their network of ‘reformists’, which were supportive of the UCS, and  
physicians working in urban areas, allied with the ‘conservatives’ in the bureaucracy, 
which were in opposition to the reform proposal.  The Thai Medical Council was 
often presented as in competition and direct conflict with the RDS as a result of the 
UCS debates in the early 2000s. The RDS, whose key members had a high social 
profile, had also been voted into the leadership of the Council during the 1980s, but 
gradually lost this influence in the decade that followed. 
Political pressure within that group, also, has to be important, but we can say 
that, okay, the Medical Council in Thailand used to be [...]The members that 
elected the Medical Council [leadership], used to be the people who worked in 
rural areas, we call them the Rural Doctors’ Society. But at this time, most of 
the people who are elected are the people who work in big cities, and have a 
really negative idea toward the universal [coverage] policy. (I8_civil service) 
Urban physicians also opposed the newly introduced purchaser-provider split that 
reduced the revenues of government-owned hospitals in urban areas (Pitayarangsarit, 
2004). Some physicians actively resisted the implementation of the scheme, for 
example when they refused to complete the paperwork required by the NHSO 
(Pitayarangsarit, 2004).  
The second version of the policy problem that HTA could solve, namely how to 
make explicit coverage decisions for the UCS, was slower to emerge. In fact, HTA 
was not part of the debates for UCS initially. As had been the case with the Social 




supporting the UCS reforms, including the Rural Doctor’s Society, preferred not to 
raise the problem of determining an evidence-based benefits package, even though 
there had been previous discussions about the importance of investing in cost-
effective interventions (as seen above, in the case of the Social Security Scheme). 
One key informant involved in the design of the UCS indicated that this was a 
strategic decision, so as to not add a likely controversial question to what were 
already difficult negotiations.  
So I don’t think that it [HTA] was a relevant question to raise, […] don’t ask 
this question when there is a moment of political window [for UHC] open 
briefly. So the benefits package initially was not guided by HTA evidence. 
(I12TH_civil service) 
The initial UCS benefits package was modelled on the existing benefits package of 
the Social Security Scheme, with the long-term goal of harmonising the differences 
between the UCS, the Social Security Scheme and the Civil Servants Medical 
Benefits Scheme7. In addition, the UCS ensured that all Thai citizens had access to 
medicines listed on the NLEM8.   
The difficulty of defining a benefits package of health services became apparent 
during a series of controversies linked to high-profile inclusion and exclusion 
decisions. For example, renal replacement therapy for patients with end stage kidney 
disease was initially (in 2001) excluded because of its substantial budget impact, but 
was re-evaluated and included in the UCS budget in 2006. There was also sustained 
pressure from manufacturers and physician groups to open reimbursement to 
medicines and other services that were not included in either the NLEM or the 
existing UCS benefits package. Interviewees described a growing pressure on the 
UCS to name clearer criteria to justify decisions about the inclusion or exclusion of 
services, especially to manufacturers and patients. In this context, HTA was seen as 
 
7 The Civil Servants Medical Benefits Scheme was the first publicly financed health insurance scheme 
in Thailand. It covers the covers the cost of health care for civil servants and their dependants as well 
as civil service pensioners and their dependants.  




both providing a mechanism to develop such criteria and a process to manage these 
emerging conflicts.  
In the context of universal health coverage, the demand for new health 
technologies increased - very new technologies, usually expensive. 
Policymakers have very limited resources. They need someone to help them 
and [HITAP] helped them with evidence, helped them with a participatory, 
transparent process. (I1TH_civil service) 
HTA developed as a tool that offered procedural clarity in coverage decisions for 
high-cost medicines in the NLEM and for the expansion of the UCS benefits 
package. Put differently, HTA emerged as a way to expand access to ‘technologies’, 
while also enforcing limits to the expansion of the reimbursement lists. After its 
establishment in 2006, HITAP provided the technical secretariat for two decision 
making processes: on inclusions to the NLEM and on the development of UCS 
benefits package.  
By 2016, these decision-making processes faced increasingly complex prioritisation 
and decision-making problems, particularly with regards to setting priorities for 
between conditions, the methods for assessing these priorities, as well as the 
implementation of the interventions recommended by HTA processes. Consequently, 
the idea of HTA as part of the processes for benefit decisions expanded to include 
comparing interventions that offered the best value for money across different 
conditions, as well as the effective implementation of new services added in the 
benefits package. The need for evidence also became broader.   
For example, now we evaluate a programme that’s already implemented, so 
it's actually programme evaluation. But I said this is HTA as well. Why? I think 
the implementation of policy comes from ex-ante evaluation. We said, ok, it 
would be good for the country to do this and decision-makers decided to 
implement. So after implementation, it has become programme evaluation. 
And  HTA researchers are the best people to do the ex-post evaluation. Because 
they are the ones who were involved in advising about the programme, at 
policy agenda-setting and policy implementation [levels]. And it's also good 
for them to learn, as well, [whether] what they predict at the beginning - 80% 
acceptance of screening for Down Syndrome - will be real when implemented. 
Because that 80% comes from research on small groups [sample], and now we 




In summary, the policy problems that HTA was seen to be able to solve evolved 
considerably. Important HTA advocates included researchers and civil servants that 
were members of a policy network whose goal was to advance health system reform. 
These advocates started from a broad understanding on HTA as a solution to numerous 
policy problems. In time, these policy problems were refined in the context of country 
institutions, particularly the governance structures of the UCS.  
Subsequent chapters will explain how these problems were taken up by HTA bodies 
(chapter 6) and how HTA processes associated with these problems were established 
– or not (chapter 7).  
The development of HTA as a policy idea in the Philippines 
As in Thailand, HTA emerged as a policy idea in the context of wider policy 
problems expressed by actors who first advocated for HTA. In the Philippines, this 
wider context was about improving the efficiency of government as a steward of 
health policy. HTA advocates acted in this context, with the initial push in 
establishing HTA coming from within the civil service, which also benefited from 
links with researchers.  
All interviewees mentioned the same civil servant as the key figure in advocating for 
HTA in the Philippines, Dr Madeleine Valera, ‘the mother of HTA’ 
(I3PH_academia, I8PH_civil service).  Valera was a career executive civil servant9 
who held several senior positions at the Philippine DoH (1988-1998), PhilHealth 
(1998-2010) and again at DoH (2012-2013). As a civil servant, she was involved in 
the legislative process that led to two landmark pieces of legislation: the Generics 
Act (1988) and the National Health Insurance Act (1995). Furthermore, key 
informants suggested that her early leadership on HTA led to the development of a 
policy network for HTA advocacy that included civil servants and researchers as 
main members.  
 
9 The Philippines civil service includes two broad categories: career and non-career service. The 
highest grade for the career service is the career executive service officer (CESO), as Dr Valera. The 




It is important to look closely at the development of the Generics Act and the 
National Health Insurance Act, not only because they speak Dr Valera’s advocacy 
for HTA, but because they were major pieces of legislation that constituted 
important institutional pillars of health policy in the Philippines and of the 
development of HTA. The Generics Act of 1988 was a major win for its initiators - 
the Secretary of Health and a group of top level executives at DoH -, which was 
aided by a political climate favourable to reforms, after the ouster of President 
Ferdinand Marcos. The Generics Act was important for the development of HTA 
because it was the basis for establishing a process to develop an essential medicines 
list. Subsequent to the Generics Act, Madeleine Valera became part of the National 
Drug Policy Committee secretariat and as such supported the development of 
regulations to limit procurement of medicines to the essential medicines list (known 
as the National Formulary)10.  
The NHIP, which was established by the National Health Insurance Act, reformed 
the existing public insurance scheme, the Medicare Program11,  for government 
workers (Medicare I) and employees in the private sector (Medicare II). As a result 
of the negotiation process for the National Health Insurance Act, the final NHIP 
structure included many concessions to providers and employers, particularly with 
regards to the type of health benefits includes - inpatient care- and the payment 
mechanisms - fee-for-service, whereby PhilHealth would reimburse facilities up to 
fixed amount. The NHIP also adopted a first-dollar policy, whereby financial risk 
was placed on patients and not on PhilHealth or the providers, and .  
In this context, a proposal to include HTA in the legislative text was taken up by a 
private insurance group that also ‘understood the importance of HTA’ with regards 
to cost-containment (I16PH_civil service). However, key-informants credit Dr 
 
10 Despite the implementation of a Devolution Act (1992), which shifted responsibility for ‘personal 
health care’ to local government units, medicines policy remained under the remit of the DoH, 
together with other public health responsibilities.  
11 At the time, the Medicare Program was the healthcare component of two larger social security 
programmes: the Government Service Insurance System for civil servants and the Social Security 
System for workers in the private sector.  The Medicare programme reimbursed physicians through a 




Valera12 with the fact the HTA is explicitly mentioned in the National Health 
Insurance Act of 1995. At the time, the existing commercial insurers and health 
maintenance organisations (HMOs) provided coverage for services not included in 
the existing public schemes (Solon et al., 1995). Private insurers were involved in 
NHIP negotiations as they were seen as an important source of health financing that 
was likely to grow in the future13.  
HTA advocates – including Dr Valera – describe learning about HTA from 
international research literature, as well as from initial HTA programmes established 
in the region, particularly a HTA programme developed by the Malaysian 
government (De Rosas-Valera, 2009).  Further, the establishment of the NHIP 
included extensive input from health economists, as a result of USAID allocating a 
large investment for the ‘Baseline Studies on Health Care Financing Reforms’. 
Health economists at the University of the Philippines and the PIDS14 collaborated 
on these studies, but the major push was the large investment from the USAID.  One 
of the USAID-funded studies informing the reforms tackled the problem of diffusion 
of medical technologies as an important, if overlooked, aspect of the health system 
reforms (Picazo, 1995).  
The first iteration of HTA, named as such, in the Philippines responded to this 
problem of investment in expensive, technology-intensive medical equipment and its 
likely inflationary effect on health expenditures. Researchers and civil servants 
involved in informing the plans for the NHIP identified this problem of funding 
expensive equipment, but considered it important for the future development of the 
Program, rather than a current problem faced by the health system. At NHIP’s 
inception in 1995, policy-makers envisioned that it would achieve universal 
coverage by 2015, therefore its long-term evolution was important. However, given 
 
12 DoH civil servants were often assigned as liaisons to key legislators and other negotiators, keeping 
track of their position and any changes in these positions. This was also done in the case of the 
Generics Act (Kintanar and Romualdez, 1989). 
13 Contrary to these expectations, the growth of private insurance in the Philippines remained slow 
until 2013, when it accelerated (Dayrit et al., 2018).  





the low levels of expenditure in the country prior to the NHIP establishment, the 
problem of overinvestment in expensive medical equipment had not yet emerged. 
The Medicare Program, did not cover high-cost procedures, and offered low levels of 
financial protection for its members. Thus, the USAID funded study did not find that 
Medicare’s payments for expensive medical equipment were excessive (Picazo, 
1995).   
The study suggested that the risk of overinvestment in medical equipment only 
existed in a few affluent urban areas (Picazo, 1995).  Like in Thailand, private 
hospitals at every level of care, including large corporate hospitals in urban 
conglomerations and small diagnostic or ambulatory clinics made their own 
decisions about acquiring medical equipment. These acquisitions were often 
informed by physicians’ participation in professional conferences or through direct 
contact with suppliers (Picazo, 1995).  In contrast, in the public sector the more acute 
problem was under-investment in medical equipment and infrastructure, particularly 
outside urban conglomerations. The procurement of medical equipment was largely 
the responsibility of the DoH, through central budgeting, for a limited number of 
general medical centres and regional hospitals, some specialist hospitals and one 
university hospital.  Other 600 provincial, district and municipal hospitals had been 
devolved from the DoH to becoming the responsibility of local government units 
(LGUs) after 1992, which likely accelerated the problem of underinvestment.    
Regardless, the National Health Insurance Act mandated the creation of a technology 
assessment programme to tackle the problem of investment in medical equipment 
ensuring  that ‘the acquisition and use of scarce and expensive medical technologies 
and equipment are consistent with actual needs and standards of medical practice’ 
(National Health Insurance Act, Republic Act No. 7875 of 1995) (see chapter 6 for 
more details on alternative proposals for HTA establishment). This legal mandate 
provided an opportunity for civil servants and researchers who advocated for HTA to 
build a policy network that became involved in the development of HTA procedures, 
once PhilHealth was established.  
Despite a narrowly defined focus on HTA associated with the text of the 1995 




equipment), the HTA committee under PhilHealth significantly shifted its remit once 
it became established. HTA advocates realised that there was a mismatch between 
the problem indicated in the NHIP Act, and the actual role of PhilHealth. Simply put, 
PhilHealth did not have the authority to influence providers’ investment in medical 
equipment, except indirectly through the services for which it authorised 
reimbursement. The overall policy problem facing PhilHealth in its first years was 
how to define reimbursable services and how to pay providers for these service, as 
well as checking that providers’ claims reflected real clinical practice. PhilHealth 
also encountered the problem of providers started claiming reimbursement for 
medicines that were not included in the country’s essential medicines list (PNDF), 
which was against PhilHealth reimbursement policies.  
But, if I remember it right, what was written in the law, the first initial law, 
was that it focuses on big ticket equipment and other devices.  […] But that’s 
what I remember, more often the devices were adequate.  But what happened 
to us - our questions were very basic in terms of drugs, laboratory, ordinary 
laboratory tests. In the law, it was more focused on big-ticket items. Now, […] 
I think, the concept of health technology back then was about big-ticket items, 
but actually health technology is not only about big equipment, but actually 
it’s anything that has to do with delivering health services.  (I6PH_civil 
service) 
HTA advocates thus developed a series of procedures to help PhilHealth decide what 
services were to be reimbursed, i.e., what were the appropriate services for the 
diagnoses that were reimbursable. This was done through reviewing clinical practice 
guidelines and by developing a positive list for medicines, which supplemented the 
PNDF. The development of this HTA process at PhilHealth, as well as the reasons 
for abandoning these early initiatives are analysed in detail in chapter 7.  
While the positive list allowed for reimbursement of more medicines, albeit 
temporarily, it also served to highlight the inadequacy of the PNDF published by the 
DoH as the reimbursement list for PhilHealth.  The PNDF’s list initial role was to 
ensure availability of key medicines as well as to rationalise procurement of 
medicines by the DoH (for its vertical programmes and the few DoH-retained 
hospitals), by the LGUs for the majority of public facilities, and by large hospitals 
that also engaged in procuring medicines.  The further development of HTA was 




reimbursement list for PhilHealth. The DoH and PhilHealth collaborated to develop 
a HTA process for that purpose. However, a HTA process split between DoH and 
PhilHealth was not successfully implemented due to disagreements between DoH 
and PhilHealth with regards to each of their roles and responsibilities (see chapter 7 
for more details).  
 
The new policy problem: pricing and reimbursement of essential medicines 
Pharmaceutical policy took an prominent place in policy debates from the early 
2000s. It was increasingly recognised that Filipinos paid the highest prices for 
medicines, both in the region and among middle-income countries across the world. 
From 2006, the problem of medicines prices was also discussed in Congress, when a 
first draft of what would become the Universally Accessible and Quality Medicines 
Act (also known as the Cheaper Medicines Act) of 2008 was presented. The Act 
strengthened regulation with regards to price monitoring and introduced a legal basis 
for direct regulation of medicines prices.  The evolution of HTA become linked to 
this important policy changes both with regards to organisational and process 
development, although indirectly.  
As the institutional framework with regards to essential medicines changed, HTA 
advocates adapted to the new conditions to develop HTA processes. After the 
Cheaper Medicines Act was passed and the focus of pharmaceutical policy shifted to 
the issue of appropriate pricing, NCAPM, a newly created body under the DoH, was 
mandated with conducting HTAs to support the development of a new edition of the 
PNDF, that would also include price negotiations. In 2012, cost-effectiveness 
became a full criterion for decisions between alternative medicines to be included in 
the Formulary. As of 2016, a formal price negotiation process had not been created, 
but the process associated with Formulary inclusions had evolved towards a fully 






Defining a guaranteed benefits package 
After 2010, the continuous expansion of services reimbursed by PhilHealth and 
appropriateness of decision-making for benefit expansion emerged as a policy 
problem. Ongoing additions to the benefits package happened alongside an 
expansion of population coverage and a number of associated policies aimed at 
increasing financial risk protection for members. Thus, the first iteration of this 
policy problem that led to the re-emergence of HTA as a major concern at PhilHealth 
was about the incremental and piecemeal additions to PhilHealth health benefits 
package.  
As explained previously, PhilHealth had been established with a mandate to expand 
its benefits package. Since 1998, its benefits had been under a process of continuous 
revisions through Circulars approved by the PhilHealth Board. These inclusions have 
been described as appearing to be ‘the product of lobbying, sometimes with the 
support of professional medical organizations, but occasionally resulting from the 
private interest of a single congressman or senator’ (Obermann et al., 2006, p. 3181). 
A similar description could characterise the process in place for coverage decisions 
at the time of the interviews for this research. Benefit requests could reach the 
President and Chief Executive Officer (CEO) or other decision-makers (e.g., 
members of the PhilHealth Board), who then referred the intervention to the 
Departments responsible with benefit development. However, despite receiving 
orders for benefits packages from higher hierarchical levels, which were often 
political appointees, civil servants indicated that some benefit development became 
delayed within the PhilHealth civil service. This was because any new benefit 
requires a specific definition, clinical guidelines or pathways, a payment mechanism 
and implementation by a local PhilHealth office.  
A lobby group will approach somebody, an insider for example, who is part 
of decision making and that person will approach the President and CEO and 
then that person will write marginal notes and route that document […] 
saying it is approved in principle, make a benefit out of that. (I3PH_civil 
service) 




services was done in an unstructured, irrational manner (I1PH_civil society). The 
proposed solution was to develop a basic ‘guaranteed’ benefits package using cost-
effectiveness criteria across and within conditions and an associated decision-making 
process for further inclusions.  
More generally, interviewees from within the civil service, as well as academia, 
suggested that opposing interests were at play when making coverage decisions both 
at PhilHealth and the DoH. For example, pharmaceutical companies, patient 
organisations and other civil society groups lobbied for specific additions to 
PhilHealth benefits or DoH programmes reflecting their particular concerns. These 
benefits could be targeted at services for which there was unanimous agreement that 
they should be prioritised (e.g., maternal and child health), but led to fragmented 
programmes. Other actors questioned whether the services included in benefit 
packages were appropriate or offered the best value for money, even when they were 
for priority conditions.  
We have 46 health care programs, we have […] kangaroo mother care, and we 
have new-born care. They are the same right, and we have infant, and there are 
three separate programs because there’s people lobbying for each of these. We 
have women’s health, and sick motherhood, and family planning, and they are 
all fragmented, and then we need to give that, run that to 81 provinces, 144 
cities, 1,491 municipalities, 42,000 barangays and [central government] are 
not in control of that. They can only recommend to the LGU. The local 
government unit health care workers are not hired by the Department of Health. 
So they [central government] can say TB is important but that doesn’t mean 
anything to them [LGUs]. To them that’s a suggestion, and we may or may not 
use it. (I15PH_academia) 
 
Actors with an interest in specific services being reimbursable questioned whether 
the types of conditions being prioritised were appropriate. For example, outpatient 
benefits, including primary care, had been discussed by PhilHealth and actors 
funding vertical programmes (e.g., UNICEF Philippines). A primary care benefit 
was developed, but its implementation was delayed due to its high budget impact.  
In sum, interviewees expressed that PhilHealth benefit expansion did not employ a 
transparent or rational process. In parallel with benefit expansion at PhilHealth, DoH 




fragmentation of care provision and funding. International donors generally were 
seen as lobbying DoH primarily.  
These funders and donors and advocates target DOH and they say okay, we 
have this much money and we have a TB program. Of course, DOH always 
accept that money and tries to integrate into their present set up, but at the 
frontlines there are very few people who will be able to handle that. So (…) 
okay we have a schistosomiasis program, it all goes there, but they [frontline 
workers] have to report to different [programmes], so there’s so much 
paperwork because of this fragmented [setup] - okay I’m going to report to the 
TB program, the HIV [programme], malaria [programme], all those things. So, 
they become so overworked that they can’t even see patients. That’s the kind 
of system that we have. (I15PH_academia)  
A third iteration of the policy problem was linked to insufficient capacity to spend 
incoming funds. While the idea of scarcity of resources was discussed by 
interviewees, the more acute problem was the allocation of the available budget, 
which had significantly increased in early 201015. Both at PhilHealth and at the DoH, 
incoming budgets for capital investments had been consistently underspent starting 
2013. At PhilHealth, interviewees explained low utilisation rates as the result of its 
Board’s reluctance to implement benefit packages with high-budget impact (the most 
important of which was the primary care benefit) because of a desire to ensure 
appropriate reserves. Traditionally, PhilHealth leadership had taken a conservative 
approach prioritised reserves over expanding service coverage (I8Ph_PhilHealth).  
The question always was, how much does the Actuary Department allocate for 
each benefit, because it’s always a question of how much?  They [Actuary 
Department] don’t even care about the effectiveness of the interventions, it’s 
always budget. (I7PH_civil service) 
A guaranteed benefit package was proposed in 2016 to solve this multi-faceted 
problem. Its development will be analysed in chapter 7.  
In summary, HTA advocates who were civil servants and researchers defined the 
policy problems HTA could solve in an continuously evolving manner. The initial 
policy problem focused on investment in medical equipment, only to change when 
 
15 The source of the incoming revenues was the Sin Tax Law passed in 2012. Most of the funds were 




PhilHealth officials were met with the more pressing problem of defining 
reimbursable services. Among these services, medicines were particularly important, 
and eventually provided the impetus for developing other HTA processes at the 
DoH. Finally, the fragmented evolution of service coverage in the country led HTA 
advocates to develop a proposal for a guaranteed benefit package which included 
include a HTA mechanism.  
Chapters 6 and 7 will analyse the organisational structures that developed these HTA 
processes and how HTA processes were developed for each of these policy 
problems.  
Comparative analysis of the emergence of HTA  
Comparing the evolution of HTA as a policy idea in the two countries identified 
several stages of development in Thailand and the Philippines, during which 
advocates redefined what they saw as the policy problems that HTA was expected to 
help solve, while also reconsidering how HTA could provide the solution to these 
problems.  
The development of the ideas about HTA in Thailand and the Philippines shows 
clear similarities between the policy problems HTA was expected to solve. First, 
HTA was associated with problems about the investment in expensive medical 
equipment. Second, HTA was applied to the complex problems raised by coverage 
of medicines. Lastly, as both countries moved towards UHC, HTA became 
associated with increasing demands for expansion of publicly funded services. On its 
surface, the most likely explanation for this uniform pattern of change may be the 
transfer of the policy idea across borders. As discussed in Chapter 2, the same 
evolution of HTA was shown at global level:  from comparing alternative 
technologies to comparing services for different conditions, to applying diverse 
criteria for prioritising health services.  
Indeed, HTA advocates in both countries reported links with global health 
institutions promoting HTA or global HTA experts. However, a closer look at policy 




Specifically, HTA advocates re-defined the policy problems with reference to 
existing or new country institutions. For example, the problems related to innovative 
medical equipment in Thailand should be understood both in reference to the Social 
Security Scheme and the UCS reforms and in the context of how these policy 
reforms changed to procedures for budget allocation. In contrast, in the Philippines, 
the same problem of overinvestment in innovative medical equipment was defined 
prior to the establishment of a new payer, PhilHealth. This caused a mismatch 
between the problem defined in the National Health Insurance Act and the actual 
problems faced by PhilHealth. The latter were about establishing what routine 
services were appropriate for reimbursable diagnoses, rather than investment in high-
cost medical equipment.   
HTA advocates in both countries responded differently to pressures to include new 
interventions among publicly funded services. In Thailand, HTA advocates decided 
against the developing a clearly defined benefits package because they saw this as a 
potential to risk to their health system reform efforts. In contrast, in the Philippines, 
the idea of a guaranteed benefit package was taken up by HTA advocates while 
debates about UHC were ongoing. Again, this suggests that in order to understand 
how HTA became established, the problems it aimed to solve need to be understood 
in context, where context means existing country institutions related to the policy 
problem, as well as how these institutions influence the positions of relevant policy 
actors.  
Comparing HTA establishment in the two counties shows an important similarity, 
specifically the role of civil servants at middle to high levels of the bureaucracy as 
HTA advocates. In both countries, the main thrust for HTA advocacy across the 
three stages of establishment came from within the bureaucracy of ministries of 
health or payers. These actors developed formal and informal links with researchers 
in national universities and international organisations present in the country. The 
linkages between national policy actors, specifically civil servants and researchers, 
and global policy actors – e.g., global HTA experts, members of the international 
global health bureaucracy -,  were key in the emergence of HTA - and of economic 




However, the characteristics of the links between these actors that advocated for 
HTA were specific to each country. In Thailand, HTA advocates were part of an 
established network of civil servants, academics and members of civil society, the 
RDS. This network had a longstanding involvement in a movement for health system 
reforms that included consistent support for the development of health system and 
policy research. In the Philippines, a network of advocates that were civil servants 
and researchers developed around the idea of HTA. This network was formed around 
HTA advocacy, as opposed to the idea being taken up by an existing network, as was 
the case of Thailand.  
Identifying the HTA advocates, as well as the policy problems for which they 
advocated HTA was a solution is the first step in analysing the establishment of HTA 
organisation and processes. Subsequent chapters will explain how these problems 
were taken up by HTA bodies (chapter 6) and whether and how HTA processes 






6. Creating HTA organisations in Thailand and the 
Philippines 
Having previously analysed the role of actors and ideas in establishing HTA, the 
following chapter analyses the organisations that were created to coordinate HTA.  
Institutionalising HTA processes often means establishing: a) a new organisation 
within a country’s health system governance; and b) processes of decision-making, 
typically consisting of procedures for evidence generation and appraisal, as well as 
procedures for participation and consultation in decision-making, in compliance with 
ethical principles of fairness. Yet a HTA process might be established that does not 
bring about the creation of a new organisation; likewise, a new organisation might be 
created that subsequently moves away from using HTA. The following two chapters 
will examine these two aspects of HTA design – the organisation and the processes –
separately. In this chapter, the organisations mandated with HTA will be analysed in 
terms of whether and why new bodies were established, and why particular 
organisations – and not others – were put in charge with coordinating HTA.  
The creation of an organisational structure also interacts with established 
arrangements of health system governance16, and is in turn influenced by these 
arrangements. Existing approaches to health system governance to some extent 
determine which policy problems are most relevant to be addressed by HTA or how 
existing decision-making processes might be amenable to include HTA procedures. 
For example, health system reforms towards universal health coverage, which 
increasingly occupy health policy debates in middle-income countries such as 
Thailand and the Philippines, were likely to cause changes to the configuration of 
reimbursable services and the purchasing of these health services, to which HTA is 
often applied. Such reforms might also influence the use of HTA by focusing 
 
16 Health system governance is used here in its meaning of governance of the health system 
(Kickbusch and Gleicher, 2012) and refers to a set of state/government institutions that constrain state 




attention on specific policy goals, such as the efficiency, equity or the quality of 
service provision in each country.   
The chapter consists of an analysis of HTA organisational design in Thailand and the 
Philippines as defined above, followed by a section comparing both countries. Two 
aspects of creating HTA organisations will be examined specifically: 1) the 
governance arrangements relevant to HTA, as they relate to health system reform; 2) 
the creation of organisations coordinating HTA.  
Establishing HTA organisations in Thailand 
As outlined in Chapter 5, HTA was established in Thailand as part of a process that 
spanned over three decades and that still continued as of 2016. As can be expected, 
major shifts in health system governance have taken place during these decades, 
including substantial health system reforms in 1990 and 2000. Major political events, 
including three military coups in 1991, 2006 and 2014 and a severe financial crisis in 
1997, also changed the country’s political and economic outlook significantly.  
This section consists of an in-depth analysis of the creation of organisations 
mandated with coordinating HTA, which is explained in the context of major 
changes to health systems governance that are relevant for the development of HTA.  
Organisational design for HTA 
Interviewees linked the establishment of both organisations with the work done to 
support HTA by the HSRI, which they identified as central in the development of 
HTA. The role of the HSRI and its link with the RDS in promoting HTA in Thailand 
was examined in Chapter 5. In short, the HSRI leadership strongly supported the 
idea of HTA and used its role as a research funder to finance HTA-related projects. 
Between 1992 and 1999, the HSRI’s support for HTA included both national and 
regional/international activities. As part of this support, the HSRI established a 
technical committee and associated research and development programme on HTA 
in Thailand. The HTA committee or working group considered the options for both 
the organisational design and the processes of using HTA. Specifically, the 




The first option for establishing HTA was identifying any existing organisations with 
similar responsibilities and either widen their mandate to include HTA or create an 
HTA unit within these organisations. The Food and Drug Administration’s Office of 
Medical Devices was discussed as an obvious choice, given its role in regulating 
market access for medical equipment. However, actors suggested that the HTA 
mechanism would require the generation of evidence on effectiveness and cost-
effectiveness, and could not rely solely on international evidence of safety and 
efficacy, necessary for market authorisation. Committee members also believed that 
the organisation should take a broader perspective on HTA that encompassed 
pharmaceuticals and other technologies, and not just medical devices (Tomson and 
Sundbom, 1999b).  
The second option discussed by committee members was to establish a new 
independent body for HTA, for which they considered the model of agencies created 
in other countries that generated and compiled HTA-related evidence and/or had a 
regulatory role. The TASSIT project, as a Thai-Swedish partnership, enabled direct 
learning from the Swedish Council on Technology Assessment (SBU), established as 
a Swedish government agency in 1992. The Director of the SBU at the time, Egon 
Jonsson, who was an early advocate for HTA globally, was commissioned, together 
with Dr Monchai Chalaprawat, professor at Chulalungkorn University, to develop a 
proposal for an independent national HTA body. Prepared in 1997, their report 
proposed the establishment of an independent ‘national council, committee or board’ 
on HTA, composed of various actors relevant for the governance of medical 
technology, but excluding manufacturers due to their vested interest in HTA. The 
council would be mandated with ‘providing scientific facts and conclusions about 
the appropriate diffusions and use of health care technology in Thailand’ (Tomson 
and Sundbom, 1999a, p. 17). The proposal detailed what kind of evidence this 
council would use, specifically reviews of the published literature on safety and 
efficacy, research on cost-effectiveness for selected medical equipment and evidence 
on the existing diffusion and use of technology in the country. There was an 
understanding that it was important to ensure a degree of independence between the 





It was elaborated [by a MoPH representative] that a national mechanism 
could be created by some fund partly financed by the government, since it 
would seem possible for the government to support a non-profit organization 
dealing with HTA (Tomson and Sundbom, 1999a, p. 10).  
However, the proposal for a Thailand Council on Technology Assessment was never 
implemented. Studies suggest that this was due to a lack of human resources at 
HSRI. In particular, the HSRI committee lacked full-time staff and functioned as a ‘a 
loose network of academics interested in HTA’ that were only ‘meeting part-time’ 
(Teerawattananon et al., 2009, p. 244). It was also suggested that the proposal was 
not implemented due to a lack of infrastructure for ‘health economics appraisal,’ 
(i.e., decision-making based on economic evaluation).  These factors led to a failure 
to scale up TASSIT activities, including the council, as financing ended at the end of 
the 1990s (Tantivess, Teerawattananon and Mills, 2009, p. 934). In addition, as one 
civil servant suggested, the lack of follow-up of TASSIT proposals may have also 
been caused by insufficient ownership of the project, which was seen in Thailand as 
a Swedish initiative (I10TH_civil service). 
However, the strong previous support for HTA from the HSRI, mentioned by several 
interviewees, makes these assertions puzzling.  In fact, the TASSIT programme was 
an ambitious project in this respect (Culyer, Podhisita and Santatiwongchai, 2016). 
In 1999, a TASSIT project report described the establishment of a Working 
Committee on Thai-Swedish Co-operation17 that included HTA activities (Tomson 
and Sundbom, 1999a). Further, in February 1999, three civil servants visited the 
SBU offices in Sweden, and plans were made to organise a similar study tour during 
2000/2001, at the suggestion of the Swedish partners. These civil servants were 
affiliated with the MoPH’s DMS, specifically its Bureau of Medical Technical 
(Technological) Development. In 2002, one of these civil servants became the 
Director of the newly established HTA unit (later named IMRTA), in the same 
Department. It is notable that the individuals who participated to the study visit were 
also involved in the first attempt to establish a body mandated with HTA in 
Thailand. However, interviews did not identify a direct link between the 
 




establishment of this unit and the activities of TASSIT, while indicating a link 
between HSRI support and the establishment of IMRTA (I8TH_civil service).  
Another explanation for the lack of continuity of TASSIT proposals could be that a 
change in leadership at HSRI led to a change in priorities. Indeed, starting in 1998, 
the strategy of HSRI and its activities supporting HTA changed in focus. The new 
HSRI leadership supported a slightly different understanding of HTA that focused on 
standard setting and efficiency of technology use in tertiary hospitals, particularly 
through accreditation mechanisms, rather than on the broader activities first outlined 
by the committee. HSRI pursued this focus by establishing a collaboration between 
HSRI, the DMS at the MoPH and major private and public hospitals. This 
collaboration was established as part of a project on hospital quality improvement 
and accreditation18 (Poolsukh, 2002). Notably, the civil servants who would later 
establish IMRTA also collaborated with the HSRI during this quality improvement 
project (I23TH_civil service).  
Beyond its strategy to support HTA, the HSRI, alongside the RDS, had a strategy of 
financially supporting the establishment of a series of organisations within the Thai 
health system governance structure. The RDS were known to pursue policy change 
through creating new organisations that became part of health system governance, 
but were independent from the existing bureaucracy.  
We have four principal organisations. I don’t think we can afford to have the 
fifth, the sixth, the seventh, but we have some significant things to do, some 
specialised things to do like technology assessment. So instead of creating a 
new organisation that needs national legislation, it’s easier to branch out from 
the principal ones. (I19TH_civil society) 
Many of these organisations were initially supported by funding from the HSRI and 
were known as the ‘networks of HSRI’ (I8TH_civil service) or ‘daughter institutes’ 
(I10TH_civil service). Particularly after 1998, HSRI supported the establishment of 
small projects with technical or research purposes (e.g. accreditation, health 
information systems, health financing reform, ethics in human research) within the 
 
18 Between 1997-2001, 35 hospitals joined the programme voluntarily, with 7 hospitals undertaking 




existing administration or under the HSRI. Civil servants and members of the Rural 
Doctors Society (or mentees of the RDS) were put in charge of small research or 
technical programmes focusing on the priorities of the HSRI Director General and/or 
Board.  
These small projects were funded by the HSRI initially, but were encouraged to 
pursue independence from both HSRI and their line managers in the MoPH. This 
resulted in some organisations becoming independent such as the Institute of 
Healthcare Accreditation, a public organisation, and the Health Insurance System 
Research Office, which is currently an independent public organisation. The 
organisations that became independent did so through three main legislative 
pathways: a special act regulating a wider policy (e.g. the Health Insurance System 
Research Office, through the National Health Insurance Act that set up the UCS) or a 
royal decree under the Public Agency and Institute Act (e.g., the HSRI, the Health 
Accreditation Institute) (I10TH_civil service). However, there are also examples of 
failure to achieve independence from the administration as some of these research 
programmes stayed dependent of HSRI funding or remained strictly under the 
auspices of the MoPH (I8TH_civil service).  
Interviewees understood the establishment of IMRTA as part of this wider strategy 
of establishing organisations that should aim to become independent. IMRTA was 
established in 2002 with the support of the Deputy Director of the DMS at the time, 
who also supported the idea that this unit should eventually become independent 
(I21TH_MoPH). The HTA unit was to work in collaboration with a hospital 
accreditation institute, which was an idea that was developed in discussions among 
the contributors to TASSIT. To this end, the unit was expected to generate evidence 
on the effectiveness of medical technologies and encourage hospitals under its 
administration to conduct more research that would then influence clinical practice. 
Over time, this unit expanded its remit to include the development of clinical 
practice guidelines or standard treatment guidelines, in addition to assessing the 
effectiveness (less frequently, the cost-effectiveness) of new technologies to be 




However, interviewees described IMRTA as a less successful example of the 
organisational design strategy of the HSRI, particularly with regards to its 
independence from the MoPH.  The HTA unit remained closely embedded within 
the Department of Medical Services (as it became an institute in the Department in 
2007). 
We tried, as HSRI, tried to invest in many people, to try to establish a unit to 
work as Dr Yot [the director of HITAP] is at this moment. But, it failed. For 
example, HSRI used to invest in a number of people in the Department of 
Medical Services, and tried to support them to do HTA in general, but […] 
the mission was not a success. (I8TH_civil service) 
Reasons given for the lack of success were the level of commitment of its staff, lack 
of support from the management of the DMS, IMRTA’s embeddedness in the 
bureaucracy, therefore its lack of autonomy, as well as the novelty of HTA in the 
country (I8TH_civil service, I21TH_civil service). Some scholars suggested that 
IMRTA did not have sufficient capacity and funding to conduct research or to 
influence decision-making on investment in medical technology (Teerawattananon et 
al., 2009; Culyer, Podhisita and Santatiwongchai, 2016). These accounts are 
contradicted by the fact that the unit was strengthened in 2007, when it became an 
institute under the DMS. However, the Department was also the centre of debates on 
budget allocation for specialised care during the UCS design. In general, as part of a 
government ministry, the DMS, as other MoPH departments, was highly centralised 
and exposed to government politics, e.g. when recruiting its Director General, 
especially during the phase when the UCS was planned. When the new UCS 
governance structure was established in 2005, the reformist bureaucrats had won the 
argument at the cost of the officials who favoured more conservative approaches 
(I10TH_MoPH). However, the latter maintained leadership within the DMS after the 
establishment of the NHSO.  
The establishment of HITAP in 2006 was also linked to the HSRI and informed by 
its approach to influence policy through building organisational networks, although 
it developed in a different way. The network strategy of the HSRI was adapted in the 
face of belief by some actors that it might not be effective in leading to 




was maintained as worthy among reformists.  As such, the development of HITAP 
followed an adjusted path, but still inspired by the HSRI’s strategy for organisational 
creation, as outlined above.  
Specifically, HTAP’s establishment grew out of the IHPP, created in 2002. The 
IHPP originated from the work of the Thailand Research Fund’s Senior Researcher 
Scholar programme in health economics and financing, that had produced studies to 
inform plans for health system reform at the beginning of the 2000s. The main 
contributions of the programme were: ‘cost studies, the estimation of budget 
requirements for the universal coverage scheme in its implementation phase and a 
manual for analysis of hospital financial status and performance’ (Pitayarangsarit 
and Tangcharoensathien, 2009, p. 72).  IHPP also produced a number of influential 
economic evaluations (e.g., national programme to prevent mother-to-child HIV 
transmission, use of micronutrient supplements in HIV treatment, proton radiation 
therapy) (Tantivess, Teerawattananon and Mills, 2009). 
In 2001, the IHPP was established via a formal agreement in the form of a 
memorandum of understanding (MoU) between the HSRI and the MoPH, 
specifically its Bureau of Policy and Strategy, under the Office of the Permanent 
Secretary.  
The IHPP is not the daughter institute, no, because it was established based on 
the MoU [Memorandum of Understanding]. The daughter institutes were 
established based on Health System Research Institute’s own creation, not 
partnership with any organisation. It is their internal creation. And, they are in 
an interim process; the Health System Research Institute expected that these 
agencies would soon be independent; that they would move out of the Health 
System Research Institute to either having their own Royal Decree or law to 
establish an independent institute, or spin out into a private foundation. 
(I10TH_civil service) 
Interviewees mentioned discussions between the signatories of the initial 
Memorandum on whether IHPP should stay within the MoPH or sever its ties 
completely, to achieve the independence preferred by the HSRI. A compromise was 
reached in the form of a status of ‘semi-autonomy’ (I10TH_civil service; 
I12TH_civil service) that meant that the IHPP remained under the authority of the 




In addition, a foundation attached to the IHPP was established, the International 
Health Programme Foundation (IHPF), which allowed IHPP flexibility as to its 
sources of funding and use of these funds. Through its foundation, IHPP could 
receive funding from organisations other than government sources, including from 
international organisation (Pitayarangsarit and Tangcharoensathien, 2009). This 
resulted in the IHPP having both strong links with government and a degree of 
independence, though its ‘foundation’ status.  
Of course, through personal contact, and through […] civil servant status, it is 
linked to the Ministry of Health. […] So, IHPP has two hats. One hat, it’s like 
a programme, a group, research group, within Bureau of Health Policy and 
Strategy. The other hat is an NGO, the IHPF, the foundation. (I10TH_civil 
service) 
HITAP was established due to the growing interest in generating economic 
evaluation among leadership and staff at IHPP. In the first instance, two IHPP 
researchers undertook PhD research on the use of cost-effectiveness analysis in the 
development of HIV/AIDS policy (Tantivess, 2006), and the feasibility of using 
economic evaluation in reimbursement decisions relating to health services in 
Thailand (Teerawattananon, 2006). This was followed by the two researchers being 
asked to develop a proposal for a research programme in economic evaluation of 
health services, initially, which was later broadened to include HTA.  
Initially, IHPP sought international funding for this proposal, which was 
unsuccessful. Eventually, the ThaiHealth made the equivalent of US$1 million (or 30 
million Baht) available the proposed programme over three years. HITAP would 
later secure a second tranche of funding from the same organisation, the maximum 
time that ThaiHealth can support one programme. According to one academic, the 
connection of IHPP with senior civil servants and politicians, and the RDS, secured 
its financial support.  
Some technocrats in the Ministry of Public Health sold this idea about 
establishing HITAP in the country, and many of their partners thought, oh, 
it’s a good thing; it’s a good start, to have some organisations like HITAP, 
just to conduct or generate the evidence to support policy decision-making, 
especially in this area: first, economic evaluation, and then, broader, HTA. 
Yes, they thought that this was quite important to start in Thailand. So, they 




people, big policy-makers, and they talked, and they said, okay, we should 
find some funds to support HITAP. And, yes, they got funds from 
ThaiHealth. (I6TH_academia) 
In turn, the IHPP organisational model influenced the establishment of HITAP. One 
interviewee referred to IHPP as HITAP’s ‘mother organisation’ (I4TH_civil service). 
The directors of both programmes were civil servants accountable to the Bureau of 
Policy and Strategy, which meant that both organisations reported to the same part of 
the Ministry of Public Health. As IHPP had done, HITAP created an associated  
foundation to provide it with more financial flexibility by being able to attract 
funding from other national and international sources of funding, reducing its 
dependence on government sources such as ThaiHealth and the HSRI.  
Both IHPP and HITAP were therefore only loosely connected with the Ministry of 
Public Health. HITAP has remained a semi-autonomous research organisation within 
the MoPH, despite formally still being part of the MoPH.  However, reflecting the 
idiosyncrasy of the two programmes in the Thai health system governance structures, 
the semi-autonomous status is defined by practice, not by formal rules.  
When they have - like a MoPH structure, they have six departments, they have 
this dependent organisation, ... and then suddenly they have included IHPP and 
HITAP. I don’t know why. And after that, people never questioned it and then 
they continued that. So it became - I don't know how or when - it became 
official. (I4TH_civil service) 
However, maintaining independence from the MoPH was an aim from the start of 
HITAP, unlike in the case of IHPP. As HITAP grew, its leadership showed a desire 
to secure its independence and to clearly define its status within the Thai structure of 
health system governance. In 2015, the HITAP leadership advocated for and drafted 
a bill that would have made HITAP an autonomous public organisation. However, 
this initiative was unsuccessful, because after the military coup of 2014, the Cabinet 
(i.e. the executive) had begun to reign in the creation of new public organisations and 
increased the supervision of existing ones19.  
 
19 The Thai Health Promotion Foundation, the major initial funder of HITAP, was a prominent target 




Public organisations are quite independent, still under the Ministry but not 
just small programmes like this [HITAP]. But it [establishing HTA as a 
public organisation] failed because the government tried to freeze the number 
of public organisations. This is not only HITAP, but many organisations 
under other ministries as well that tried to become public organisation. 
(I1TH_civil service) 
The development of the processes of using HTA established under the coordination 
of HITAP will be analysed in chapter 7.  
Summary  
This section examined the establishment of two organisations mandated with HTA in 
Thailand, IMRTA and HITAP. Each of these two organisations has a distinct focus, 
with IMRTA concerned with improving clinical effectiveness and clinical practice in 
tertiary hospitals and HITAP focusing on economic evaluation for coverage 
decisions of the UCS.  
The difference in focus reflected changes in the understanding of the idea, starting 
from a broad conceptualisation of HTA that included prioritisation of medical 
technologies and standard setting in tertiary hospitals, and clinical practice 
guidelines and pharmacoeconomics. The creation of IMRTA was guided by an 
interest in using HTA to developed standards of care for specialised services, which 
were likely to require expensive investments in medical technology. In contrast, 
HITAP was established with a focus on developing the prominence of economic 
evaluation to inform coverage of health services.  
These two organisations emerged from discussions among key advocates for HTA 
who considered the options for establishing an HTA organisation, convened with 
support from the HSRI. The preferred option, inspired by the SBU, was to create an 
independent body that would assess medical equipment needs for the entire health 
system and individual technologies, when necessary. However, as this was not 
immediately feasible, an incremental approach was chosen, with small programmes 
established within existing bureaucratic structures initially, using government 
funding and civil servant support, but with a view of achieving independence at a 




IMRTA being established as part of the MoPH/DMS.  The establishment of HITAP 
and its mother organisation, IHPP, also aimed for autonomy, but this time, initiators 
were able to use an opportunity to place the new programme outside of the MoPH. 
This resulted in HITAP being seen ‘semi-autonomous’: overseen by the MoPH but 
with a substantial degree of autonomy.  
Organisational design for HTA must be explained in the context of a wider 
understanding of organisational design in the country’s health governance. In 
Thailand, organisational design strategies included:  
• Health reformists’ and HSRIs’ organisational design strategy of establishing 
independent bodies through incremental steps.  
• The interest of high-level civil servants who had alliances with the RDS and 
the HSRI.  
• The use of the legal framework that guided organisational creation: the use of 
Royal Decrees or special legislation.  
• Wider politics of the executive that supported or sought to limit the creation 
of independent bodies.  
Establishing HTA organisations in the Philippines 
As outlined in Chapter 5, the establishment of HTA in the Philippines started in the 
early 1990s and was ongoing as of 2016.  During this time, the Philippine health 
system underwent major changes: devolution of health service provision from central 
to local governments (in 1992), the establishment of a social health insurance 
programme (1995), major efforts for expansion of coverage (early 2000s), medicines 
pricing regulations (late 2000s), as well as accelerated moves towards universal 
coverage (since 2010). New health policy programmes and changing priorities for 
health system reform can be identified with each change in government. For 
example, Gloria Arroyo, Philippine President between 2001 and 2010, focused on 
reducing prices for, and improving access to, essential medicines, as well as 
increasing membership to the country’s social insurance programme. Her successor, 
Benigno Aquino, President from 2010 to 2016 led major reforms towards UHC, 




improvements in health facilities infrastructure, as well as increased efforts to 
achieve the health-related Millennium Development Goals.  
The following section will analyse development of HTA organisations in the 
Philippines in the context of changes to health system governance that were relevant 
for HTA development.  
 
Organisational design for HTA 
As of 2016, several government bodies, either under the DoH or under PhilHealth, 
were coordinating HTA-associated tasks. NCPAM, under the DoH, provided the 
secretariat of a Philippine National Drug Formulary System, which used HTA 
principles in making decisions on inclusions to the country’s National Formulary – 
or PNDF-, acting as an essential medicines list and a reimbursement list for 
PhilHealth20. At PhilHealth, the Department of Health Benefit Development used 
HTA principles in the design of some of its benefits packages and supported the 
development of a priority-setting project using HTA principles as part of a proposal 
for an overhaul of its benefit development system.  However, as of 2016, there were 
no organisations in the Philippine health system governance that were solely charged 
with HTA, despite the fact that proposals for the establishment of such an 
organisation were gaining ground.  
The history of HTA in the country (1994-ongoing) shows that there were multiple 
attempts to establish organisations to coordinate HTA. The first such attempt could 
be traced back to 1994.  At that time, a number of researchers and civil servants 
became increasingly interested in HTA as an important tool to inform investment 
decisions on medical technologies, particularly in the context of the announced 
establishment of the NHIP. These early advocates entertained two main options for 
 




HTA organisational design: a) the establishment an independent body mandated with 
HTA; and b) the inclusion of HTA within the mandate of larger organisations. 
The first option was proposed during the negotiations for the country’s National 
Health Insurance Act of 1995. Specifically, a proposal that an independent, public-
private council be established and charged with HTA was included in one of the 
drafts of the bill. This council, tentatively named the Provider Practice and Payment 
Commission (PPPC), would be tasked to advise the newly established payer on 
innovative medical equipment for which the new NHIP should pay (Picazo, 1995).  
This proposal emerged from a USAID-financed project21 commissioned to inform 
the creation of the NHIP. Picazo (1995) analysed existing options for advising on 
appropriate diffusion and use of medical equipment by considering the models of 
organisations in charge with HTA internationally. For example, the model of the 
Office for Health Technology Assessment of the USA Congress suggested that the 
Philippines Congress could take over some oversight of a potential HTA process. 
The researchers dismissed this model as ‘dangerous, given the Legislature's penchant 
to politicize’ (Picazo, 1995: 52).   An executive branch model, also stemming from 
the USA22, was dismissed for the same reasons. The author suggested that the 
government should not be the sole owner of a HTA body. Preferable alternatives 
were independent ‘professional/trade associations; academic/research entities; or 
consortia’ (Picazo, 1995: 52).  In line with this last preference, the proposal made for 
inclusion in the National Health Insurance Act outlined that the HTA council would 
be a public-private partnership.  However, this first specific organisational design 
proposal did not receive sufficient support.  Providers successfully argued that, in 
order to identify appropriate medical devices for reimbursement, it was sufficient to 
have providers (physicians and hospitals) represented in the PhilHealth Board. HTA 
advocates rightly identified this point of view as a conflict of interest (Picazo, 1995).  
 
21 A series of research studies produced as part of the Baseline Studies for Health Care Financing 
Reforms project.  
22 After the model of the Agency for Health Care Policy and Research, which is under the US 
Department of Health and Human Services. The Agency receives government funding for health 




As a compromise, the initial proposal was replaced by a more generic reference that 
health technology assessment should be included under the quality assurance 
programme of the NHIP. In other words, the second option for organisational design 
was eventually used, by embedding HTA-related functions in PhilHealth. 
Specifically, HTA was taken up by the Department of Quality Assurance as part of 
its responsibilities to develop policies for health service delivery and reimbursement. 
The Vice-President (VP) for Quality Assurance established a HTA committee to 
guide the Department in the development of such policies.  Other activities of the 
Quality Assurance department were: the development of accreditation procedures for 
PhilHealth providers; management and analysis of PhilHealth data (on burden of 
disease, disease classification, as well as data on utilisation and performance 
review); and complaints and/or other technical issues regarding claims. At the time, 
the Department was also running a Peer Review committee that would convene 
expert clinicians to make decisions on disputes on claims reimbursement. As such, 
the HTA committee was only one of the two committees charged with supporting the 
activities of the department and was directly linked with the department.  
According to key-informants, the HTA committee was established because the VP 
for Quality Assurance, Madeleine Valera, was a strong supporter of HTA. However, 
the HTA committee did not receive equal backing from higher levels in the 
PhilHealth governance, such as the Board of Directors or the PhilHealth President 
and CEO. Consequently, its role in the PhilHealth governance were determined by 
the limits of the Quality Assurance Department’s mandate and the influence of the 
VP for Quality Assurance in the organisations.  
[I]t was seen within PhilHealth as just a specific function of her office [the 
Quality Assurance Office].  That means you still have the prove to everybody 
else within the organisation that your decision is right.  Just like in any other 
office.  So it never had, I don’t think, sort of legitimacy that this is a 
corporation output, or the legitimacy that this is a health system output.  So 
that was the problem. […] Had it been higher, not at the office of [Quality 
assurance].  Let’s say it was made a committee reporting to the Board - 
different start. (I9PH_PhilHealth) 
In other words, HTA activities were embedded in the structures of PhilHealth. This 




and of the Board (I4PH_civil service). Consequently, the activities of the HTA 
committee were easily curtailed in 2006, and completely stopped once the VP for 
Quality Assurance was replaced and left the organisation, in 2009. The development 
of the procedures associated with the work of this committee, as well as what led to 
its discontinuation, will be explained in chapter 7, on process design.  
In sum, this first attempt to establish HTA within the structures of PhilHealth had 
three characteristics. First, it was linked to major legislation (the National Health 
Insurance Act of 1995) that directly mandated the use of HTA. Second, HTA was 
attached to the mandate of a larger organisation within health system governance. 
Third, organisational design was dependent on the authority and resources of civil 
servants, as well as the limits imposed to the freedom of civil servants by other 
institutional rules within the larger organisation. These three characteristics are 
representative of the subsequent development of organisations charged with HTA, as 
will be shown below.  
A subsequent episode of HTA design, the development of HTA procedures for 
determining inclusions in the country’s National Formulary, was also preceded by a 
major legislative episode: the passing of the Universally Accessible, Cheaper and 
Quality Medicines Act of 2008 (also known as the Cheaper Medicines Act of 2008). 
The Act was a complex and controversial piece of legislation. In particular, the 
imposition of maximum retail prices for selected medicines drew strong criticism 
towards the Philippine government, nationally and internationally. Between 2008-
2010 its implementation was led by the Secretary of Health, with support of an ad-
hoc group at DoH and an Advisory Council including industry and civil society.  
In 2010, the Secretary of Health created a new body charged with the 
implementation of the new law, the NCPAM. NCPAM’s mandate included 
managing medicines access programme established during the negotiations for the 
Cheaper Medicines Act, strengthening efforts for rational use of medicines 
(encouraging generics prescribing and utilisation) and the coordination of decision-
making processes for the National Formulary, as well as the Advisory Council, 
which became permanent. NCPAM coordinated the development of a HTA process 




(or PNDF). In 2012, it drafted new regulations for medicines selection to the PNDF 
that included cost-effectiveness as a criterion. As had been the case at the PhilHealth, 
the development of this process was coordinated and supported by middle- and high-
level civil servants (the NCPAM Director and an Assistant Secretary of Health23, 
respectively).  The procedural changes associated with this episode will be analysed 
in chapter 7, on the use of HTA for inclusions in the National Formulary.  
After 2010, the incoming administration of President Aquino took up wide policy 
reforms towards universal health coverage, which were supported by a series of key 
legislative proposals24. In 2013, Congress passed a revision of the NHIP Act of 
1995, which had been particularly relevant for HTA establishment. The new act 
contained a re-definition of the usefulness of HTA25 by moving away from standards 
of care and indicating that cost-effectiveness should be the basis of benefit 
expansion. As was the case in 1995, legislation did not indicate any direct 
organisational design aspects around HTA. It did, however, indicate that both the 
DoH and PhilHealth would be entitled to make coverage decisions for health 
services based on their cost-effectiveness.  As such, the Act indirectly created a 
mandate for HTA both within the DoH and PhilHealth.   
During 2013-2016, the design of HTA continued the pattern of attaching HTA 
processes to existing organisations. In the case of DoH, NCPAM continued an 
ongoing development of HTA principles and associated procedures for the National 
Formulary, while also administering its other tasks.  At PhilHealth, civil servants that 
had supported the now defunct HTA committee used HTA principles for the 
 
23 And former VP for Quality Assurance at PhilHealth during 1999-2009. 
24 These bills referred to a so-called Sin Tax Law, a Reproductive Health bill, a revision of the 
National Health Insurance Act of 1995 and an Act strengthening of the Bureau of Food and Drug 
Administration.  
25 The 2004 revision of the 1995 Act did not bring about changes with regards to HTA. However, it 
indicated that ‘The Corporation shall assess the advantage and appropriateness of health technology 
consistent with actual needs and current standards of medical practice and ethics and with national 
health objectives. In this regard, the Corporation may require specific types of health care providers to 
upgrade their facilities, equipment and manpower complement as a prerequisite to accreditation.’ In 
other words, the problem was under-diffusion of health technologies and/or lack of compliance with 




development of selected benefits packages. For example, the NCPAM and 
PhilHealth collaborated in the design and implementation of a primary care benefits 
package including outpatient medicines26 and a benefits package for catastrophic 
conditions - z-benefit- developed with technical assistance from NICE International. 
In addition, consistent support for the revival of HTA from among the civil service at 
PhilHealth, alongside increasing demands on benefit development, led to an 
initiative of a priority-setting process for all benefit development work. The process 
built on the existing departments/functions of PhilHealth and attached them to HTA-
related responsibilities. Two existing departments, i.e., the Departments of Benefits 
Development and Department of the Actuary, would design benefits according to 
recommendations of an appraisal committee responding to the Board. The details of 
the design of this process will be analysed in Chapter 7, on process design.  
Organisational design of HTA through adding on HTA functions to the mandates of 
existing bodies matters because existing rules and practices of the organisations 
interact with decisions made through HTA processes.  For example, the HTA 
committee within PhilHealth was simply stopped once the PhilHealth Executive 
Committee and Board decided to discontinue the honorary payment of the HTA 
committee members, once the Committee also lost the support of the PhilHealth 
President and CEO and the VP overseeing the Quality Assurance Group, a supporter 
of HTA, left the organisation. At the DoH, NCAPM had their direct accountability 
lines changed several times, based on decisions by the Secretary of Health. As a 
policy body, the NCPAM should have been placed in the Health Policy and System 
Development Team. However, as it managed procurement of medicines for managed 
access programs, NCPAM was moved under the direct supervision of the Secretary 
of Health, and later under the Office of Health Regulation (a step removed from the 
Secretary of Health). Finally, in 2016, the NCPAM was downgraded to a policy 
body, renamed the Pharmaceutical Division, and placed under the DoH Health 
Policy and Planning Bureau for a short time. After a change in administration, the 
 
26 Two versions of the primary care benefits package were designed (2012, 2015). The expanded 
benefits package (2015) had its implementation halted. Most accounts suggest this was due to its 
budget impact once it included medicines for non-communicable disease (i.e., hypertension, diabetes, 




body remained under the Office of Health Regulations. These changes will be further 
explained in Chapter 7, in relation to the HTA processes NCPAM was coordinating. 
With both DoH and PhilHealth housing HTA activities, the question of what would 
be the best or most appropriate placement for HTA began to gain ground.  The 
option of establishing an independent organisation to coordinate HTA became 
increasingly salient. Table 6.1 outlines the options for organisational design that 
advocates were considering in 2016.  Establishing an independent body for HTA was 
by far the preferred option among HTA advocates. There were a series of interim 
solutions that HTA advocates believe would help organisational design for HTA 
move towards the target of an independent body. For example, actors who supported 
the design of the priority-setting process for PhilHealth benefit development treated 
it as a prototype, expressing different plans for HTA in the short term and in the 
medium and long term.  Thus, while it was acceptable for a HTA process to be 
housed at PhilHealth in the short-term, it was indicated that it would be preferable to 
move all HTA activities under the coordination of the DoH in the long term 
(I7PH_academia; I12PH_civil service).  
Another proposal was that the DoH would create a mirror committee to the one 
charged with decision-making for the National Formulary. The newly created 
committee would be tasked with decision-making on health benefits and would 
follow the existing procedures used by the National Formulary Committee. 
However, moving benefit decision-making at DoH would have entailed that 
PhilHealth is stripped of its decision-making power on benefits development.  Thus, 
debates around the organisational design of HTA in 2016 should be understood in 
the context of ongoing purchasing reform plans. Actors who supported strategic 
purchasing reforms believed that there was no circumstance in which HTA should be 
carried out at PhilHealth, and that it was the remit of the DoH. The underlying 
meaning here is not so much that a payer should not make decisions based on HTA, 
but that DoH should not be involved in purchasing services. In fact, in order to 
effectively use its strategic purchasing power, PhilHealth would have to be present 





Okay, this is my position.  That should not be PhilHealth, but the process, let’s 
just make PhilHealth do it, then in the next administration, we’ll tell the 
Minister of Health to say it should be done for the whole … for everything. 
Not just what PhilHealth pays for. (I12_civil service) 
Even among the supporters of HTA, there were different points of view with regards 
to the best placement of HTA within health governance. The preferred options 
depended on the informant’s main interest. Actors whose main advocacy referred to 
HTA supported the use of the tool either at PhilHealth or the DoH.  However, 
PhilHealth housing HTA for benefit development also had its supporters, including 
those that were against stripping PhilHealth of its power to make coverage decisions.  
Actors whose main interest was the establishment of strategic purchasing by 
PhilHealth advocated for: a) an independent council or several HTA committees 
housed by the DoH; and b) a clearer split between functions of the DoH and 
PhilHealth – the DOH would become responsible for quality assurance, accreditation 
and benefit development and PhilHealth would manage contracts with providers and 
strategic purchasing (negotiating payments, pooled procurement).  
If we realign our roles and DOH views PhilHealth as its purchaser, then we 
have to work very closely with them and they have to understand that in a way 
they have to give up some of their powers and listen to DoH. But if the new 
Secretary of Health feels like we’ll just do the public health part, let them do 
whatever they want, and then it’s a totally different thing even if I insist on 
certain things with them I wouldn’t get the buy-in. (I8PH_civil service) 
The further development of HTA was seen as dependant of the outcomes of these 
debates on DoH and PhilHealth roles. The 2018 UHC Bill, signed into law in 2019, 
established a new configuration of health system governance and prominently 
mandated the establishment of a HTA advisory body. Unlike the National Health 
Insurance Act of 1995 which failed to specify details on organisational design, the 
final version of the UHC Act states that the HTA Council should be housed by the 
DOH, as per the preference of HTA advocates. Further, it states that the HTA 
Council must transition in a separate entity of the DoH within five years of its 
effective operation. The Act envisions that the Council would be attached to the 
Department of Science and Technology instead, which would also provide training 
grants for policy systems experts. These are all design details that are reminiscent of 




between HTA advocates in the Philippines and HITAP and NICE International  will 
be explained in Chapters 7 and 8.  
 
Table 6.1. Design as a process of ‘placement’ and of development of an appropriate 
organisational form (June 2016-March 2019). Source: interviews & document 
review.  
Date Options for 
organisational design 
Policy basis Placement 
June 
2016 
HTA for medicines –  
DOH 
HTA for benefits - 
PhilHealth 
Generics Act of 1988 
Cheaper Medicines Act of 2008 
– indirectly 
Board Resolution 2016 - 
directly  




Parallel HTA committees 
at DoH (essential 
medicines; benefits)  
N/A DoH – Health Policy 
Development and Planning 
Bureau (HPPD), and/or 




National HTA Program – 
expands PNDF 
guidelines to services 
beyond medicines.  
Draft DoH administrative order 
(Sept 2017) 




HTA Council  UHC Bill Draft  Coordinated by PHIC 
March 
2019 
HTA Unit  UHC Act 2019 Independent, secretariat by 




This section has analysed the nature of organisational design for HTA in the 
Philippines, between 1994-2016. During this time, several existing organisations 
coordinated HTA processes. These processes had a varied focus: a) the development 




decisions on essential medicines (at the DoH); and c) coverage decisions and 
priority-setting for health benefits package development (at PhilHealth).  Despite 
this, there were no organisations solely mandated with HTA in the country until the 
UHC Act of 2019 mandated the creation of a HTA Council linked the structures of 
the DoH, but with a mandate to become independent in five years since its 
establishment. The change in focus is associated with changes to the idea of HTA, 
but also with changes to health governance structures.  
Advocates for HTA applied a strategy for organisational design that had three facets. 
First, it linked HTA establishment with major legislative episode. As a consequence, 
there is a legal mandate for HTA in the Philippines starting with the National Health 
Insurance Act of 1995. This legal mandate has been consistently updated with all 
subsequent revisions of the National Health Insurance Program (in 2004, 2013 and 
2018). An exception was the Cheaper Medicines Act of 2008, which did not make 
direct reference to HTA. However, it mandated a strengthening of National 
Formulary decision-making. Second, except for 2019, organisational design details 
were not specified in legislation. In consequence, HTA activities were attached to 
existing governance structures, specifically:  the Quality Assurance Department of 
PhilHealth, the NCPAM at DoH, and the Departments of Benefits Development and 
of the Actuary, at PhilHealth.  Third, the establishment and development of 
associated HTA processes were substantially influenced by the institutional power 
and its limits exercised by middle- and high-level civil servants who were HTA 
advocates.  
An alternative organisational design option, that of establishing a body solely 
mandated with HTA, was considered by advocates as early as 1994. However, 
despite the existence of legal mandates, no such organisations had been established 
as of 2016.  In the context of a movement for clearly defining purchasing roles 
between PhilHealth and the DoH, the necessity of a body solely mandated with HTA 
re-emerged. Advocacy for such a body is best understood in the context of debates 
for clearly delineating purchasing roles in the country, which fed into the design of 




Comparative analysis of organisational design for HTA  
Having analysed the processes of organisational design for HTA in each of the two 
countries, both similarities and differences emerge, as well as some case-specific 
characteristics.  
Major similarities are the options considered for organisational design and the role of 
HTA advocates.  In both countries, the available options for building an organisation 
were limited between: attaching HTA tasks to existing organisations; or establishing 
an independent body mandated with conducting HTA. In addition, a variation of the 
first option was considered in Thailand, which was the establishment of a HTA-
specific unit as part of existing structures with associated mandates.  As found in 
Chapter 5, the existence of HTA advocates organised in networks was also decisive 
in both countries. Within these networks, civil servants seemed to have had some 
degree of freedom in establishing organisations for HTA. It is perhaps unwise to 
assume that ‘political will’ coming from the highest levels of health governance is 
not important. However, the Thai and Philippine cases suggest that the role of 
middle to high ranking civil servants should not be overlooked when defining 
‘political will’ for establishing HTA.  
While the options available for organisational design were limited to two main 
choices, the strategies used by advocates were different for each country. In 
Thailand, the core of the strategy was to establish small programmes financially 
supported by research funding allocated by the HSRI, with the goal that these 
programmes should pursue independence from the government bureaucracy. 
Importantly, this strategy was not solely applied to HTA, but was more broadly used 
in Thai health system governance. HITAP’s establishment, along with its ‘mother 
organisation’ IHPP’s, followed a modified version of this core strategy, whereby the 
research funders entered an agreement with other offices of the MoPH. 
Consequently, HITAP has a special status within the Thai MoPH, known as ‘semi-
autonomy’. In the Philippines, the strategy for organisational design required a legal 
mandate for HTA that was then used by civil servants to develop HTA activities 




legal mandate, between 2004 and 2006, none of these structures was solely mandated 
with HTA. This choice of organisational design again suggests, the importance of the 
civil service for explaining the uptake of HTA in both countries, while also showing 
that a legal mandate on its own did not lead to HTA becoming institutionalised.  
This analysis suggests that the differences in strategies for establishing HTA can in 
part be explained by factors relating to the main advocates for HTA, which were 
civil servants. Compared to the Philippines, civil servants in Thailand benefitted 
from a wider degree of freedom, especially as they also created links through the 
network of the RDS. In the Philippines, civil servants were less autonomous in their 
decisions regarding the approach to establishing HTA. As a consequence, the HTA 
processes that were developed were attached to existing organisations.  The 
development of these processes will be explained in detail in the subsequent chapter.  
The available country-specific strategies for organisational design also translated in 
the degree of independence of the organisation that coordinated HTA. In both 
countries, advocates for HTA indicated a preference for a HTA organisation that was 
independent. In Thailand, there were clear pathways to achieve independence for a 
newly created organisation. This could be done by special legislation or by a single 
Royal Decree, under the Public Agency and Institute Act. HITAP attempted to use 
this institutional mechanism to achieve the status of an independent public 
organisation in 2015, but this was prevented by the executive branch which limited 
the creation of independent public bodies. However, HITAP had been able to 
maintain a degree of autonomy by establishing an associated foundation. In contrast, 
in the Philippine, HTA advocates were not able to identify alternative pathways 
towards independence that did not require legislation. However, the legal mandate 
did not lead to a body dedicated to HTA being established. The exception was the 
UHC Act of 2019, which became law after years of debates about purchasing health 
services, which also included debates about establishing an HTA organisation. As a 
consequence, the Act included specific organisational and process details that HTA 
advocates hoped would facilitate the development of a HTA organisation.  
In sum, the comparative analysis above showed that the options for organisational 




advocates and their networks, worked from within the civil service to build HTA 
organisations. However, they did so within existing institutional constraints which 
shaped the opportunities for creating HTA organisations in the context of new health 







7. Developing HTA processes in Thailand and the 
Philippines 
This chapter will analyse the development of HTA processes, taking as a starting 
point the policy problems that HTA was expected to address. As outlined in Chapter 
5, these policy problems evolved over time in both countries, but following a pattern 
that was similar. In short, these policy problems were linked to: a) investments in 
high-cost medical equipment; b) coverage decisions for medicines; and c) setting 
priorities for the further definition and expansion of the benefit package. Each 
country case study will explore the development of HTA processes responding to 
these three policy problems. It will analyse how HTA processes evolved under the 
influence of how policy problems were defined, of changing institutional contexts 
and of policy actors’ interests.  
This chapter will analyse the processes functioning as of 2016, as well as other 
attempts at process development that were either not implemented or were less 
durable. It first analyses the development of HTA process in Thailand and in the 
Philippines separately, followed by comparing the HTA process development in both 
countries. Successful proposals will be discussed in more detail than those proposals 
that failed to be implemented. 
The development of HTA processes in Thailand 
The first full-fledged proposal for a HTA process in Thailand dates back to 1997 and 
aimed to establish a national mechanism to inform investment decisions on 
innovative medical equipment. This proposal emerged from the TASSIT project 
under the name of the National Council on Health Technology Assessment. The 
plans for this Council drew heavily on the model of the SBU27 (see more details on 
why in Chapter 6). The proposal details a process that consisted of several structures 
 




with distinct roles: a HTA Council; a Standing Scientific Committee and several ad-
hoc scientific committees as required by the technology assessed; and a Secretariat 
(Jonsson and Chalaprawat, 1997).  
Initially, the proposal stated that the Council would not decide whether technologies 
should be covered, but it would present recommendations based on evidence 
synthesis and primary research on the cost-effectiveness of individual technologies. 
It would also generate evidence on the diffusion and use of health technology 
already in place (Jonsson and Chalaprawat, 1997).  However, by 1999, TASSIT 
project documents suggested that HTA advocates were arguing that a HTA council 
should have a regulatory role, and not merely an advisory one (Tomson and 
Sundbom, 1999b).   
These plans for a national HTA council never came to fruition. Causes for this can 
be found in the governance of the TASSIT project (the project ended when its 
funding ended), as well as the influence of key actors (such as a change in focus of 
HSRI leadership) (see more details in chapter 6). A more convincing explanation 
refers to the fact that the policy problem, as it was defined, would affect multiple 
decision-making points as well as broad policies: budget allocation to and by the 
MoPH (the Bureau of Budget approved budget proposals from the MoPH); Social 
Security Scheme payment mechanisms; and the existing tax incentives for the import 
of medical equipment which further incentivised investment in innovative 
equipment. In other words, there was no existing decision-making structure 
committed to linking evidence on the diffusion, uptake and cost-effectiveness of 
medical technology with resource allocation decisions (see a more detailed analysis 
of how the problem was defined in chapter 5). 
Despite the failure of this first proposal, policy actors who supported HTA continued 
to be preoccupied with this problem and the proposed solution of establishing a 
national mechanism to assess appropriateness of investment in medical equipment. 
HTA advocates continued to look into the link between budget allocation procedures 
and investment in medical technologies across the health sector. However, the 
difficulty of the task was highlighted by another failed attempt to establish a national 




second proposal for a similar mechanism was part of a legislative initiative to 
strengthen the regulatory environment for medical devices. Passed in 2008, the 
Medical Device Act included wide regulatory provisions regarding medical devices 
registration, advertisements, and authorisations for sale and distribution.  
With regards to HTA, the Act included provisions for the establishment of a Medical 
Device Board that would, among other tasks, identify medical equipment that should 
undergo HTA in order to ensure ‘that the use of such medical devices are [sic] 
suitable and corresponds to the health problems of the public and the economic and 
social conditions of the country’ (Medical Device Act, B.E. 2551/2008 – unofficial 
translation). The proposed membership of the Board largely derived from the MoPH 
(ten members from various MoPH departments) which was to be balanced by nine to 
eleven ‘qualified members’ (experts), one of which would be an expert in HTA. 
According to HTA advocates, the HTA process aimed to assess the appropriateness 
of innovative and costly medical equipment before market authorization.  
Similarly to the TASSIT proposal, the Medical Device Board would have 
represented a significant change in governance arrangements. However, HTA-
specific plans, as well as the wider Act, had not been implemented by 2016, as the 
MoPH omitted to develop secondary legislation for the implementation of this Act 
(Tangcharoensathien, 2015). This was due to the fact that the general provisions of 
the new Act went against the interests of manufacturers, suppliers and users of 
medical equipment in private and some public hospitals, which opposed regulation 
to what had so far been a growing, but unregulated market for the medical equipment 
industry. Medical device regulation is difficult across the board and HTA being 
applied to it is still in its infancy, including in high-income countries.   
In addition, the provisions of the new Act also exposed conflicting policy priorities 
within the MoPH, which were linked to a planned known as the Medical Hub Policy. 
This plan aimed to attract foreign patients to well-equipped private facilities and 
present Thailand as a model destination for medical tourism. The Medical Hub 
policy  was supported by the Ministry of Finance, which designed incentives for 
large private hospitals to attract foreign patients with hotel-like facilities disposing of 




had economic development priorities which included stimulating the local medical 
device manufacturing market. The Bureau of Investment aimed to grow local 
manufacturing of basic medical devices and of and advanced equipment (and 
therefore has put in place tax incentives for the import of basic materials for 
manufacturing such equipment) (Pitakdumrongkit, 2017).  The intention was that the 
revenues generated as a result of this plan would be re-invested in the public health 
system (UCS), as one of the worries for the sustainability of the scheme was 
maintaining appropriate levels of funding.  
However, some UCS supporters believed that the focus on medical tourism would 
have a detrimental effect on the UCS in two ways. First, they believed that health 
professionals would be disincentivised to practice within the public health system.  
Second, they mistrusted that revenues from the Medical Hub Policy would in fact be 
re-invested in the UCS. In interviews, HTA advocates expressed mistrust that the 
MoPH would use such funds to invest in under-favoured areas rather than in already 
rich and developed urban hospitals (I8TH_civil service). These latter worries were 
confirmed by budget allocations from the Ministry of Finance in subsequent years. 
For example, it was reported that the Bureau of Budget ‘intentionally misinterpreted’ 
the capital replacement and depreciation costs included in the estimates of the 
capitation budget of the UCS as a standard for capital investment and therefore did 
not allocate sufficient funds to the MoPH for investment in its large network of 
public facilities (Tangcharoensathien, 2015).  
The ongoing evolution of the Medical Hub Policy, the halted implementation of the 
Medical Device Act (including its HTA process) shows a behind-closed-doors 
process of negotiation and lobbying.  Over the next decade, capital investment 
budget did not keep pace with the growth of the UCS budget and was recently 
identified as one  of the major problems threatening the sustainability of the UCS 
(Tangcharoensathien et al., 2018). Because the UCS budget is allocated annually, it 
is sensitive to political decision-making by the Cabinet and the Bureau of Budget. 
The budget allocation negotiations are opaque, and it was hard to find the specific 
reason for this. However, in the context of strained relationships between the MoPH 




lobbying to either receive more of a say in NHSO governance or undermine it 
altogether and re-establish a separate funding stream towards the MoPH.  
It is notable that HTA advocates, informed by the nature of the institutional context 
regarding investment in medical equipment in the country, attempted to establish an 
ambitious HTA process that would have been part of the regulatory framework for 
medical equipment. Even though the Medical Device Act had not been implemented 
as of 2016, there were signs that its implementation would be attempted again in 
2018. This topic is likely to be a subject of further development in the following 
years. 
A third attempt to establish a HTA process took a different focus because it came at 
a time of changing the definition of the policy problem. The introduction of HTA in 
the DMS in 2002 was important because the department coordinates high-cost care 
provided in the largest and most specialised public hospitals, specifically 32 
hospitals and institutes, most of which are located in the Bangkok and Greater 
Bangkok Area. In 2002, budgets for high-cost care and capital investments were still 
under the administration of the MoPH, which indicated that a HTA process could 
inform investment in medical equipment for these hospitals. However, the MoPH 
was stripped of this power in 2005.  
The definition of the problem changed as existing governance arrangements 
changed. Specifically, it was defined less as a budget allocation problem and more as 
a problem of identifying which high-cost, specialised services should be provided in 
tertiary hospitals. According to an interviewee from the civil service, the status of 
HTA processes at the DMS was raised by the creation of the IMRTA in 2007. This 
move by the DMS leadership was a reaction to a particular study, carried out by the 
IHPP, on the appropriateness of investing in proton radiation therapy for cancer 
treatment, compared with existing radiation therapy. This study indicated that public 
investment on such expensive medical technology was not advisable as replacement 
to alternative radiation therapy.  The study recommended that innovative technology 
should not be prioritised over investment in more basic infrastructure, even though 
the technology would likely be more efficacious (although not as effective in real-




Lack of basic instruments of radiation therapy and essential health personnel, 
especially radiation therapists and medical physicists, should be the first 
priority of the government investment before attempting to invest in expensive 
medical technology. (Prakongsai, Tantivess and Tangcharoensathien, 2007) 
This position was controversial because many health professionals were naturally 
inclined to want to apply the most efficacious treatments. As a response to these 
controversies, the Department leadership moved to strengthen the existing HTA 
process to establish authority over recommendations on adoption of medical 
technologies (I10TH_civil service). After this episode, the HTA process at the DMS 
was defined as intending to set ‘the standard of medical technology in Thailand’, 
beyond the specialised hospitals under its administration (I21TH_civil service).  It 
was a move to establish authority and legitimacy on making recommendations on the 
use of innovative technologies in tertiary care under the DMS, and not under the 
IHPP. 
To do so, the IMRTA maintained a focus on generating evidence on clinical 
effectiveness for specialised tertiary care and evolved as a research body generating 
evidence in support of the development of clinical practice guidelines for high-cost, 
specialised services (I2TH_academia). The evidence IMRTA advocates for and 
generates includes epidemiological research, systematic reviews of efficacy and 
effectiveness (informed by Cochrane methodology) and other clinical effectiveness 
research, such as standard practice surveys. However, a discrepancy between the 
aims of the process and its operation could be seen, or, as indicated by one 
interviewee, the IMRTA was too embedded in the MOPH/DMS line of command to 
be able to set its own priorities or make independent recommendation (I21TH_civil 
service). Because of this, interviewees suggested that the IMRTA process was a 
failed initiative of HTA advocates as it had had initial links with TASSIT and HSRI, 
which were subsequently lost (see Chapter 6 for more details). 
In summary, a narrow definition of the purpose of HTA, namely to inform decisions 
on the introduction of expensive medical equipment in tertiary hospitals, led to three 
options for process design being developed by HTA advocates. The initial framing 
of the policy problem led to failed proposals for a HTA process. The failure could be 




other decision-making procedures there were tackling the same problem) or by their 
fit with actors’ interests or conflicting institutional developments (the Medical Hub 
Policy).  The IMRTA was a hybrid in that it was created to establish legitimacy over 
technology-related investment with the MoPH. After the change in institutional 
context in 2005, it adjusted the focus of the HTA process to one of indirectly 
influencing providers by generating evidence on clinical effectiveness research.   
 
Coverage decisions for medicines  
The establishment of the UCS in 2001 also raised the question of how to ensure cost-
containment with regards to medicines expenditure, while also making decisions 
about the coverage of high-cost medicines that were deemed essential. The existing 
processes to make coverage decisions for medicines, up to that point, had been the 
country’s essential medicines list, the NLEM. After the establishment of the NHSO 
in 2003 and especially after the full transfer of UCS funds to the National Health 
Security Fund in 2005, there was sustained pressure from medical professionals and 
manufacturers to open a reimbursement path through NHSO decision-making. For 
example, as early as 2003, multinational pharmaceutical company Novartis 
established the Glivec International Patient Assistance Program to facilitate access to 
imatinib (a cancer medicine with the brand name Glivec), to eligible patients within 
the UCS.  Decision-making on eligibility would have been made by the USA- based 
Max Foundation. The rationale for this process  was that it would ensure 
independence of decisions on treatment (Sruamsiri et al., 2015).  
Initially, this policy problem was taken up at other levels of governance than the 
NLEM, specifically the Permanent Secretary of the MoPH, the leadership of the 
FDA and the Secretary General of the NHSO. In 2005, the head of the FDA and a 
new Permanent Secretary initiated direct price negotiations with manufacturers of 
key innovative medicines (among which was imatinib) which were deemed 
unaffordable for the UCS. The Minister of Public Health created an ad-hoc Working 
Group for Price Negotiation of Patented Essential Medicines. By links with these 




that fed into these negotiations. However, the negotiations broke down:  
manufacturers did not agree to lower prices, which led the policy-makers mentioned 
above to support compulsory licences for the medicines under consideration. 
Cheaper alternatives were to be produced by the Government Pharmaceutical 
Organisation, a publicly owned pharmaceutical manufacturer.   
The events surrounding the issue of compulsory licensing in Thailand have been 
analysed in detail in published literature (Wibulpolprasert et al., 2011; Mohara, 
Yamabhai, et al., 2012).  They are important for the development of HTA processes 
because they exemplify the pressure on the Thai government to develop a 
reimbursement pathway for innovative medicines. For example, imatinib was 
included in the compulsory license programme initially, but no compulsory license 
was necessary as the manufacturer eventually offered, in January 2008, to expand its 
patient access programme and grant universal access for Thai cancer patients. The 
drug was subsequently included in Thailand’s NLEM in 2008, within a special 
category for high-cost medicines (Jor2 or E2 sub-list). Specific procurement and 
reimbursement procedures were developed alongside this new category of the 
NLEM. Specifically, in addition to the capitation budget of the UCS, hospitals could 
be reimbursed for E2 medicines under a separate reimbursement stream 
(Yoongthong et al., 2012). The payers implemented this programme over time, 
which allowed subsequent negotiations between payers and manufacturers. The 
NHSO initiated implementation of the E2 programme in 2009. In 2013, the Social 
Security Scheme transferred its budget for medicines procurement in the E2 
programme to the NHSO, to participate in pooled procurement through the NHSO.  
The HTA process developed incrementally over that same decade, in parallel with 
the events described above. The developed of a HTA process for medicines coverage 
took  the existing NLEM procedures as a starting point. Figure 7.1 provides a 
chronological overview of the addition of the main elements of the HTA processes to 
the existing procedures of the NLEM. Their evolution will be analysed below. The 
first step in the development of the HTA process consisted of a change to the role of 
the NLEM in the Thai health system. From 2004, the new NLEM was described as 




being a minimum list of basic, essential medicines utilised solely for procurement by 
public hospitals to becoming a reimbursement list for all three public insurance 
schemes.  This happened gradually (in 1999 for the Civil Servants Medical Benefits 
Scheme; in 2004 for the UCS). 
The second set of changes to the NLEM were procedural changes related to the 
specialities represented in the Clinical Working groups, on the one hand, and 
evidence requirements, on the other hand. To support the use of pharmaco-
economics for NLEM selection, the membership of the Clinical Working Groups 
was altered to include one health economist in each of the Clinical Working Groups. 
Furthermore, starting in 2004, clinical effectiveness became an additional criterion 
for assessment, alongside safety and efficacy. The NLEM Subcommittee and 
Secretariat developed a scoring system (ISafE) combining the above criteria. This 
scoring system was used to support prioritisation of medicines to be included in the 
NLEM for each therapeutic class (Chongtrakul, Sumpradit and Yoongthong, 2005).   
The ISafE score has been described as a ‘threshold of quality’ (Wibulpolprasert, 
2008), whereby medicines that score below the 50th percentile for each therapeutic 
category were excluded from the NLEM based on clinical effectiveness criteria. In 
addition, the ISafE score was applied alongside some consideration for cost.  
Specifically, those medicines that passed the ‘threshold of quality’ were 
subsequently assessed through a secondary step of dividing medicines costs by their 
ISafE score. An academic researcher who was involved in the first application of the 
new procedures described the new inclusion process as a form of rudimentary 
economic evaluation. An Essential Medical Cost Index (EMCI) was used to that end, 
multiplying WHO recommended Defined Daily Doses by the cost derived from the 
list price at the Ministry of Commerce.  
They developed something called [ISafE score] […] to incorporate evidence-
based medicine [in NLEM], and as part of that they kind of calculated some 
sort of a simple economic evaluation process, by having the cost divided by 
outcomes, and that is the system that every Working Group needs to use. […] 
ISafE is more like the effectiveness part, and EMIC is an ICER [incremental 




Figure 7.1. Evolution of the procedures for the selection of essential medicines (2004-2016).  Source: own analysis, based on key-informant 






The 2008 edition of the NLEM established the methodological foundations for a 
full-fledged HTA process. Interviewees indicated that the 2008 edition of the NLEM 
played a key role in the development of HTA in the country (I12TH_civil service). 
In parallel with generating economic evaluation evidence for NLEM informally, 
HITAP’s key activity for the first year after its establishment in 2007 was to develop 
methodological standards for HTA. For that purpose, HITAP organised a 
consultative process for the development of economic evaluation guidelines, and 
commissioned the development of a Thai national database of economic evaluation 
studies. The first steps towards the development of Thai guidelines had been 
undertaken even earlier as part of the PhD research of the HITAP director (or leader, 
in HITAP terminology), which explored the feasibility of using economic 
evaluations for reimbursement of health services in Thailand28 (Teerawattananon, 
2006).  
The guideline development process included convening a larger group of national 
experts in economic evaluation, who then carried out reviews of the state of the art of 
methods for HTA and economic evaluation and made recommendations as to the 
appropriate choices for Thai HTA standards. The guidelines were based on an 
extensive assessment of existing HTA processes in other countries: Australia, 
Canada, Denmark, Norway, Hungary, England and Wales (Teerawattananon & 
Chaikledkaew, 2008). One interviewee described this process as one that included 
multiple consultative meetings and debates. Debates were often settled by consensus 
facilitated by the HTA expertise of the HITAP director (ITH6_civil service). The 
NLEM Subcommittee endorsed the guidelines in 2007, which then became the 
methodological standards for economic evaluation to inform the Subcommittee. 
 
 






The idea came from […] having seen [from abroad] that a national guideline 
is so important, so that Thai pharmaceutical industry can conduct HTA 
themselves, but based on the guidelines and assumptions [included there]. So 
this guideline will harmonise different partners and different contributions in 
a more transcribed way, and if the pharmaceutical industry conducts this in 
line with the guidelines and they have an external peer review, and it is in line 
with the guidelines, the result is reliable. So this prevents potential distortion 
that pharmaceutical industry produces competing and conflicting findings. So 
this is a powerful normative work that contributed to the long-term 
development of HTA. (I12TH_civil service) 
 
The economic evaluation guidelines did not make any reference to a cost-
effectiveness threshold, and instead suggested how incremental cost-effectiveness 
analyses should be presented in order to judge comparative value for money. The 
NLEM Subcommittee made a separate decision on the cost-effectiveness threshold, 
which referenced the WHO’s Commission of Macroeconomics in Health (World 
Health Organization, 2001) recommendation of a threshold of 1-3 times GDP per 
capita (I12TH_civil service).  
It is notable that economic evaluations carried out by HITAP researchers in support 
of policy decisions prior to this threshold decision used the highest point of this 
range. For example, in 2001, the Prime Minister announced universal access to 
HIV/AIDS medicines, mere months after the newly established UCS had excluded 
this treatment from its benefit package. IHPP researchers, including an official who 
would become part of HITAP leadership, had a close involvement in carrying out 
research, including economic evaluations, on how to ensure universal access to anti-
retroviral therapy. Two economic evaluations carried out before and after 2001 both 
indicated that anti-retroviral therapy was cost-effective at a threshold of 3 times the 
GDP per capita. However, extensive analyses of this policy process (see Tantivess, 
2006; Tantivess & Walt, 2006) showed that evidence on cost-effectiveness was not 
decisive in the 2001 decision of ensuring universal access.  In fact, the decision to 






a combination of factors which included a well-organised civil society advocacy, 
with links to a growing global advocacy, reductions in medicines prices, as well as 
the change in political leadership which led to higher prominence of the RDS in 
early 2000s (Tantivess & Walt, 2006). However, the economic evaluation results that 
the treatment to be cost-effective highlighted to HTA advocates  a tension between 
cost-effectiveness and affordability. Many policy-makers believed the treatment to 
be unaffordable for the newly established UCS, even if it provided good value for 
money.  As a result, HTA advocates learned that economic evaluation can inform the 
process of decision-making, but does not determine decision-making 
(I3TH_researcher). They also saw that, in practice, a threshold of 3 times the GDP 
per capita was too high and that affordability was an important consideration. As a 
result, in December 2007, the Subcommittee decided to use the lower point value as 
a threshold (1GDP/capita).  
HITAP and IHPP learned from this experience on the use of economic evaluation in 
policy-making, which added to their growing expertise in economic evaluation. As 
such, HITAP became the co-secretariat of the Health Economic Working Group, as 
the coordinator of the development of the economic evaluation guidelines. Prior to 
this change, the secretariat of the NLEM had been coordinated solely by the FDA, 
whose focus was on safety and efficacy of drugs. Consequently, the Health 
Economic Working Group was established and HITAP became its co-secretary. 
Importantly, the Health Economics Working Group was placed at coordination level, 
which in effect created an additional step or filter in the selection process: 
prioritisation of submissions that should undergo economic evaluation. 
For the 2008 revision of the NLEM, price negotiations for the most contested 
medicines were carried out by an ad-hoc price negotiation working group. However, 
for subsequent revisions, a permanent Committee for Price Negotiation of Patented 
Essential Drugs was created. The Price Negotiation Working Group was established 






undergo economic evaluation. Since then, the process has worked as follows:  the 
pharmaceutical manufacturer submits a price which is used as the basis for the 
economic analysis. The analysis presents results and indicates the price at which the 
medicine is cost-effective. These tables are then used to inform the negotiation of the 
price between the NLEM Subcommittee and the manufacturer.  
All these procedural changes were made directly by the NLEM Subcommittee. 
Interviewees suggested that there was consistent support for HTA from three 
subsequent chairs of the Subcommittee starting in 2001 and this view continued to 
be represented in the NLEM committee through the decade that followed. In 
particular, key members of the progressive faction of the bureaucracy (often 
members of the RDS) either had links with the chairperson of the subcommittee or 
took up the position themselves (I2TH_academia; I6TH_academia; I10TH_civil 
service). The skills of the chairperson were seen as particularly important, as 
decision-making was done through consensus, not voting (I8TH_MoPH).  Further, 
the chairperson was able to name key individuals for newly created positions (such 
as the Health Economic Working Group). The NLEM Subcommittee chair supported 
these procedural changes based on the advocacy of a HTA supporter (I10TH_civil 
service). Given this antecedent, it is likely that such incremental changes of the HTA 
process will continue. According to key-informants, a complete overhaul of the 
system is unlikely from one chair to another, but small procedural changes such as 
the ones that affect HTA processes are at the discretion of the chairperson of the 
NLEM Subcommittee (ITH7_pharma; I3TH_MoPH).  
In summary, the development of the HTA process for reimbursement of medicines 
was influenced by the manner in which related policy problems were defined, as well 
as the existing institutions associated with the problem. Medicines reimbursement 
was important from two angles: essential medicines and cost-containment, and how 
to reimburse innovative, expensive medicines that were deemed essential. The 






associated with the first version of the policy problem. The problem of funding 
innovative medicines was addressed by developing alternative institutional 
mechanisms, including negotiations with manufacturers and issuing compulsory 
licenses/pricing and reimbursement. Between 2004 and 2012, a decision-making 
process that combined elements of the two was developed, with some high-cost 
medicines becoming part of the NLEM and the latter being re-named into an optimal 
list to be used for reimbursement.  Methods for these economic evaluations, as well 
as the economic evaluation guidelines produced in 2007, drew heavily on the 
experience from other countries. Debates on methodology were agreed on amongst 
national experts who were involved in consultations. The development of the HTA 
process also included carrying out economic evaluations for decision-making on 
NLEM and for innovative medicines, such as antiretroviral and oncology drugs.  
 
Defining the benefit package: setting priorities and choosing between 
alternatives 
After the UCS was established in 2001, policy questions about the definition of the 
benefit package provided by the scheme became increasingly urgent. As examined in 
Chapter 5, many HTA advocates were also supporters of the UCS reform. However, 
while some health reformists understood the usefulness of HTA for coverage 
decisions, they felt that the question of benefit package design should not be raised at 
the first stages of the UCS, so as not to risk the progress of health system reform. 
They perceived the problem as too difficult to solve and likely to draw even more 
criticism to the UCS. As a result, a major point of focus during creation of the UCS 
was the development of payment mechanisms for health services and associated 
budget allocation responsibilities, with less attention given to the composition of the 
benefit package. Consequently, the UCS benefit package was modelled on the 






the Voluntary Health Card Scheme, a tax-financed scheme ran by the MoPH 
(Pitayarangsarit, 2004).  
However, the NHSO Board was soon forced to tackle the design of the health 
benefits package. A major exclusion from the UCS benefit package was renal 
replacement therapy for end-stage kidney disease, which drew considerable 
criticism.  Civil society groups, alongside the Royal Society of Nephrology and 
some health reformists did not agree with the exclusion, which was made based on 
cost-effectiveness grounds, but ignored equity aspects. The NHSO commissioned a 
series of  studies by HITAP and IHPP, with a view of identifying the best possible 
pathway for inclusion (Tantivess, Werayingyong, Chuengsaman, & 
Terrawattananon, 2013). The ensuing policy became known under the name of 
Peritoneal Dialysis First and was informed by an economic evaluation that compared 
haemodialysis and peritoneal dialysis with current treatment i.e. palliative care 
(Teerawattananon, Mugford, & Tangcharoensathien, 2007). Neither of these options 
were deemed cost-effective, but ‘peritoneal dialysis was found to provide better 
value for money’ compared to haemodialysis (Tantivess et al., 2013). Policy change 
was not immediate, with costs being a consistent concern and nephrologists 
opposing adoption of peritoneal dialysis instead of haemodialysis, which they 
preferred. However, physicians eventually conceded that haemodialysis would not 
be available to patients in isolated communities due to lack of equipment or 
difficulties in accessing health facilities. As demands from civil society continued in 
the face of the fact that the other publicly financed schemes were providing these 
services, universal access to peritoneal dialysis was announced in January 2008, 






continued to be monitored closely, as one of five budget subcategories of the 
NHSO29 (NHSO Annual Report, 2013).  
Based on this example of evidence generation that informed both coverage decisions 
and the subsequent design of reimbursement arrangements, the NHSO Board created 
a NSHO Subcommittee for the Development of Benefit Package and Service 
Delivery (SBPD). The SBPD commissioned the IHPP and HITAP to develop a 
process for prioritisation of services requested for inclusion in the UCS benefit 
package.  
The prioritisation process was developed between 2009 and 2010 and was 
coordinated by a research team (the IHPP and HITAP) and a project team (which 
also included officials of the NHSO, thus creating a direct link with policy-makers 
throughout the development process). The research team was responsible for 
reviewing international experience on explicit priority-setting for interventions 
considered for public reimbursement and propose criteria and procedures for 
prioritisation. The research team presented a consultation panel with the six most 
commonly used criteria for priority-setting, identified based on their review of 
experiences of HTA agencies in England and Wales, Canada, Spain, Germany, 
Netherlands, Sweden, and the United States. The research team then convened a 
consultation panel on prioritisation criteria, which deliberated on the adoption of 
these six selected criteria in Thailand. This consultation panel included academicians 
who deliberated on the types of evidence that would need to be gathered for each 
criterion. They also decided that all criteria should be given equal weight with the 
option to make additional adjustments in the future (Youngkong et al., 2012).  
 
29 Alongside general capitation, HIV/AIDS programme, chronic diseases package and a psychosis 






The project team was responsible for organising consultative meetings to agree on 
the procedures for the nomination of interventions and their prioritisation for 
assessment. As such, the project team also put together a consultation panel that 
included participants selected for ‘their expertise and […] purposively to cover 
stakeholders who play an important role in the Thai health insurance system’ 
(Youngkong et al., 2012). The goal of this panel was to agree on the number and 
type of actors involved in the decision-making process and the criteria for 
prioritisation.  
Figure 7.2 presents an outline of the resulting process for the prioritisation and 
assessment of proposed health services to be reimbursed by the UCS.As a first step, 
technology proposals are sent in to HITAP and IHPP as part of a nomination 
process. This step was inspired by the topic selection process that IHPP and HITAP 
had previously used to enable them to carry out research that policy-relevant. This 
strategy was also reminiscent of the idea of policy-relevant research that led to the 
establishment of the HSRI (see Chapter 5 for more details). The Nomination 
Working Group membership included:  
• Decision-makers from the Bureau of Policy and Strategy, Ministry of Public 
Health, and the administrators of the three health insurance schemes (4 
members);  
• Health professionals, i.e., representatives of the Royal Colleges of 
Physicians and the Royal College of Dentists (4 members); 
• Academics from faculties of public health, nursing, pharmacy and health 
economics. The faculties of Medicine and Dentistry were covered under the 






• Civil society, i.e., representatives from civil society groups  registered as a 
legal entity (e.g., foundation) and represented in the National Health 
Commission30 (13 organisations) (4 members).  
• Patient groups, as listed by the National Health Commission Office (4 
members).  
• Industry, i.e., representatives of the Thai Pharmaceutical Industry 
Association (TPMA), the Pharmaceutical Research and Development 
Association (PReMA), the Thai Medical Device Technology Association (3 
members). 
• Lay people, i.e., provincial networks of the National Health Assembly, 15 
randomly selected provincial networks (4 members).  
Notably, this Nomination Working Group included representatives of all insurance 
schemes in the country. Interviewees suggested that this was due to the long-term 
plan of ‘harmonising’ the benefit packages of all health insurance, with the CSMBS 
having the more generous plan.  
The two research organisations, HITAP and IHPP, would be tasked to synthesise 
evidence on the prioritisation criteria for each of the prioritised interventions.  Group 
The evidence on prioritisation criteria would be subsequently presented to a Topic 
Selection Working Group that would also be established as a part of the process.  
The Topic Selection Working Group included the same members as the Nomination 
Working Group, except for industry and lay people representatives. Industry 
representatives were excluded due to potential conflict of interest, whereas lay 
people representatives were deemed difficult to identify for the purpose of topic 
 
30 The National Health Commission is an autonomous government agency aiming at providing input 







selection (they usually convene once a year for the Thai Health Assembly) and to 
also being represented by the civil society category (Youngkong et al., 2012).  
 
 
Figure 7.2. Prioritisation and decision-making for inclusions in the Universal 
Coverage Benefit Package. Source: Mohara et al., 2012; Youngkong et al., 2012. 
Notably, the procedures for the Nomination Working Group built on the existence of 
the National Health Commission Office (NHCO), established in 2007 as part of the 
National Heath Act, with the goal to enable wider participation in health policy- 
making for the entire Thai health system (not just UCS). One of the key activities of 
the Commission is the yearly Thai Health Assembly. As explained in Chapter 5, the 
idea for the Thai Health Assembly first emerged amongst the RDS in the late 1980s. 






January, when the Thai Health Assembly generally happens. According to 
interviewees, sixty to eighty proposals were typically received as part of a yearly 
nomination process and were subsequently presented to the Topic Selection Working 
Group, alongside evidence on prioritisation criteria prepared by HITAP or IHPP.  
According to interviewees, six to seven interventions were typically selected per 
round of prioritisation, two times a year, out of all the requests received in January, 
with HITAP and IHPP having capacity to conduct ten to twelve assessments per year 
(Mohara, Youngkong, et al., 2012). In 2009-2010, twelve interventions were 
selected for assessment, of which five resulted in a recommendation for inclusion in 
the UCS benefit package. The procedures state that the SCBP appraises evidence and 
makes recommendations to the Board. The NHSO Board is therefore the ultimate 
decision-maker. However, interviewees highlighted the importance of the Secretary 
General of the NHSO in organising deliberations within the Board and, ultimately, 
making decisions. As is the case in the NLEM Subcommittee, decision-making is 
generally made through consensus, not through voting. In case consensus is not 
reached, it is the chair, usually the Secretary General, who makes the decision 
(I8TH_civil service). 
Support from the Secretary General also meant the NHSO Board agreed to earmark 
funding for the research necessary for this HTA process and transfer these funds to 
the HSRI. HITAP and IHPP have to justify their research proposals to the HSRI and 
the funding did not go directly to them. A civil servant interviewed for this study 
suggested that a key factor that allowed research bodies such as HITAP and IHPP to 
be involved in evidence generation for NHSO was that the NHSO did not develop 
any in-house capacity to conduct research in support of these tasks (I3TH_ civil 
service).  
In summary, the development of a HTA process for defining the health benefit 






variety of technologies being considered, in an institutional context where there were 
increasing demands from a newly established payer, namely the NHSO. As was the 
case for the NLEM, HTA process development was initiated in response to complex 
policy problems with regards to coverage of health services. Their solution was 
initially informed by evidence outside any formal processes of HTA. Researchers at 
HITAP and IHPP were then tasked with developing a HTA process to formalise their 
input in policy-making. Importantly, the incremental development process for HTA 
processes built on existing institutions. Specifically, the governance mechanisms of 
the NHSO were built into the associated processes. Furthermore, other institutions, 
such as the participatory infrastructure promoted by the RDS and set up after the 
passing of the National Health Act of 2007 (i.e., NHCO), also influenced specific 
procedural steps as part of the HTA process housed by the NHSO.   
Summary  
The development of HTA processes in Thailand responded to different policy 
problems that required decision-making, namely decisions on investment in 
expensive medical equipment; coverage decisions on medicines; and setting 
priorities for assessment of requests for inclusion in the UCS benefit package. 
Different HTA processes were developed to address these tasks, some of which were 
never fully implemented or were amended (as on medical equipment). HITAP 
played an important role in the development of HTA processes for medicines and 
UCS benefit packages.  
In the case of medical equipment, changing power structures regarding investment in 
medical equipment brought about by universal coverage reforms explain the focus of 
two proposals (1997, 2008) for HTA processes at national level: assessing expensive 
medical equipment and make recommendation about its use during market 
authorization.  In addition, a changing institutional context also influenced the 






response to IHPP-generated evidence contesting the appropriateness of investing in 
expensive radiation technology which they compared with the low priority that was 
given to providing access to basic equipment and appropriately trained personnel. In 
this context, the DMS attempted to establish authority over evidence generation on 
standards of practice for medical equipment. However, changing institutional roles 
and diminished budget allocation power for the MoPH led to limited impact of this 
initiative.  
The problem of developing reimbursement procedures for innovative medicines was 
equally influenced by existing institutions. Initially, policy development for 
reimbursement of innovative medicines (e.g., oncology and antiretroviral therapy) 
was carried out independently from existing procedures for designing the country’s 
essential medicines list. Evidence from economic evaluations and policy research 
provided by IHPP and HITAP researchers was used, independently from a HTA 
process, to inform policy development for innovative medicines and decision about 
inclusion in the NLEM. Consequently, the NLEM transitioned from an essential 
medicines list used for public procurement, to an optimum list and a de-facto 
reimbursement list used to inform centralised procurement of high-cost medicines by 
the NHSO. The procedural adjustments to accommodate this change were developed 
incrementally and built on existing procedures. With support from subsequent 
NLEM Subcommittee chairs, HITAP played an important role in both evidence 
generation and incremental changes to the procedures of the NLEM, thus becoming 
the coordinators and legitimate experts on HTA in the country.   
The third policy problem, regarding new inclusions to the UCS benefit package, was 
addressed by developing a process of prioritisation and of assessing appropriateness 
of available interventions. The process was developed through a direct commission 
from the NSHO SBPD. It was informed by a review of existing priority-setting 
criteria internationally, which were the adapted using multi-criteria decision analysis 






academics. The development of the HTA process was decisively informed by 
existing country institutions, specifically the NHSO governance arrangements and 
the participatory mechanisms coordinated by the NHCO. 
Specific challenges to the existing HTA processes in the country will be further 
analysed in Chapter 8.  
The development of HTA processes in the Philippines 
As in Thailand, the Philippines developed distinct HTA processes that evolved in 
response to different policy problems: a) investments in innovative medical 
equipment; b) coverage of medicines and c) setting priorities for the expansion of 
publicly funded health services. The section analyses what influenced the 
development of several HTA processes associated with these policy problems in the 
Philippines.  
As explained in chapter 5, the Health Insurance Act of 1995 established a legal 
mandate for HTA. This act indicated that HTA would be used to assess the use of 
expensive medical equipment by providers offering care to PhilHealth members. 
This Act also linked HTA with other tools for regulating provider behaviour, 
specifically quality assurance, utilisation review and accreditation of health care 
providers.  
In 1998, one of the early advocates of HTA became Vice President of the 
Accreditation and Quality Assurance Group at PhilHealth and proceeded to 
implement this HTA mandate. The development of a HTA process was coordinated 
by the Quality Assurance Group within PhilHealth, and happened incrementally, 
building on the reimbursement procedures of the newly-established payer. In 1999, 
the Quality Assurance Group established a Technical Working Group, eventually 






research and validation studies to assist the Corporation formulate reasonable 
policies on reimbursement of providers’ services’ (PhilHealth Special Order No. 23, 
1999). Thus, the stated goal of the HTA committee was to develop reimbursement 
policies within the confines of the already established payment mechanism, fee-for-
service, and its procedures of reimbursement. These procedures included 
continuously updating the health benefit package through PhilHealth circulars, which 
the HTA committee was mandated to assist in drafting (PhilHealth Special Order 
No. 23, 1999). 
The PhilHealth leadership set priorities for expansion of coverage for example on 
grounds of health planning priorities (e.g., Millennium Development Goals 
conditions) and other considerations, including lobbying from various actors 
(I12PH_civil service).  Further, the Quality Assurance Group’s other responsibilities 
contributed to identifying services in need of assessment based on its utilisation and 
claims review processes.  
The problem was that the claims and the review decision differed and it was 
based on the perspective of the reviewer.  I mean different across the country, 
based on the perspective of the reviewer.  And it’s hard to say what is right and 
wrong if you don’t have a basis for it.  So that’s why we were looking for 
something, a standard, at that time.  Basically, it’s the subjectivity of the review 
process.  We don’t have clinical practice guidelines at that time, or treatment 
[guidelines] that were being used by PhilHealth at that time. 
(I6PH_PhilHealth) 
 
The interest in finding a mechanism to aid decision-making was therefore driven 
both by the difficulty of making decisions where peer reviewers disagreed and a 
large number of claims that could not be reimbursed according to existing rules, but 
were submitted by providers nonetheless. In the context of PhilHealth actively 







The basic structure of the HTA committee was informed by principles of HTA 
conveyed through direct advice from an international HTA expert, David Banta 
(I6TH_PhilHealth). This advice influenced the multi-disciplinary composition of the 
committee, and its role as peer-reviewers of HTA assessment reports (also referred 
to as HTAs) produced by the Secretariat (i.e. PhilHealth staff). Furthermore, the 
evidence principles that guided the generation of such reports followed the hierarchy 
of evidence which placed randomised controlled trails (RCTs), systematic reviews 
and meta-analyses at the top, as well as procedures for quality review of evidence 
through established checklists. If the evidence was particularly weak or contested, 
the committee members would carry out the evidence review and international 
experts working as external consultants carried out peer-review.   
The HTA committee brought together experts on:  methods for HTA (clinical 
epidemiology, health policy and economics), the top services PhilHealth reimbursed 
(surgery, internal medicine, including clinical immunology and obstetrics and 
gynaecology), and technology-related topics (medical devices and rational use of 
medicines, pharmacology and toxicology) (I6TH_civil service).  
The HTA process did not seek to limit reimbursement. Its main role was to issue 
procedures associated to expanding coverage. However, it did have a view of 
standardising medical care. For instance, new benefits prioritised by PhilHealth 
management were issued alongside clinical pathways and quality standards based on 
appraisals of clinical practice guidelines. For this purpose, the HTA committee 
secretariat sought guidelines that were first assessed for quality and selected so that 
they respected the hierarchy of evidence (I16PH_civil service).   
Back then, when we were doing HTA, I think we adopted standards.  We don’t 
have to reinvent the wheel. If the healthcare providers themselves, their 
medical societies, developed the standards, we just looked at each standard and 
if they followed the process of evidence-based development of guidelines.   If 






international standards that then we adopted.  It’s not really us developing 
them, we adopted them and saw if they follow the correct methods.  And we 
did that with health technology assessment. (I8PH_PhilHealth) 
One key reimbursement regulation that directed the focus of the HTA processes was 
that reimbursement for medicines was permissible only for generic medicines 
included in the country’s essential medicines list (PNDF). Providers, particularly 
private hospitals, complained to the PhilHealth about their reimbursement claims 
being refused. Physicians also believed that more innovative procedures and 
medicines should be reimbursed and claimed these for reimbursement. The problem 
was exacerbated because the PNDF at the DoH was not being updated regularly. 
The HTA process for medicines developed incrementally. First, since medicines 
represented the largest share of claims that could not be reimbursed to providers, and 
pressure to expand the reimbursement list was growing, the HTA committee and 
Quality Assurance staff attempted to collaborate with the PNDF committee, with the 
aim of supporting PNDF to take up HTA for inclusions in the essential medicine list 
and associated Formulary (I16PH_civil service).  The PNDF committee did not take 
up HTA at that time, but responded to the pressure form PhilHealth by issuing a new 
PNDF edition.  As a second step, the Quality Assurance Group proposed that 
PhilHealth issuing a circular to providers announcing the newly reimbursable 
medicines, according to the PNDF. As a third step, the HTA committee proposed 
that, in order to avoid delays in the future, the HTA committee assess medicines and 
announce new inclusion through circulars, upon approval from the PhilHealth Board. 
These circulars would expire after a year or when the medicines would be included 






The positive list was introduced in May 200031 and meant that PhilHealth could pay 
claims for ‘medicines not yet listed in the PNDF, but which are approved by the 
Bureau of Food and Drugs and the National Drug Council [responsible with the 
PNDF] or the Health Technology Assessment Committee’ (PhilHealth Board 
Resolution no 338, s. 2000).  Finally, in August 2000, another Board resolution 
stated that approval from the PNDF committee approval was no longer necessary 
and that reimbursement for medicines not yet listed in the PNDF could be granted 
solely with approval from the HTA committee, for medicines that had received 
market authorisation from the Bureau of Food and Drug Administration. The 
positive list was updated each year until 2006, when an episode of contestation led to 
a complete re-organisation of technology assessment for medicines.   
As was the case for the other activities of the HTA committee and the Quality 
Assurance Group, the development of the positive list aimed to expand 
reimbursement of medicines. As expressed in meeting minutes of the HTA 
committee from 2003, ‘[t]he committee stressed that the purpose of the positive list 
is to look at the drugs that might really be more effective than existing PNDF drugs’ 
(HTA Committee Meeting Minutes, October 2003). As such they were therapeutic 
equivalents, which meant that the main sources of evidence required for this process 
was from studies of efficacy and effectiveness. This evidence was retrieved from 
RCTs, clinical practice guidelines, systematic reviews or meta-analyses, often from 
other countries.  The articles retrieved based on set search criteria would then be 
assessed for quality and included as sources of evidence in an evidence table 
developed by PhilHealth staff for that purpose.  
 
31 In November 1999, the Board had already approved a series of medicines, recommended by the 






Key-informants explained that the analysis of cost of the medicines under 
considerations were warranted only when a) any new medicine was considered as 
being sufficiently supported by evidence of safety and efficacy; and b) the new 
medicine was more expensive than its therapeutic equivalent already included in the 
PNDF. However, these analyses of cost were not full economic evaluations. Instead, 
judgements on cost-effectiveness were made by assessing and comparing costs 
between a technology of interest and comparators, as well as the strength of evidence 
of efficacy. In other words, assessment of evidence of efficacy was structured, 
whereas ‘cost-effectiveness’ judgements were made based expert judgement 
(I3PH_civil service).  
Much of the data used for these HTA reports came from other countries and 
published in scientific databases which were unavailable to PhilHealth staff. The 
HTA committee debated whether requests for evidence should be made directly to 
manufacturers, many of whom were multinational companies (I3PH_civil service). 
This move was questioned by some members who believed that only studies 
published in peer-reviewed journals constituted acceptable evidence. In contrast, the 
chair of the committee believed that asking manufacturers to provide evidence was 
an acceptable solution as long as evidence requirements were specified and papers 
were subsequently evaluated for quality (I16PH_civil service).  However, there was 
some downsides to this procedural change, specifically that the manufacturers would 
often criticise the delay in producing assessments and including medicines under 
evaluation in the positive list. 
We told them, well, we’ll give you the parameter, show us the evidence, so we, 
sort of, put the burden on them, to look for those.  And, the drug companies 
normally could find that literature, and come back to us for us to use that 
literature for assessment.  I mean, in an ideal world, we shouldn’t be doing 
that, we should have been having our own resources, so that we could use them, 
but that’s how we did it at the time.  We basically threw the burden back at the 
applicant, and said, well, produce this literature or we don’t do anything with 






But it was because we were not a full-time committee, we were a part time 
committee, drawn from different sources.  So, there were those inefficiencies.  
(I17PH_civil service) 
Criticism of the functioning of the HTA committee reached a peak when it was 
decided to assess atorvastatin (brand name Lipitor), developed by the multinational 
pharmaceutical company Pfizer. The assessment was initiated based on the 
utilisation review of PhilHealth, which highlighted that the medicine was 
increasingly being prescribed by physicians.  
So, we said that, okay, let’s take a look at it, even though nobody applied for 
it.  There was no application from the industry, or from a health professional, 
but they were being used heavily by many of the healthcare providers 
accredited by PhilHealth. And, we said, no, we’ll have to put a stop to this, 
seeing that if they use it, the patient now has to pay out of pocket, even though 
in the formulary there’s a cheaper version, called simvastatin and it is effective. 
(I17PH_civil service) 
The HTA assessment concluded that the existing evidence did not prove that the 
medicine was efficacious as the available evidence used on surrogate markers (in this 
case, lower cholesterol and blood lipids). The HTA committee concluded that 
providers would not be reimbursed when prescribing atorvastatin based on the view 
that its efficacy was not proven and that it was more expensive than existing 
treatment (I17TH_civil service).  
In response, the manufacturer’s country representative confronted the chairperson of 
the HTA committee and the VP of Quality Assurance Group, and threatened the 
President and CEO of PhilHealth with litigation (I3PH_civil service; 
I11PH_pharma). The manufacturer’s representatives argued that the HTA committee 
did not use the most up-to-date data, as it did not ask the company to submit 
evidence.  
They managed to exclude the most recent evidence on the product. So the 






there are new data already so I was criticising them that if you’re coming up 
with an HTA such as this that will have an impact on the product [sales], then 
you should have all available data. I don’t care if you need to revise it but it 
needs to be updated at the time that you came up with that assessment. 
(I11PH_pharma). 
The HTA committee, in contrast, argued that the surrogate marker was not an 
appropriate outcome measure and that, in the absence of data on relevant outcomes, 
such as cardiac events avoided, the evidence of safety and effectiveness of the drug 
was insufficient for a positive decision.   
No government in their right mind, with limited resources, is going to ask 
people to buy that product, and expect it to be reimbursed, if it’s that kind of a 
cost benefit ratio, I mean, two out of 1,000 with positive beneficial effect.  But, 
the argument seems to be, well, because the cholesterol went down.  Yes, but 
that surrogate marker, you haven't verified this outcome. Secondly, we told 
Pfizer, well, your own data in their own website said so… it’s a warning, it’s 
on the website, that says that we cannot guarantee that the drug will cause the 
prevention of primary or secondary cardiac conditions, and it is not used for 
the treatment of cardiac [events].  The website said so itself, so we went to 
Pfizer in the Philippines and said, your website says so.  They said, well, did 
you see the fine print at the bottom?  What? For US citizens only.  The website 
was created for US residents, and it shouldn’t be used for the rest of the world, 
or ROW. Can you imagine the arrogance of industry at that time?  
(I17PH_DoH) 
In response to the complaints of the manufacturers, the HTA committee agreed to 
publish a letter-to-the-editor of the HTA newsletter from Pfizer, and to conduct the 
evaluation with the data provided by Pfizer in the future. However, after the 
atorvastatin episode, the leadership of PhilHealth indicated that the HTA committee 
should end assessments of medicines, arguing that this was the responsibility of the 
DoH, through the PNDF committee. However, it supported the stance that the HTA 
committee could contribute evidence in support of the activities of the PNDF. Thus, 
the HTA committee was involved in drawing new regulations for the PNDF that 
used the procedures developed for PhilHealth (see following section for a detailed 






committee with regards to assessment of individual technologies were curtailed. 
Instead, the HTA committee focused on appraisal of CPGs and the development of 
standards for reimbursement, but was no longer involved in assessing specific 
technologies.  The committee continued to convene until a change in administration, 
when the incoming PhilHealth President ceased to approve the honoraria for the 
HTA committee members (I3PH_PhilHealth).  
In sum, the initial policy problem to which HTA responded referred to likely 
overinvestment associated with expensive medical equipment. This understanding of 
HTA was given a legal basis as part of the National Health Insurance Act of 1995. A 
committee was formed to implement this mandate when one of its architects became 
a high-ranking official at PhilHealth, the newly created payer organisation. The 
design of the process for HTA was influenced by two factors: a) the payer’s 
problems and priorities with regards to defining benefits for assessment; and b) by 
learning about HTA from international experts.  Based on these institutional rules 
and procedures at PhilHealth, not only the perception of the problem which HTA 
was supposed to address changed, but also the specific procedures of the HTA 
process.  PhilHealth priorities and procedures also directly influenced the 
establishment of the positive list for medicines reimbursement.  
 
Coverage decisions for medicines  
As explained above, the first changes to the Formulary selection procedures that 
signalled a move towards HTA were made in 2002. At the time, HTA advocates at 
PhilHealth attempted to persuade the Formulary committee of the importance of 
HTA. In fact, new procedures for the Formulary Committee published in 2002 
indicated that cost-effectiveness evidence might be used for selection of medicines.  






procedures in practice. According to a former member of the HTA committee, this 
was because the membership of the committee included experts who were not likely 
to consider cost-effectiveness as a criterion for decision-making. The use of 
pharmaco-economics and HTA was an innovative development, which had not been 
established among the more conservative advisers that were part of the National 
Formulary Committee (I16PH_civil service).  
As discussed above, criticism directed towards the slowness of the PNDF resulted in 
a debate over appropriate reimbursement policies for PhilHealth and their alignment 
with PNDF selection. The consensus that emerged amongst HTA advocates and 
DoH and PhilHealth officials was that the legitimate place for HTA activities was 
decision-making for PNDF inclusions at DoH.  
Procedures for selection of essential medicines and listing/delisting in the Philippine 
National Drug Formulary (PNDF) were re-designed to include input from the 
PhilHealth HTA committee. In 2006, a joint DoH/PhilHealth administrative order 
was written that combined elements of the two existing processes (HTA committee 
at PhilHealth and PNDF procedures) and represented a complete reorganisation of 
the process for inclusion of medicines at DoH. First, the membership of the National 
Formulary Committee - now renamed the Formulary Executive Council (FEC) - was 
reduced to ten members, who represented multiple disciplines, including health 
economics and clinical epidemiology. The FEC and its secretariat continued to be 
hosted by the DoH. The HTA committee at PhilHealth was tasked to form two other 
committees responsible for the prioritisation of medicines to be assessed and to bring 
together the evidence in their support: the Epidemiology Committees (consisting of 
two sub-committees for Clinical Epidemiology and Public Health) and the 
Pharmacology Committee, respectively.   
The Epidemiology Committee and its two subcommittees would have to undertake a 






included in the Formulary, to be used either for clinics and hospitals (Clinical 
Epidemiology sub-committee) or for public health programmes run by the DoH 
(Public Health Sub-committee). The subcommittees would also need to prioritise 
requests from the DoH, PhilHealth or other relevant individuals and organisations 
including manufacturers, non-government organisations, health professionals’ 
organisations, and members of the public. The Epidemiology committees were 
charged with prioritising proposals by reviewing ‘the most cost-effective clinical or 
public health practice guidelines’ (AO 2006/018), as well as applying a series of 
criteria for prioritisation. Specifically, prioritisation of medicines was done based on 
burden of disease, efficacy and safety (expressed as a benefit/risk ratio), pharmaco-
economics analysis (based on ‘quality’ economic evaluations), appropriateness to 
health provision structures in the country (e.g., level of expertise required for 
prescribing or administering etc.). The Pharmacology Committee was mandated with 
evidence generation to support comparative assessment of medicines, specifically by 
calculating the benefit/risk ratio for medicines in the same therapeutic class.   
To guide decision-making by the FEC at DoH, evidence synthesis and generation 
rules were transferred from the HTA committee at PhilHealth. Cost-effectiveness 
was more clearly defined as a criterion for deletion of medicines from the PNDF 
(i.e., if there were more cost-effective medicines), but its use depended on the 
Committee deciding to assess cost-effectiveness. As had been the case since 2002, 
the new regulations stated that the FEC may choose to perform a cost-effectiveness 
analysis, not that it is mandated to do so.  In general, cost-effectiveness was often 
quoted in the regulations in different versions, such as economic dominance, 
defining medicines as more or less cost-effective). However, the procedures 
associated with regard to methodological guidance were not developed in detail.  
The DoH and PhilHealth also negotiated that PhilHealth paid for the activities of the 






members). PhilHealth would also ensure the secretariat of these two committees. 
Lastly, PhilHealth committed to cover the cost of the publication and distribution of 
the Formulary. However, a change in leadership at PhilHealth resulted in a loss of 
support for these plans, and increased pressure from PhilHealth to ensure the payer 
maintained decision-making power for coverage decisions. This pressure was 
expressed in another amendment of the PNDF regulations in 2008, which granted 
PhilHealth increased decision-making power. Based on the new regulations, 
decisions by the FEC would have to be approved by the PhilHealth President, as well 
as Secretary of Health. However, these new provisions will change again in 2010, 
after another change in leadership at PhilHealth.  
In parallel, the overall medicines policy was re-configured in 2008, as part of the 
Cheaper Medicines Act, which included amendments of patent protection laws to 
allow local manufacturers to produce and register medicines reaching the end of their 
patent protection, to disallow patents for newly discovered uses of known medicines, 
legal protection for parallel imports, and, importantly, the power to directly set 
ceiling prices by the President and a mandate for DoH to establish a system for price 
regulation and monitoring  (Picazo, 2011, p. 17). It also led to the establishment of 
the Food and Drug Administration as a regulatory agency and a strengthening of its 
regulatory powers. 
During the negotiations regarding the implementation of the Act, the existing routine 
procedures for PNDF selection were interrupted and the PNDF was not updated 
between 2008-2011. According to one DoH civil servant, several options were 
considered for the re-constitution of the Formulary, including having the PNDF 
secretariat housed by the FDA (newly established as a regulatory agency and not a 
Bureau of the DoH) or PhilHealth. However, neither of these organisations accepted 
the tasks, it was implied, because the new Formulary would likely involve price 






resistant in immediately widening its role in medicines financing and allowing for 
outpatient medicines reimbursement, due to the likely budget impact. As a third 
option, the Secretary of Health created a new policy body within the DoH, the 
NCPAM, just before a change in administration.  
‘Because [the NCPAM was] running the formulary [...] because there was 
really a very ... there is really a very powerful industry in the Philippines and 
you have to present them with that [HTA].  You sit down with them and you 
have to argue with them on the basis of evidence, that ... they’re very 
powerful in the Philippines.’ (I5PH_civil service)  
The experience of the Cheaper Medicines Act had highlighted the uncomfortable 
position that civil servants found themselves in when negotiating with the industry. 
Interviewees from the civil service indicated that, at different times, civil servants 
and even Secretaries of Health had been ‘fearful’ (I17PH_civil service), felt ‘bullied’ 
by the industry (I22PH_civil service) or had engaged in ‘battling with these various 
interest groups’ (I5PH_civil service).  The official appointed to lead the newly 
created body was supported by the DoH leadership to take on a masters’ degree in 
HTA at the University of Birmingham in the UK (2011-2012) to mitigate the 
strength of the industry with expertise in HTA. Further, the main supporter of HTA 
in the Philippines who had initiated HTA at PhilHealth was appointed 
Undersecretary of Health at the DoH, under the new administration, and continued to 
support HTA as a policy solution for pharmaceutical selection, procurement and 
reimbursement.  
HTA is not very new to the Philippines, […] Undersecretary Madeleine 
Valera - so she introduced HTA back in 1999 in PhilHealth.  They were 
already doing it, except that here [in the Philippines] reforms are personality 
based, so she left PhilHealth and PhilHealth dropped HTA. (I5PH_Civil 
service) 
NCAPM issued new procedural rules for PNDF inclusion soon thereafter. The new 






included substantial revisions to the membership of the committee, submission 
procedures and prioritisation of submissions, as well as procedures for evidence 
synthesis and generation, and rules for transparency, such as declaration of conflicts 
of interest, and public sharing of PNDF materials). Cost-effectiveness was added as a 
criterion for inclusion, alongside the detailed procedures to be used. In addition, 
more stringent criteria were attached to decision-making on exemptions to 
procurement requested by government bodies (e.g., DoH programmes or public 
hospitals).   
The FEC could ask for further evidence gathering to be carried out by so-called 
evidence review groups (ERG). The ERGs would be charged with preparing 
evidence summaries on the PNFS’ inclusion criteria: benefit/risk assessment; cost-
effectiveness; budgetary impact and health system consideration. The evidence 
summaries would be based systematic reviews and other sources such as clinical 
practice guidelines and post-marketing surveillance data. Criteria for forwarding 
submissions to the ERGs would be ‘deliberated on by the FEC’ (AO 0018/2012). In 
practice, the ensuing process for ERG submissions was a not very systematic, 
lacking a score or checklist (I3PH_academia). Decision-making was described by 
one member of the FEC as being based on whether the evidence was deemed ‘sound 
and believable’, but not associated procedures were clarified (I13PH_academia). 
Besides FEC members, specialities representatives could be called for deliberations 
if necessary.  Consequently, key informants spoke about prioritisation and even 
decision-making in some cases being reached depending on who was present at the 
meeting (I3PH_academia), particularly since 2015, membership was lowered from 
eleven to seven members due to difficulties in achieving quorum (I18PH_civil 
service).  
Submissions to the ERG happened only in two cases:  if evidence was contested 






if evidence was believable, but no decision-making could be reached (high degree of 
uncertainty), submission to the ERG would also be warranted. However, formal 
economic evaluations by the ERG were rare. Most decisions are made based on 
efficacy/effectiveness data or expert opinion and a comparison with prices on the 
successful price bid list or the Drug Price Reference Index (DPRI) for essential 
medicines.  
So I don’t know if there are other people in the country who can do that.  So 
because of that many of the decisions that are made in the HTA I would say 
about 80 percent do not include a cost-effectiveness evaluation or economic 
models. Many times it was down to either cost minimisation type of analysis 
or even a cost consequence analysis. (I13PH_academia) 
Although cost-effectiveness evaluations were rare, the FEC secretariat and the 
NCPAM continued to make incremental moves to support their use by the FEC. In 
2012, the Undersecretary of Health established links with NICE International in 
order to learn from the process of NICE. In 2012-2013, the FEC secretariat received 
support from NICE International and HITAP in carrying out three economic 
evaluations for priority topics in the country. As a result of these partnerships, the 
Formulary Secretariat commissioned the development of a methods manual by a 
leading health economist in the country. The aim of this manual was to standardise 
the evaluation process, ensure methodological quality and a transparent process 
based on HTA principles.  Further, a cost-effectiveness threshold of 1 GDP per 
capita was adopted by the FEC, as recommended by the WHO Commission of 
Macroeconomics in Health.   
According to FEC members, dissent over a FEC decision within the committee was 
rare. However, some high-profile cases of contestation were linked to a limited 
number of cost-effective analyses on innovative vaccines, conducted starting in 2013 






In summary, HTA processes for medicines coverage developed incrementally based 
on the existing procedures at the PNDF, as well as being informed by the HTA 
processes of PhilHealth. Initially, HTA advocates tried to complement the 
procedures for inclusion in the Formulary and reimbursement at PhilHealth. 
However, the collaboration between PhilHealth and the DoH on assessing medicines 
was short-lived. PhilHealth leaders challenged regulations indicating that PhilHealth 
could pay for evidence generation experts and that DoH would maintain decision-
making power. PhilHealth believed it should be able to make decisions over the 
coverage of medicines, not only their reimbursement. As will be seen in chapter 8, 
the lack of clarity in roles between the DoH and PhilHealth continued to be a 
challenge to the sustainability of PNDF processes. 
  
The expansion of services covered by PhilHealth 
In January 2016, a Subcommittee for Benefits was established under the PhilHealth 
Board for the first time and was charged with clarifying decision-making on benefit 
expansion by PhilHealth (see chapter 5 for a more in-depth analysis of this policy 
problem). In short, the process of developing benefits by PhilHealth became of 
interest for policy action in the context of perceived irrational prioritisation of 
benefits as well as delays in the implementation of primary care benefits or other 
benefits under consideration by the PhilHealth Board (I16PH_civil service; 
I7PH_reseracher). Interviewees explained that the Subcommittee was formed at the 
advice of researchers and civil servants that had a wider interest in health care 
reforms and advancing towards UHC. This advice was given directly to a member of 
the PhilHealth Board (I16PH_civil service).  
The members of the Benefits Subcommittee are representatives for: the employers 






Department of Finance, health care providers sector, formal economy sector, Filipino 
Overseas Worker sector, Department of Social Welfare and Development, and an 
expert member of the Monetary Board (members).  Civil servants of the PhilHealth 
Department for Benefit Development and representatives of the commissioner 
(UNICEF Philippines) also sat on Subcommittee meetings. The Subcommittee met 
approximately five times during December 2015 – June 2016.   
In parallel, the UNCEF Philippines, which had an interest in benefit package 
development and was awaiting the implementation of a benefit package for 
premature births, as well as one for children with disabilities, commissioned a study 
to provide answers to the question of what conditions should be prioritised for the 
expansion of benefit packages. Two private research organisations established by 
Filipino academics, Epimetrics, Inc. and the Alliance for Improving Health 
Outcomes Research (AIHO), carried out this study. The research group was invited 
to present its work to the Subcommittee on Benefits in January 2016.  
The research group utilised Global Burden of Disease and Census Population 
Projections (2015-2035) to produce a ‘list of the most burdensome disease causes’ 
(Wong et al., 2018). The research group presented the findings of the initial study by 
comparing the top burden of disease (measured in DALYs) to the main claims paid 
by the PhilHealth in 2014. They used the Pareto principle as an arbitrary point to 
identify the diseases responsible with the largest share of the disease burden, i.e., 
80% of DALYs lost. In general, the research group showed a mismatch between the 
burden of health problems and current spending, as well as very few of these priority 
problems being allocated a large share of the spending because costly interventions 
were prioritised over less costly and often less technology intense interventions (e.g.,  
pre-term birth complications interventions: paying for routine obstetric care and 
caesarean sections separately) (Wong et al., 2018). The Pareto principle was used in 






principle that a small number of conditions would cause the majority of DALYs lost. 
Based on its findings, the research team suggested that PhilHealth should be 
developing its benefit packages by using criteria of burden of disease, cost-
effectiveness and relevant ethical criteria (particularly priority to the worse off). 
But then when [PhilHealth]got the list … okay, ischemic heart disease, we 
already have a package for this or COPD. We already have this.  I don’t know 
what others, diabetes, other common ones. So the question was, what do we 
do now?  What do we do with this list?  What are the interventions that we 
should cover, because they’re so used to expanding by intervention/interest 
group?  Like, it’s a very niche population, like children with disabilities, 
premature new-borns, other packages.  Kidney transplants, breast cancer … 
they were so used to disease/intervention [pairs], that they weren’t sure what 
to do with the list of the high burden diseases.  ‘Okay, you gave this to us. 
What do we do with it?’ […] ‘What do you propose?  Maybe you need a benefit 
package.  Maybe you need a priority-setting process’ and then they said, ‘Oh, 
maybe, yes.  That’s a good idea. We can do that,’ […] So deliverables kept on 
changing along the way, because we just had to respond to what PhilHealth … 
what we thought PhilHealth needed and basically our assessment of how they 
could benefit from our work.’ (I7PH_civil service) 
In light of these findings, the Subcommittee agreed to expand the remit of the initial 
project. Initially researchers considered developing distinct benefit packages for the 
48 conditions that they identified as causing 80% of DALYs lost (I7PH_researcher).  
However, the research team realised that the task was beyond their capacity, partly 
because it required data that was unavailable (e.g., on the costs of the proposed 
benefits). There was an ongoing process of consultation and decision-making 
between researchers, civil servants and commissioners to decide on the best proposal 
for the Committee. Eventually, a new goal was set that was to produce: 1) a proposal 
for a priority-setting process, 2) a prototype for the development of benefit packages, 
and 3) a list of interventions to undergo economic evaluation.  
 The prototype for the development of the benefit package was renamed the 
guaranteed health benefit package (GHBP). The prototype uses the tool developed 






OneHealth Tool (OHT) software.  These tools were useful in localizing foreign cost-
effectiveness studies (by inputting global disease burden estimates, as well as 
adapting outcomes and costs to the Philippine population). In the short term, 
researchers proposed that the process would have to be supported by such 
localisation of global data. In the long term, however, they outlined the need for 
systematic data collection, epidemiological data, more information on intervention 
inputs and costs, and health utility data elicited from a Philippine sample. Such pre-
requisites for economic evaluation were lacking in the country at the time.  
The development process for the GHBP included a first step of reviewing literature 
on priority-setting principles. Interviewees indicated that the research group was 
informed by two main sources from the international literature: the report by 
Glassman and Chalkidou (2012) that reviews the experience of priority-setting 
institutions, with a focus of making recommendations for low and middle-income 
countries; second, the accountability for reasonableness framework (Daniels, 2000), 
which has informed many established HTA processes. Furthermore, researchers 
reviewed the published experiences of HTA processes in other settings, such as 
Australia, Chile, Thailand, and England and Wales. Based on these sources, 
researchers identified twenty procedural and substantive criteria that they then 
prioritised in focus group discussions with selected actors.  The research group 
identified participants based on their expertise in public health, evidence-based 
medicines, ethics, quality of care, health policy, health economics, epidemiology and 
law. The focus group discussions were aimed at debating and re-classifying criteria, 
in order to identify which criteria should or should not be used for priority-setting by 
PhilHealth.  
The development of this process highlights the difficulties of translating existing 
criteria and process steps from other settings. As expected, consultations on the 






achieving agreement (I2PH_academia). Interviewees involved in the consultations 
highlighted that some results were unexpected, in particular the lower value received 
by equity considerations. Participants did not value equity and fairness highly 
because there was a perception that it would lead to exclusion of parts of the 
population that are comparatively better off, thus undermining the goals of UHC. 
Furthermore, participants also valued ‘expressed stakeholder demand’ negatively 
due to being associated with undue influence and lobbying for specific benefit 
packages.  
Roundtable discussions used the outputs from focus group discussions to refine the 
list of process and priority-setting criteria.  Some experts argued that over-emphasis 
on magnitude did not sufficiently take into account the difference between life-
saving interventions and lower-impact treatments. Furthermore, some experts, 
particularly clinicians, disagreed with prioritising high-burden diseases over rare 
conditions. Ultimately, it was research group members who made decisions on how 
many criteria to select, and many of these criteria were adopted through direct 
emulation of existing HTA processes. For example, cost-effectiveness was relatively 
low on the list, below equity and fairness, but it was added as a criterion for priority-
setting anyway.  Overall, the research team added cost-effectiveness as a criterion to 
be included after three main priority-setting criteria were applied to shortlist 
interventions: magnitude and severity with an equity component, effectiveness and 
household impact.  
Researchers themselves indicated that there were some barriers to the direct 
emulation of criteria and practices used in other settings. First, there was little 
guidance on how decisions on criteria were made in other countries, which raised a 
question about the out-of-context character of existing advice. In particular, the 
research team wondered why and how certain decisions were taken with regards to 






carried out in specific parts of the bureaucracy and what was the link with other parts 
of the civil service. Consequently, researchers tried to use of existing structures of 
PhilHealth for the different functions of the process. Interestingly, the creation of a 
jury pool for shortlisting and appraisal panels was based on the example of 
Thailand’s nomination and prioritisation panels. As explained in the case study of 
Thailand, the participatory mechanisms used by the NHSO drew on pre-existing 
structures of public engagement, namely the Thai National Health Assembly.  
Following this model, the research group recommended that PhilHealth assemble a 
three-year jury pool of ‘experts, advocates and sectoral representatives, willing to 
declare conflicts of interest and ensuring that the members would be geographically 
representative’ (Timola, 2018), but that would mean establishing these mechanisms 
for this specific process.   
The proposal outlined above was approved by the Benefits Subcommittee and the 
PhilHealth Board in May 2016. However, this approval came just before a change in 
administration which led to new appointments at the DoH and the leadership of 
PhilHeath. Clearly, the implementation of the priority-setting process depended on 
the incoming leadership. In addition, civil servants and HTA advocates indicated that 
the influence of the civil service, whose members were involved in the process 
development, could also lead to the implementation of the proposal, as was the 
continuing support from the research team. Consultants describe aiding civil servants 
in the implementation of their output, including by preparing policy documents, such 
as circulars, for implementation.  
Once they’re okay with it, now that their board has approved of it [the priority-
setting process], then our work is not yet done. It’s still in our commitment to 
do the circulars with them. Because if we expect them to take it on after we 
give them a full technical report then maybe it’s one year after, two years after, 
it still not yet done. The strategy for us, for fast massive uptake, will have to 
be: okay, now that it’s approved, you give it back to us, what are the main 






the office, and if you need any more changes tell us, we will help you edit it. 
It’s really an added arm and leg for them [civil servants]. (I12PH_ researcher) 
As explained in chapter 6, however, some HTA advocates believed that HTA 
processes should be housed by the DoH. In effect, subsequent developments led to 
focus being concentrated on DoH activities, with plans for a HTA council housed by 
the DoH to consider coverage decisions for health services, as well as medicines.  
In sum, the development of the priority-setting process for PhilHealth was prompted 
by increasing debates on the appropriateness of the benefits being provided. These 
debates focused equally on the types of services being provided and the conditions 
that were being prioritised via existing benefit packages. A research project 
commissioned by UNICEF Philippines attempted to respond to both these aspects of 
the policy problem. It reviewed existing procedures for priority-setting from other 
countries to identify criteria for prioritisation and review these through a consultative 
process. The research team also produced analyses that associated priority conditions 
by burden of disease with cost-effective interventions. Based on these analyses, the 
team produced a proposal for priority-setting to PhilHealth which was adopted by 
PhilHealth Subcommittee on Benefits. Decision-making and implementation of the 
process remained the decision of the PhilHealth Board.  
Summary 
The development of HTA processes in the Philippines was organised around three 
policy problems that policy-makers needed to address. They were very similar to the 
problems to which HTA was expected to respond in Thailand and resulted in 
attempts to develop HTA processes to: inform decisions on investment in medical 
equipment (which evolved into defining reimbursable services for PhilHealth); 
inform decisions of inclusion in the country’s essential medicines list; and develop a 






In chronological order, the first HTA process was developed even though the 
problem of overinvestment in medical equipment was anticipated rather than 
identified as a major trend in the Philippine health sector. Further, the existing 
institutional arrangements for social health insurance did not provide many levers for 
tackling the problem of investment in medical equipment. Consequently, once a 
HTA process was established, it contributed to refining the policy problem in 
accordance with the institutional context - specifically, the reimbursement of 
medicines and of routine medical services used in reimbursable inpatient procedures. 
However, the new focus, particularly on medicines, attracted opposition from 
manufacturers. One episode of confrontation between manufacturers and PhilHealth 
over the assessment of atorvastatin (Lipitor) that involved a recommendation to not 
reimburse the medicine had important consequences to limiting the activities of the 
HTA committee and, ultimately, its discontinuation. The conflict over atorvastatin 
directly led to PhilHealth giving up HTA of medicines. However, HTA processes for 
medicines were not completely abandoned. They were moved to the DoH, which 
policy-makers believed had the authority to carry out such assessments for inclusion 
in the essential medicines list and associated National Formulary.   
The HTA process developed for the National Formulary resulted in task sharing 
between the DoH and PhilHealth and built on the procedures that had been 
developed by the HTA committee. However, the new process was never 
implemented due to disagreements between DoH and the PhilHealth leadership. In 
parallel, direct, ad-hoc negotiations with manufacturers as a result of the Cheaper 
Medicines Act suspended regular procedures for medicine selection in the 
Formulary. The re-constitution of the Formulary Committee brought about the 
development of new procedures for the Formulary and the inclusion of cost-
effectiveness as a formal criterion for medicine selection and that could inform price 
negotiations (2012). However, the associated procedures were slow to be developed 






A third HTA process was developed as an answer to the opaque process of benefit 
development by the payer, PhilHealth. The UNICEF country office, which had 
collaborated with PhilHealth on the development of selected benefits, funded a study 
on identifying priority conditions that should be tackled by PhilHealth. The results 
were presented to a PhilHealth Subcommittee on Benefits, although there were no 
formal links between PhilHealth and the commissioning of the study. The policy 
problem was refined in collaboration with this Subcommittee and PhilHealth civil 
servants. Specifically, PhilHealth already provided benefits targeting high-burden 
conditions, although not consistently. The focus of the study became to identify best 
available interventions for 48 conditions that caused 80% of disease burden. While 
the task of using generalised cost-effectiveness analysis to achieve this goal proved 
to be beyond the capacity of the research team given available resources, the project 
resulted in a proposal for a process to develop a guaranteed benefit package for the 
PhilHealth and to assess any new interventions being considered by PhilHealth. The 
process was developed by reviewing international experience in priority-setting and 
by consultative meetings to adapt international criteria and principles to the 
Philippine context.  Both proposals were approved by PhilHealth Board just before a 
change in administration. The implementation of the two proposals was likely to 
depend both by incoming PhilHealth leadership and wider debates over purchasing 
responsibilities in the Philippine health system.  
The debates over purchasing and further contestation to the functioning of HTA in 
the Philippines will be analysed in Chapter 8. The following section will compare 
and contrast the development of HTA processes in the two countries.  
Comparative analysis of the development of HTA processes 
The analysis of HTA process development in the two countries highlighted the 
multiple attempts at establishing HTA processes. The policy problems that were 






fact that HTA was initially seen as a tool to inform investment in medical equipment 
seems like a clear sign of policy transfer, as was the problem of high-cost medicines. 
The same cannot be said about defining a minimum benefit package. High-income 
countries have only rarely set out to clearly define their health benefit packages. 
Instead, they use HTA and other means to define aspects of the health benefit 
package. For middle-income countries, in line with development towards UHC, the 
complex question of how to cover the basic services emerges, in addition to 
increasing demand for innovative services.  
Unsurprisingly, then, the first policy problem raised by HTA advocates in both 
countries was investment in expensive medical equipment. Differences between the 
two countries came from the degree to which HTA advocates defined the policy 
problem through the lens of the existing country institutions that were mandated with 
finding solutions to the problem or needed to be reformed to do so. For example, in 
the case of Thailand, HTA advocates concentrated on the existing decision-making 
arrangements for investment in medical equipment.  Specifically, government 
involvement in medical equipment was considerable, at different levels of 
government: the MoPH central and provincial leadership, as well as the Bureau of 
Budget under the Ministry of Finance. As a consequence, all these decision-making 
points needed to be informed by a proposed HTA process. HTA advocates also 
believed that investment in medical equipment by private providers was to the 
detriment of the public health system, in the absence of a uniform policy that 
supported private provision alongside public provision. Seen only briefly in the 
1990s in association to HTA, the problem re-emerged as the Thai government 
unveiled the Thai Medical Hub policy designed to encourage medical tourism to 
Thailand. Initially, the growth of the medical tourism industry was seen as an 
opportunity to increase financing of the publicly financed UCS. However, these 
coordination plans did not receive sufficient support. As a consequence, the 






opposition. Furthermore, the plans were ambitious given that the application of HTA 
to medical equipment is notoriously difficult due to the generally lower levels of 
regulation applied to medical devices. As such, opposition also came from outside 
government.  
In contrast, in the Philippines, there was little role for government when it came to 
investing in expensive medical equipment.  As such, the first iteration of HTA was 
implemented independently from the institutional arrangements for investment in 
medical equipment. In other words, the idea of HTA - as a tool for cost-containment 
associated with innovative medical equipment - was transferred in an institutional 
context where there were no clear decision-making structures for the problem. Thus, 
the Philippine case at this stage seems to be a pure case of policy transfer. However, 
the lack of power structures - that could be infringed upon by a HTA process with 
regards to medical equipment - allowed the process to be modelled by the payers’ 
other needs or policy problems. Once implemented, the focus of HTA processes 
further changed based on the priorities and role of the payer under which it 
functioned. Neither of these included direct influence on investment in medical 
equipment. Rather, the focus of HTA processes shifted towards basic services and 
treatments, which represented the bulk of reimbursable claims by PhilHealth. The 
focus of the HTA processes evolved as a response to PhilHealth’s institutional roles.  
Specifically, PhilHealth could influence provider behaviour indirectly, based on: a) 
limiting reimbursement of medicines to those included in the National Formulary; b) 
developing procedures to judge reimbursable claims from providers; c) developing 
evidence-based guidance for providing newly introduced services; and d) developing 
accreditation procedures for providers.  
One particular factor that distinguished the two cases was the degree to which 
domestic research and evidence generation influenced the establishment of HTA 






drove the MoPH to attempt to establish authority over generating such evidence and 
associated recommendations for appropriate investment in medical equipment. In 
contrast, in the Philippines, evidence generation, appraisal and coverage decisions 
seemed to be brought about by HTA processes, once established. Because both 
countries had domestic research teams that developed policy proposals for priority-
setting, we posit that the contrast was due to weaker institutional pathways for 
research to inform policy-making in the Philippines rather than a lack of capacity 
from researchers. This hypothesis is supported by the lack of pre-requisites for 
economic evaluations – such as burden of disease studies based on basic national 
statistics or costing data – in the Philippines. By comparison, key-informants in 
Thailand highlighted the importance of this basic evidence ‘infrastructure’.  
In both countries, the placement of the authority for coverage decisions was a 
significant institutional influence on the design of HTA processes. Different views 
over who should coordinate HTA processes led to interruptions in the case of the 
Philippines, and parallel organisations aiming to coordinate HTA processes in 
Thailand.  For example, in the Philippines, once the policy problem to which HTA 
procedures at PhilHealth responded was re-defined to be the lack of reimbursement 
of newer medicines, HTA advocates agreed that the authority for such decision-
making lay with the DoH, which was already hosting a committee for inclusion in 
the essential medicines list and associated Formulary. In response to the contested 
exclusion of Lipitor from PhilHealth reimbursement and the opposition from 
manufacturers linked to this decision, HTA of pharmaceuticals was moved to the 
DoH.  
As the two countries expanded their publicly-provided services, they needed to 
consider the role of the essential medicines list and develop procedures for 
reimbursement and procurement of medicines. In Thailand, HTA processes focused 






medicines procurement was particularly important for the Philippines. This 
difference is due to the institutional context in each country. In Thailand, the newly 
created UCS added a third layer of reimbursement procedures, in parallel with 
reinforcing the rule that each scheme was to use the NLEM list as a reimbursement 
list. This was done with soft regulation, rather than a clear decision as part of the 
UCS reforms. In contrast, the essential medicines list in the Philippines was mainly 
used for procurement of medicines by the DoH. The same limitation for 
reimbursement of essential medicines only by the PhilHealth existed. However, in 
practice, the benefit packages developed by the PhilHealth had not way of tracking 
which medicines were actually used. Providers were reimbursed for a specific kind 
of service, not the medicines they used to provide that service.   
In both countries, HTA processes were developed as part of adjustments to existing 
selection procedures for their respective essential medicines list. Both countries had 
rules that limited reimbursement by public insurance schemes to medicines in the 
essential medicines list. Eventually, both countries moved to include patented, 
innovative and expensive medicines in their essential medicines lists. For example, 
in Thailand, the essential medicines list was re-branded as an optimal list once it 
included high-cost medicines. In Thailand, the NLEM has been referred to as an 
optimal list, perhaps to respond to criticism that the UCS will not be able to provide 
the newest medicines demanded by patients. However, the institutional place of the 
NLEM stayed the same, with new procedures being added, including economic 
evaluation for expensive medicines and price negotiations in collaboration with the 
NHSO. A new sub-list was also created, specifically for these expensive medicines. 
In contrast, in the Philippines, both the procedures and the institutional placement of 







There was considerable difference between the extent to which economic evaluation 
were conducted to inform decisions on which drugs to include and played a role in 
policy development for reimbursement or procurement. As seen in the Philippine 
case, regulations clearly stated that cost-effectiveness should be a criterion for 
decision-making employed by the committee. However, very few economic 
evaluations were carried out to support PNDF inclusion. Three such studies, starting 
with 2012, informed deliberations over exemption requests to procure innovative 
vaccines. In Thailand, the move towards HTA included informal generation of 
economic evaluation and other research to inform policy development of high-cost 
medicines before cost-effectiveness became an official criterion for NLEM 
inclusion. Associated procedures were developed incrementally and consisted of the 
creation of a Health Economic Working Group under the NLEM that could identify 
the type of problems of the NLEM that were amenable for economic evaluation.  
Comparing the two processes also highlights the role of economic evaluation 
guidelines. In Thailand, interviewees suggested that the guidelines played a key role 
in developing and establishing HTA. They were based on PhD research of the 
official who later became the HITAP director. The process of guideline development 
included commissioning topics to researchers from universities who reviewed the 
state of the art and assessed the most appropriate rule based on the Thai capacity. It 
also guided ‘infrastructure’ needs such as preference valuation for health-related 
quality of life from a Thai sample, and built on an already strong health information 
system. The process of guideline development was settled based on authority and 
expertise. In the Philippines, having more than one economist in the Formulary 
Executive Committee highlighted differences and debates between what were 
considered acceptable assumptions for economic evaluations. As such, guidelines 
that could provide a common frame of reference and limit variability in methodology 






Economic evaluation guidelines are important because different health economists 
could carry out research to answer a specific question in different ways. Uniformity 
would ensure that the same analysis could be carried out by different researcher, and 
not negotiate choices that are unlikely to be evidence-informed. The importance of 
the guidelines can be seen in the Philippines, where there was a limited number of 
heath economists, who would not only argue for the appropriateness if the analysis, 
but also the specific methodological choices made. Methodological guidelines 
minimise both such disagreements and variability in methods used.  
The similarity in policy problem that HTA was expected to address continues for the 
third type of HTA processes developed in each country. Again, the definition of the 
policy problem was influenced by in-country institutions. In Thailand, there was 
sustained pressure on the NSHO to expand the health benefit package, often by 
adding services on its high-cost list, which was explicitly defined. In the Philippines, 
PhilHealth continuously expanded its benefit packages and was, by all accounts, 
responsive to lobbying and advocacy from various sources. The definition of the 
policy problem highlighted the need to prioritise among conditions as well as 
judging the value for money of interventions tackling specific diseases. In the 
Philippines, the researchers who developed the priority-setting and associated HTA 
process addressed the first part of the problem more clearly. In Thailand, the 
priority-setting process approached prioritising between conditions indirectly, by 
prioritising proposals for consideration, not by comparing interventions across 
conditions.  
In both countries, the priority-setting processes was directly commissioned by the 
payer (Thailand) or a development partner collaborating with the payer (Philippines). 
The development process included reviewing international experiences and 
organising consultative meetings to debate appropriateness of principles and criteria 






heavily on the priority-setting process developed in Thailand. Decision-making on 
appropriateness of criteria was debated in groups of experts and policy-makers, but 
were ultimately decided by researchers and a limited numbers of policy experts. 
Conclusion 
This chapter analysed the process of developed of several HTA processes in 
Thailand and the Philippines. These processes responded to policy problems that 
were similar in both countries, but that were defined in detail through their 
association with existing institutions. These existing institutions, specifically existing 
decision-making procedures for the three policy problems, were modified 
incrementally by adding the distinct elements of HTA. The processes that failed 
tended to attempt to establish completely new decision-making processes. The 
common frame provided by HTA as a policy solution, particularly its associated 
methods, was an important tool that, while debated, tended to be settled among a 
limited number of experts. Once settled, it enabled collaboration amongst experts 
that shared a common frame of reference.  
Existing institutions were not only relevant for the development of HTA processes, 
but also for their ongoing functioning and sustainability. This issue will be explored 







8. Ongoing functioning of HTA processes in 
Thailand and the Philippines 
Having explained how HTA was established, both in terms of organisation and 
process elements, the current chapter looks at how HTA processes and organisations 
operated in an ongoing process of institutionalisation. First, it will explore how the 
interest of actors who are generally associated with opposition to HTA emerge with 
regards to specific decisions. Second, it will analyse the nature of the debates that 
emerge when decisions are contested.  Finally, it will explore the link between HTA 
and other parts of health system governance, specifically the interaction between 
HTA organisations and processes and MoPH/DoH or payers.  
This chapter will start by analysing these three elements for each of the two 
countries, followed by a comparison of the characteristics of the ongoing process of 
institutionalisation in both countries. 
Ongoing functioning of HTA processes in Thailand 
As of 2016, the three HTA processes functioning in Thailand – the NLEM process, 
the SCBP process and the IMRTA process - had reached different levels of 
establishment.  Specifically, one interviewee referred to the NLEM process as 
having been successful in collecting the ‘low-hanging fruit’ (I3TH_civil service) of 
applying economic evaluation to high-cost medicines and contributing to lowering 
prices of such medicines. They described the usefulness of producing evidence for 
decision-making for high-profile medicines and indicated that the contestation was 
particularly useful to the establishment of the NLEM HTA process (I3TH_civil 
service). In particular, HITAP carried out research related to high-cost medicines 






before the establishment of HTA processes. Interviewees from HITAP suggested 
that such research contributed to establishing both the authority of HITAP within the 
bureaucracy, and the legitimacy of using cost-effectiveness to inform inclusion of 
high-cost medicines (I2TH_civil service).  
In contrast, the use of HTA at the NHSO appeared less established. In 2011, as part 
of the NHSO priority-setting, HITAP and IHPP argued that the decision-making 
process should focus on developing a “population-based screening package” for the 
UCS. Eleven interventions were suggested for inclusion into this screening package, 
presented to the Subcommittee in 2013 (Teerawattananon et al., 2016). Compared to 
medicines and other curative services, health promotion interventions were quick to 
attract contestation. First, actors in the NHSO Board opined that value for money 
was not a relevant consideration for this screening benefit package because ‘health 
promotion is always good’ (I7TH_academia). Second, HTA researchers also noted 
that these debates were o caused by the lack of high quality studies of the 
effectiveness of health promotion interventions. There was also debate on how to 
measure the effectiveness of health promotion interventions, for example with regard 
to measuring health outcomes (Greco, Lorgelly and Yamabhai, 2016). As a result of 
these two factors, the evidence generated to support the development of the 
population-based screening package often did not include economic evaluation.  
Interviewees suggested that, opposition to value for money as a criterion 
notwithstanding, the lack of clear judgment on the value for money for these 
interventions led to HTA processes encountering more contestation and questioning.  
But sometimes research is like art. […] Most of the time, we cannot do 
economic evaluation for every health promotion intervention, as we cannot 
find good evidence to support the effectiveness of this kind of intervention. So, 
when you review the best [effectiveness] evidence you have in hand, and you 
summarise everything for every intervention, the existing interventions in 
Thailand now, and you show them to policy-makers, it seems like, hmm, 
difficult to judge, because we don’t have economic evaluation results to 






difficult; it’s more difficult than treatment interventions, when you use an 
economic evaluation study. (I6TH_academia) 
Some of the methodological problems outlined above were addressed by a second 
edition of the Thai HTA guidelines, which included more guidance for generating 
evidence of effectiveness. Further, considerations with regards to other criteria, such 
as social and ethical implications of coverage decisions were given increased 
attention (Chaikledkaew and Kittrongsiri, 2014).  Another area of improvement was 
on the cost-effectiveness threshold, which had not been included in the first edition. 
In 2013, HITAP conducted a study that estimated a cost-effectiveness threshold for 
the Thai population based on willingness to pay (i.e. using a demand-side method). 
The results showed a range between 0.4 -2 times GDP/capita, which was lower, but 
‘in line with the range of 1-3 times the GDP per capita that the Commission on 
Macroeconomics and Health recommends’ (Thavorncharoensap et al., 2013, p. 34). 
The findings were considered to be ‘consistent with the past allocation decisions of 
the NLEM, which set a ceiling threshold of 1 GDP/QALY’ (Thavorncharoensap et 
al., 2013).  The study also indicated that there should be more than one threshold, 
depending on the conditions under consideration and the size of health improvement 
they produce.  
Furthermore, as stated by an official of HITAP, the work of the SCBP process at 
NHSO also resulted in several other questions to which answers were required 
regarding the implementation of selected interventions. These were not covered in 
existing guidelines, because they were not normally part of HTA processes.  Such 
questions required different types of evidence to be answered, such as evaluations of 
programmes and implementation research. For example, HITAP embarked on the 
development of quality standards to ensure appropriate implementation of 
interventions that had been recommended and included in the UCS benefit package. 
This particular task was carried out with support from the international branch of 






interviewees from Thailand indicated that this new direction of HITAP was not 
desirable or appropriate and that HITAP should continue to focus on assessing value 
for money and informing decisions to fund health services (I5TH_civil service; 
I10TH_civil service). 
However, some of the debates around health promotion interventions, even when 
expressed in methodological terms, were not about strength of evidence, but about 
opposition to HITAP acquiring more power (I23TH_academia). The same actors 
who disagreed with HTA processes assessing health promotion interventions also 
suggested that the MoPH should not have more than one HTA body and indicated 
that IMRTA should be maintained and strengthened (I23TH_academia). This was 
explained by the fact that HITAP staff were predominantly pharmacists, therefore 
not qualified to assess medical interventions. The IMRTA was not seen as having the 
same problem, as it was part of the DMS, which managed the country’s top 
speciality hospitals.  
A key factor to the sustainability of HTA processes was the support from the NHSO. 
For example, the high-cost medicines included in the NLEM were then procured 
centrally by the NHSO. As one key-informant suggested, the balance of power in the 
NHSO Board was vital for the adherence to either of the HTA processes coordinated 
by HITAP, and not reverting to decision-making via informal pathways. As 
suggested at the start of this section, both the NHSO membership and the NHSO 
Secretary General were important in what direction the procedures set up during 
2009-2010 would take. As one civil servant interviewed in 2016 warned:  
And then if the Benefit Package Subcommittee does not use evidence and if 
the NHSO is lobbied successfully [by the pharmaceutical industry], then 
HITAP is not used by policy-makers.  So if the [industry] is clever enough, 
[they] don’t fight with [HITAP] but try to drive the policy-makers in NHSO.  
So far they couldn’t, but at the upcoming change of administration in the 






don’t have to fight the suppliers of evidence, which are HITAP and IHPP. 
(I12TH_civil service) 
An example of the importance of this link with the NHSO were developments 
emerging in 2016 with regards to the coverage of Human Papillomavirus (HPV) 
vaccines. The two HPV vaccines available on the market in 2016 were Gardasil 
quadrivalent - which protects against Human Papillomavirus Types 6, 11, 16, and 18 
-,  produced by MSD Sanofi, and Cervarix, produced by GlaxoSmithKline (GSK). 
The two vaccines were introduced in the Thai market in 2007. Soon thereafter, 
HITAP and IHPP, with funding from the World Bank, undertook a study to identify 
appropriate policy options for cervical cancer prevention and concluded that HPV 
vaccination was unlikely to be cost-effective at given prices. Instead, it found that 
cervical cancer screening through VIA or Pap smear provided better value for money 
(Tangcharoensathien et al. 2008). The vaccines were also submitted for inclusion in 
the NLEM several times at lower prices, but they were again found not to provide 
sufficient value for money and were therefore not included in the reimbursement list.  
The repeated attempts to include HPV vaccines in the NLEM were driven by the 
National Vaccines Institute, an institute under the MoPH. The leadership of the 
Institute disagreed with the NLEM decisions and  attempted to re-initiate the process 
of NLEM assessment several times, unsuccessfully. Until 2016, the NHSO resisted 
requests to procure medicines that had not been included in the NLEM. However, in 
2016, a budget line for HPV at the NHSO was published for the 2017 NHSO budget 
line. In the context of pressure from the National Vaccines Institute to re-initiate the 
NLEM process, it was seen as possible that a second strategy had been to negotiate 
directly with the NHSO Board.    
This example shows the importance of NHSO decision-makers and their power of 
allocating NHSO budgets, including its central procurement power. The appointment 






likely that these changes were linked with the conflictual position between different 
factions of the MoPH which dated back to the UCS establishment.  
Normally, the people who are inside the Ministry, and also the people from 
the big hospitals, they prefer the previous system that the budget, all the 
budget go through the Ministry of Public Health, that they have the power 
[…]. But, in the system of the NHSO, all have to be in the committee, and 
the committee is comprised of the people from outside also, such as civil 
society groups. So, they [the former group] are not happy [at this], because 
they have to [convince the outsiders]. (I8TH_civil service) 
After the end of the interviews for this study, the NHSO was in fact stripped of its 
procurement power, through a decision of the Cabinet. Procurement for medicines 
was moved under the administration of Siriraj Hospital, a Bangkok-based teaching 
hospital.  This decision would likely have an impact on the sustainability of HTA 
processes (both NLEM and NHSO) for two reasons. First, as indicated by one 
interviewee, the demand for HTA evidence could be removed if it lost the support 
from the NHSO leadership. Second, even if HTA processes would still function as 
outlined in Chapter 7, the loss of linkages with procurement processes, or the 
removal of the NLEM as a reimbursement list, would likely make these processes 
less effective in practice.  
In summary, the functioning of HTA processes in Thailand showed ongoing debates 
that focused on three angles. The first type of debates that emerged were about the 
appropriateness of value for money criteria for services other than high-cost 
medicines. The second type of debates expressed disagreements caused by specific 
interests and fights for power. For example, advocates for offering HPV vaccines 
under the UCS scheme challenged the NLEM HTA process and eventually argued 
that NHSO should procure vaccines despite none being included in the 
reimbursement list. Further, some actors expressed that HTA processes should be 
coordinated by IMRTA instead. This view aligned with long-term conflicts between 






as being linked to NHSO’s procurement power. Interviewees indicated that attempts 
to influence the NHSO Board had been unsuccessful as of 2016. However, in 2018, 
the NHSO was stripped of its procurement power by the Cabinet. This change in 
governance arrangements was likely to influence the sustainability of HTA processes 
at NLEM and NHSO.  
Ongoing functioning of HTA processes in the Philippines 
In the Philippines, the PNDF process was the only HTA process operating as of 
2016. As explained in chapter 7, the PNDF did not commission economic 
evaluations often. However, faced with requests for inclusion of several new 
generation vaccines, three economic evaluations were undertaken to assess the 
inclusion in the PNDF of HPV vaccines, pneumococcal conjugate vaccines (PCV) 
and dengue vaccine.   
The economic evaluations for HPV and PCV vaccines were carried out in March 
2013, with technical assistance from HITAP and NICE international. The study 
found that a national HPV vaccination programme was cost-effective, under 
favourable assumptions of lifelong immunity (Guerrero, 2015). However,  the 
vaccine was not included in the PNDF until 2015. In parallel, the DoH launched a 
pilot programme for school-based vaccination of 10 000 girls, in two provinces.  The 
manufacturers of Gardasil, MSD, donated 20 000 doses out of the 30 000 needed for 
three doses for each girl.  In order to procure the remaining 10 000 doses, the 
Secretary of Health approved a one-year exemption from PNDF inclusion, which 
allowed public bodies to procure specific medicines that are not included in the 
PNDF.  
The pilot programme and the results of the economic evaluation were contested in 
the public space. The debate focused on the choice of the vaccine procured by the 






critics and supporters of the inclusion of the vaccine in the PNDF and it becoming 
part of the National Immunization Programme (NIP). Among supporters of the 
inclusion of the vaccine in the NIP, it was suggested that HPV bivalent should have 
been procured simply because it was cheaper and, in the absence of epidemiological 
data that supported the types of strains more prevalent in the Philippines, the cheaper 
vaccine should be chosen. As the results of the economic evaluation carried out by 
the PNDF were leaked to researchers and then to the press, the debate focused on the 
results of these studies, which were critiqued on methodological grounds. Among 
opponents of including HPV vaccines in the NIP, the argument was that the existing 
evidence only supported the conclusion that Gardasil offered value for money only 
under favourable assumptions of lifelong immunity. Further, the decision to procure 
Gardasil could only be supported if the protection against genital warts was accepted 
as an outcome. Again, the lack of epidemiological data contributed to this line of 
contestation, alongside the critique of the assumptions for the economic evaluation.   
Thus, debates about the pilot programme were expressed in ‘technical terms’ about 
epidemiology, effectiveness or value for money.  However, one interviewee 
suggested this debate had been engendered by the belief that the funds for the HPV 
vaccines were coming from Sin Tax revenues. This was not the case, but it was 
effective in attracting attention. Specifically, for opponents of the programme, it 
highlighted the issue of opportunity cost, which prompted the DoH to argue that the 
funds were extra-budgetary (I7PH_academia). For vaccine advocates, it appeared 
that these critics were encroaching on the territory of vaccines specialists. In 
particular, some paediatricians criticised the PNDF decision-making process as not 
appropriate for vaccines, particularly because of a perception of FEC members as 
experts in pharmacology, not epidemiology or burden of disease (I19PH_academia). 
As a more appropriate alternative, the Philippine Foundation for Vaccines had 






Again, while the debates appeared to be about expertise, they were in fact caused by 
who was perceived as having the correct expertise for decision-making.  
In 2014, there was a similar episode of contestation brought about by another 
vaccine programme, this time on PCV. This episode led to the removal of the 
Secretary of Health who had approved procurement. In 2012, the DoH authorised the 
procurement of one million doses of PCV 10 vaccine (at the price of $15.40 per 
unit), manufactured by GlaxoSmithKline under the brand name Synflorix. The main 
alternative to PCV 10 was PCV 13 (Prevenar), manufactured by Pfizer. According to 
interviewees, the decision was informed by a WHO-commissioned economic 
evaluation to assess the value for money of the two vaccines in the Philippines. 
Researchers from the LSHTM were commissioned to carry out the research, together 
with an academic from the University of Philippines, Manila, who joined the team 
‘because they wanted a Filipino to be part of this WHO team that would do the 
evaluation’ (I13PH_academia). The prices used for the study were below market 
prices, as they were negotiation through a UNICEF tender. According to a 
interviewee, the difference in price between the two vaccines was the equivalent of 
US$ 1 (I6PH_civil service). The economic evaluation indicated that PCV 13 
represented better value for money compared to PCV 10, at the given price. 
However, despite the results of the economic evaluation, the Assistant Secretary 
responsible with the Expanded Immunization Program approved the procurement of 
PCV 10. Because the vaccine had not been considered for inclusion in the 
Formulary, a certificate of exemption was needed to allow legal procurement. The 
Secretary of Health approved this certificate, which was administered through the 
PNDF, in 2012.  
However, the competitor company, Pfizer, contested the decision, one argument 
being the results of the economic evaluation which indicated that PCV 13 






criticised based on the degree to which cross-protection to other conditions beyond 
pneumonia were considered when evaluating the effectiveness of each vaccine. 
Faced with this situation, the Secretary of Health decided to embargo the economic 
evaluation and commission another study, this time in collaboration with the PNDF 
and with support from NICE International and HITAP. The study used an economic 
model developed by HITAP researchers and confirmed the findings of the initial 
study (Haasis et al., 2015). However, GSK also contested the new study based on the 
fact that it had excluded cross-protection for otitis media. Actors such as Philippine 
Vaccine Foundation, however, argued that there was insufficient local data on 
serotypes to be able to assess cost-effectiveness, therefore the decision to procure 
PCV 10 was justified (as the cheaper vaccine).  
The decision was publicly criticised by the Secretary of Justice, specifically on the 
grounds that the Secretary disregarded FEC recommendations about the cost-
effectiveness of the two alternative vaccines. Despite the fact that the FEC only 
issued recommendations, with the Secretary of Health being the ultimate decision-
maker, not respecting the FEC recommendation in the case of a vaccine (PCV) led to 
accusation of corruption and the removal of the Secretary of Health. Interviewees 
suggested that the outcome of these episodes of contestation had the effect of 
strengthening the procedures of the PNDF and disincentivised subsequent 
Secretaries of Health  to disregard PNDF recommendations.  
Pragmatically speaking because we have been the instrument in the downfall 
of people and in making sure somebody doesn’t get kicked out.  We’re more 
than just recommendatory now. (I13PH_academia) 
This point was proven by another similar debate over vaccine procurement that took 
place in 2016, this time with regards to the decision, by a subsequent  Secretary of 
Health, to establish a programme for vaccination against dengue fever, the only 
vaccine available being Dengvaxia, developed by Sanofi Pasteur. In early 2016, the 






inclusion in the PNDF. One member of the committee reviewed the evidence on the 
effectiveness of the new vaccine and concluded that the vaccine could be approved. 
However, other FEC members believed that, in the absence of epidemiological data 
from the Philippines, the safety of the vaccine was uncertain. If the vaccine did not 
protect against serotypes present in the Philippines, it raised safety concerns for 
children who might be exposed to a second infection, which is generally more 
dangerous (I2PH_academia).   
During this process, the PNDF FEC and its secretariat were put in an adversarial 
position with the Secretary of Health (I3PH_academia; I5PH_civil service). 
Interviewees reported that the PNDF committee was pressured to make a decision on 
the vaccine even before market authorization had been granted, which was also 
eventually sped up (I3PH_academia). Further, interviewees indicated that the new 
Secretary of Health did not want to go against the FEC recommendation, since the 
announcement of the provision of the vaccine had already been made publicly by the 
DoH before the FEC reached a conclusion. Consequently, the Secretary of Health 
put pressure on the FEC to grant a positive recommendation for the procurement of a 
dengue vaccine. Eventually, the FEC recommended an annually renewable 
exemption, despite disagreements between FEC members.  
As the vaccine started being administered to children, emerging evidence was 
confirming that the vaccine might not be effective or even increase severe cases of 
dengue fever (World Health Organisation, 2016). Thus, in 2018, even though the 
mandate of the Secretary of Health had been changed after the 2016 change in 
administration, the Philippine Congress organised hearings reviewing the basis for 
the decision to approve the vaccine programme, to which the former Secretary of 
Health was cited.  In the aftermath, the regulations for granting exemption requests 







Like in Thailand, the operation of HTA processes was determined by these links 
between decision-making for procurement, as well as reimbursement by the payer. 
As explained in previous chapters, the UCS Act of 2019 will attempt to establish 
clearer roles for both the DoH and PhilHealth. The further developments in this area 
are likely to influence the ongoing institutionalisation of HTA.  
Comparative analysis on the ongoing functioning of HTA processes 
In both countries, generating evidence on the most controversial topics related to 
pharmaceutical policy led to important challenges from a variety of actor categories. 
The most important such category referred to specialised clinicians who outlined 
arguments for adoption of innovative medicines, particularly new generation 
vaccines. However, even among health professionals, there was no universal support 
for the inclusion of such innovative medicines in either of the countries’ essential 
medicines list. In both countries, these actors’ criticism was often expressed in 
terminology that referred to quality of evidence. However, these criticisms were 
often about fights for power and legitimacy over decision-making. As seen in the 
Philippines, it was argued that the FEC committee did not have the necessary 
expertise to make coverage decisions on vaccines. In Thailand, similarly, there were 
repeated attempts to advocate for procurement of HPV vaccines directly by the 
NHSO, despite the NLEM not having granted their inclusion.  
Surprisingly, episodes of contestations such as the ones outlined above for both 
Thailand and the Philippines seem to have led to a strengthening of authority and 
procedures of HTA processes in both countries. However, this was only the case 
when HTA processes were supported by other institutional rules or decision-making 
points that were not strictly part of HTA processes. For example, in both countries, 
episodes of challenges to the use of HTA highlighted the link between HTA 
processes and procedures associated with other goals that went beyond HTA. These 






priorities for budget planning and resource allocation. Overall, these goals can be 
collectively referred as purchasing, for which roles were being challenged and 
contested. Specifically, HTA could inform coverage decisions, but if it were to 
influence purchasing activities, it needed to influence a series of powerful and 
diverse existing decision-making points, as well as becoming involved in aspects 
beyond value for money (specifically, issues of affordability were often raised, as 
well as issues regarding implementation).  
In contrast, the sustainability of HTA processes depended on the changing role of the 
payer. In Thailand, the role of the Board and the Secretary General of the NHSO was 
tenuous but had resulted in a strong role of the payer in central planning of services 
and procurement of high-cost medicines. As of 2016, the role of the NHSO in 
procurement (particularly of high-cost medicines and medical equipment) was being 
contested by the MoPH.  In the Philippines, ongoing debates over health system 
reform focused precisely on whether the payer should be responsible with defining 
the health benefit package or whether the purchasing and coverage decisions should 
be separated between PhilHealth and DoH, respectively. Both bodies would have to 
give up considerable power to establish a separation between these roles. In this 
context, interviewees indicated that HTA advocates believed that HTA activities 
should be hosted by the body responsible with policy direction, but there was a split 
between those who thought DoH or PhilHealth should be that body.  
Having analysed the emergence of the idea of HTA (chapter 5), the development of 
HTA organisations (chapter 6) and processes (chapter 7), as well as challenges to the 
ongoing functioning of HTA (chapter 8) in Thailand and the Philippines, the 
following chapter with bring together the findings of this analysis and discuss the 








Summary of findings 
This thesis has compared the path towards institutionalisation of HTA in two 
middle-income countries. To do so, it analysed the emergence of HTA as a policy 
idea, examined how and why organisations, processes and methods of HTA were 
established, and identified opportunities and challenges to the continued functioning 
of HTA.  For this purpose, the analysis used three theoretical perspectives, 
examining the interests of policy actors, policy ideas and the existing and emerging 
institutions.     
At the time of data collection, the two countries had reached different levels of 
development of HTA. The HTA processes in Thailand being widely seen as more 
established and as a successful model for HTA among middle-income countries and 
in South-East Asia. The main organisation coordinating HTA in Thailand, HITAP 
was seen as a source of authoritative expertise both in the country and abroad. 
However, in 2016, the role of HTAP under the MoPH, and the existence of another 
HTA body, IMRTA, which was seen as less successful, continued to be debated in 
Thailand. In addition, HITAP was criticised for dominating the HTA process, by 
being both a producer of evidence and involved in its appraisal and use in decision-
making. In contrast, HTA processes in the Philippines were presented in interviews 
as emergent and still under development. In 2016, HTA advocates were debating the 
appropriate placement of an HTA organisation, specifically whether the DoH or the 
payer should coordinate HTA processes. At the time of writing, two alternative HTA 






Establishing the elements of HTA 
During the 20-year period examined in this study, there was remarkable similarity 
between how policy actors in Thailand and the Philippines perceived policy 
problems that were associated with the emergence and development of HTA as a 
policy idea. Over the years, the definition of the policy problems HTA was expected 
to solve changed considerably, but the pattern of change was almost identical in the 
two countries. In both countries HTA emerged following its transfer from abroad 
through a range of activities from international organisations and bi-lateral 
initiatives. Specifically, HTA advocates in both countries grappled with the same 
problems as part of their initial attempts to establish HTA (dating back to the early 
1990s): the impact of high-cost medical equipment on healthcare expenditure.  Over 
the following stages of HTA establishment, the problem of containing the costs of 
expensive medical equipment was replaced by problems related to public provision 
of expensive medicines and, finally, by questions regarding the coverage of other 
types of health services. In order to meaningfully compare the development of HTA 
in the two countries, it was necessary to explore policy problems in relation to 
existing institutions (i.e. how resource allocation and coverage decisions were made 
before HTA was introduced), because these institutions guided attempts to establish 
HTA processes and organisations. This study found that actors in the two countries 
defined the policy problems that HTA meant to address in different ways reflecting 
differences in institutions that shaped decision-making.  
The emergence of HTA as a solution to these problems also depended on the roles 
and interests of the actors who became HTA advocates. In both countries, the 
principal advocates for HTA were civil servants and researchers, who were 
organised in policy networks. This broad similarity masked differences with regards 
to the purpose of these networks, which were important for the development of 






movement for health system reform with the overarching goal to improve access to 
care for underserved rural populations. Their advocacy for HTA took place in the 
context of wider efforts to increase the use of evidence in health policy-making. 
These efforts went beyond the use of HTA.  In the Philippines, in contrast, 
researchers and civil servants formed a network that advocated for HTA specifically. 
However, their advocacy for HTA also emerged in the context of health system 
reform, specifically, the establishment of the social health insurance programme, the 
NHIP, for which HTA was seen as useful.  
The choices for establishing organisations mandated with coordinating HTA appear 
to be similar when comparing the two countries. In both Thailand and the 
Philippines, a number of options were considered, including integrating HTA in 
existing bureaucratic structures (e.g. establishing an HTA committee coordinated by 
an existing office), establishing HTA-specific structures within the bureaucracy (e.g. 
an HTA unit or programme) or establishing independent public organisations (e.g. an 
institute). HTA advocates in both countries stated that the latter was both the most 
desirable and most difficult to achieve option as it signified a loss of power for 
current decision-makers. Also, in both countries, advocates for HTA, who were 
strongly represented in the civil service, used the tools of their position, such as their 
ability to use budgets and decision-making power at senior levels of the civil service, 
to establish organisations mandated with HTA. They also drew on network 
resources, such as access to international actors, support and mentorship to younger 
civil servants and links to political appointees, for that purpose.  
These two factors, networks among HTA advocates and the tools of the civil service, 
informed the strategies used to establish organisations to coordinate HTA. Yet while 
the options for establishing HTA organisations were seen as similar among actors in 
both countries, different organisational structures emerged in each country. In 
Thailand, the strategy of HTA advocates was to establish HTA programmes within 






desire to ensure the independence of any program established within the 
bureaucracy, but they also mentioned that they had experienced difficulties in 
achieving this aim. The two existing bodies mandated with HTA in Thailand, 
HITAP and IMRTA, differed in their degree of independence from the bureaucracy. 
HITAP’s status was one of semi-independence, due to it being established without a 
direct line of accountability to the government bureaucracy. It was subsequently 
integrated into the MoPH, although it maintained its financial independence. IMRTA 
was established as an HTA unit within a department of the MoPH, the DMS, and 
was directly overseen by this department even after changing its status to being an 
‘institute’.  
In the Philippines, HTA advocates who were senior civil servants used the social 
health insurance debates to provide a legislative mandate for HTA, as part of the 
operations of the newly established payer, PhilHealth. However, the authority of 
civil servants was not sufficient to establish new offices or organisations for the 
purpose of coordinating HTA. Instead, civil servants who supported HTA developed 
HTA procedures embedded in existing departments of PhilHealth. These procedures 
were carried out by HTA committees that were supported by funds allocated within 
the existing bureaucracy.  While policy actors in the Philippines also regarded 
organisational independence as desirable, this required a change in legislation, thus 
independence was only possible after an act of Congress was passed. After 2016, 
plans for a UHC bill included details about establishing an HTA Council, which 
represented a departure from previous efforts that had not been specific about the 
organisational structure for HTA.  
In both countries, the development of HTA processes consisted of making 
incremental changes to the status quo related to the specific policy problems. These 
changes were guided by existing institutions needed to change in order to establish 
HTA processes that were able to address these problems. In both countries, policy 






would have required substantial changes to the existing decision-making apparatus 
leading to such options being discarded. Proposals for HTA processes all drew 
inspiration from international models of HTA informed decision-making, reflecting 
the origins and policy transfer of HTA from high-income settings. However, policy 
transfer cannot explain why some of these suggestions were embraced while others 
failed. By comparing differences in decision-making structures in the two countries, 
the study demonstrates that HTA processes that built on the existing rules for 
decision-making tended to be more successful that suggestions that would have 
required an entirely new approach.  
Existing structures and processes for decision-making thus shaped the choices for the 
development of HTA processes, with the latter building on the former, but not 
replacing existing processes entirely. For example, both countries developed HTA 
processes focused on determining the essential medicines list. These processes built 
on pre-existing rules for decision-making about the type of medicines included in the 
essential medicines lists. Both countries had already been developing an essential 
medicines list to which public procurement and reimbursement were limited. In 
Thailand, the NLEM was developed by the NLEM Subcommittee, under the 
authority of the Prime-Minister’s Office. An HTA process was added to the existing 
NLEM decision-making procedures to determine the inclusion of high-cost 
medicines. As a result, a comprehensive health benefit package that was originally 
build around the concept of a negative list evolved to include a list of high-cost 
medicines that were centrally procured and distributed by the payer, the NHSO. In 
the Philippines, the PNDF was developed under the authority of the DoH. Again, 
HTA principles were introduced to develop and clarify the PNDF procedures. Other 
coverage decisions were made by the payer, PhilHealth, which took a positive list 
principle, meaning that new benefits were continuously added and specified as part 






analysis shows that the PNDF decision-making process and the benefit development 
by PhilHealth were not always well aligned.  
As ideas about the purpose of HTA evolved, governments in both countries faced the 
challenge of having to reconcile growing public expectations to provide more 
expensive medical services with the aim of delivering UHC, thus requiring decisions 
about the boundaries of publicly funded health services to become more explicit. As 
a consequence, Thailand broadened its use of HTA developing a process applied to 
all reimbursement decisions by the payer, NHSO, whereas policy actors in the 
Philippines embarked on debating the development of a similar process for the 
PhilHealth. These processes built on the decision-making and governance structures 
of the payers and were separate from essential medicines list decisions. However, 
this study was unable to fully compare their development as, at the time of writing, 
the process in the Philippines was still at proposal stage. However, these processes 
tended to go beyond HTA being limited to individual technologies compared to their 
alternatives and attempted to prioritise conditions and identify the interventions that 
provided the most value for money.  
The two countries contrasted in the degree in which evidence generation was used to 
inform coverage decisions before HTA was established. The government in Thailand 
had already used research evidence to inform high-profile coverage decisions 
relating to antiretroviral treatment and renal replacement therapy before HITAP was 
established in 2007.  These decisions were informed by policy analyses, including 
economic evaluations, commissioned by the NHSO for this purpose. Interviewees 
suggested that the use of evidence in these coverage decisions provided a model for 
establishing two HTA mechanisms for high-cost medicines and for other coverage 
decisions made by the NHSO. In contrast, in the Philippines, respondents mentioned 
specific studies that directly informed coverage decisions only in relation to existing 
HTA processes. The controversy following the decision on the exclusion of certain 






manufacturers, which made it difficult for decision-makers to follow the 
recommendations of the HTA committee. However, the analysis suggests that over 
time such challenges strengthened the argument for the use of HTA in decision-
making in the Philippines. For example, two consecutive Secretaries of Health were 
strongly criticised for the decision to fund several new generation vaccines (i.e. 
pneumococcal, HPV and dengue vaccination) against recommendations by the 
PNDF committee, which were informed by economic evaluations. Interviewees 
indicated that, due to such criticism, Secretaries of Health became less inclined to 
ignore PNDF recommendations. In parallel, PNDF regulations gradually limited the 
discretion of the Secretary of Health to follow PNDF recommendations.  
The choice of methods used in HTA highlighted a major difference between the two 
countries: the development and use of country-specific methodological guidelines 
for conducting HTA in Thailand, in contrast to a lack of such guidelines in the 
Philippines. Methodological guidelines provided a common ground for debates 
among actors involved in, or affected by, individual decisions in Thailand. However, 
in the Philippines, interviewees suggested that, in the absence of guidelines, the 
debates on criteria for decision-making or specific methodological choices were 
more likely to derail the decision-making process.  In Thailand, methodological 
guidelines for HTA were developed at the beginning of the development of the HTA 
process for high-cost medicines. These guidelines were then adopted by the 
committee mandated with determining the list of essential medicines (NLEM) and 
were added to the evidence and process rules already in use. The development 
process included a review of existing methodological guidelines used in other 
middle- and high-income countries, the commissioning of a series of reviews of 
existing methodological choices and an assessment of their appropriateness in the 
context of Thailand, and lastly, a consultation process among researchers and other 
relevant actors. In contrast, in the Philippines, guidelines for the use of HTA in 






effectiveness had been a criterion for decision-making since 2012. Methodological 
choices in this case depended on the expertise of the PNDF committee members. In 
the absence of methodological guidelines, some researchers expressed in interviews 
some reluctance to undertake analyses for fear of criticism from other researchers 
and manufacturers, especially relating to economic evaluations.  Notably, the 
guideline development process in the Philippines, which began in 2016, took a 
similar approach to the one used in Thailand and included learning from the Thai 
guidelines.  
As can be expected, establishing HTA processes was met with resistance from 
different groups of actors, including some policy-makers, civil servants and HTA 
advocates, as well as manufacturers and physicians. In both countries, decisions on 
specific technologies, most often medicines, attracted controversies which focused 
on a number of issues including procedural characteristics such as transparency and 
the timeliness of the decision, and the nature and validity of the evidence, including 
challenges of the appropriateness of evidence of effectiveness and on the validity of 
economic models. These debates could be characterised as ‘technical’ in the sense 
that they focused on procedures and research methods. However, to the focus on 
technical issues tended to mask ‘political’ reasons, stemming from a) actors’ 
interests, or b) different ‘ideas’ about the moral acceptability of criteria to guide 
coverage decisions.  
Actors’ interests were more readily identified when specific decisions were made. 
For example, both countries considered introducing HPV vaccination (Thailand, 
2009; the Philippines, 2013), with essential medicines list committees in both 
countries assessing the evidence for inclusion. Interviewees agreed that cost-
effectiveness was a relevant criterion in both countries. In Thailand, the committee 
reached a negative verdict, while in the Philippines the decision was positive. In both 
countries, physicians advocating for the adoption of the vaccines criticised how the 






inclusion. The analysis of these discussions suggests that power struggles were at the 
root of criticisms of the use of evidence, specifically as they relate to differences in 
views as to who should be tasked with conducting evidence appraisals (i.e. whether 
the ‘right’ experts were included), and who had the authority to make the decision 
(i.e. other bodies within the bureaucracy were seen as more legitimate).  
Actors also disagreed on the criteria for decision-making. The analysis suggests that 
such debates tended to be driven both by differences in actor interests and in their 
uptake of ideas. For example, manufacturers tended to argue that excluding certain 
types of medicines violated principles of equity. In Thailand, representatives of the 
pharmaceutical industry wondered, in interviews, whether the country should follow 
the example of the Cancer Drug Fund established in the UK to fund oncological 
treatment. In the Philippines, some researchers and civil servants also worried that 
cost-effectiveness would weigh more than equity considerations as a criterion for 
coverage decisions. They argued that the criterion of cost-effectiveness was not 
particularly helpful to determine whether interventions should be funded that offered 
small to moderate benefits to individuals, but that were deemed cost-effective 
because of the high prevalence of the condition in the population (e.g. high blood 
pressure), especially when compared with medicines for orphan conditions that 
would not be cost-effective under normal condition, but offer important 
improvements in the quality of life of a small number of patients. Even though these 
concerns were discussed in ‘methodological’ terms, they expressed a moral stance 
that prioritised health gains for the individual over health gains for the population, or 
at least one that showed awareness of the conflict between these two principles.  
In Thailand, as HTA started being applied to complex health promotion 
interventions, some actors challenged the appropriateness of doing so, but for 
different reasons. Some believed health promotion interventions were always a good 
investment, whereas others argued that the effectiveness of such complex 






during implementation (as the more complex the interventions, the less certain its 
effectiveness is).  As one interviewee suggested, even though HTA processes for 
high-cost medicines were seen as successful, these were the ‘low-hanging fruit’ of 
using HTA (I3TH_civil service), while other, emerging questions about the best use 
of the available budgets were much more complex and challenged the established 
approach to HTA. 
The path towards institutionalisation 
The path towards institutionalisation of HTA in both countries involved many 
decisions, including in relation to creating HTA organisations, developing processes 
and the methods used for analysing and appraising evidence, and embedding HTA in 
existing decision-making and governance structures. The emergence of the idea of 
HTA and the development of HTA organisations and processes were analysed 
separately for each country in order to understand how institutions, interests and 
ideas, individually and in combination, determined each element of HTA. Figure 9.1 
shows how these findings relate to the aims and objectives of the study and how 
ideas, interests and institutions, that constitute the elements of the analytical 
framework, interact with one another in this analysis. 
This study found that interests, more specifically, HTA advocates organised in 
policy networks, were key to initiating the process of establishing HTA in both 
Thailand and the Philippines. In both countries, senior civil servants were important 
members of these networks and were able to utilise the resources of the civil service 
to establish organisations that coordinate HTA. The rules of the administrative 
systems, which allowed civil servants varying degrees of independence, determined 
the way in which HTA organisations were established, and the form taken by these 







Figure 9.1. The influence of the 3Is on HTA institutionalisation. Source: own 
analysis. 
The establishment of HTA processes, in contrast, was largely influenced by existing 
institutions, especially the existing rules for making coverage decisions in which 
emerging HTA processes were integrated. The idea of HTA as a solution to 
problems associated with making coverage decisions may be directly transferred 
from other countries together with a generic understanding of the policy problem, 
but the definition of the specific problems that HTA were expected to ‘solve’ 
reflected factors associated with existing institutions. This interaction of factors 
explains the observation that HTA processes and methods were not directly copied 
from other countries, but were developed in each country and adjusted over time.  
Attempts to copy approaches directly from other countries did not result in 






of the policy problem to reflect these existing institutions was an important first step 
towards institutionalising HTA. 
The interests of some policy actors such as pharmaceutical manufacturers appeared 
to be a barrier to the development of HTA processes at different times and seemed to 
undermine institutionalisation. However, perhaps paradoxically, this thesis also 
found examples in which opposition to HTA and the results of HTA strengthened the 
development and acceptance of HTA in the long term. In addition, the functioning of 
HTA processes was influenced by other aspects of health systems governance, 
especially the processes that followed coverage decisions made by HTA 
organisations, relating to the procurement of medicines and the mechanisms of 
reimbursing providers for health services they delivered. The long-term evolution of 
the heath system also had a bearing on the sustainability of HTA in both countries 
because it explained and structured some power relations and struggles between 
policy actors, as well as influencing what policy problems were likely to became 
more prominent.  
This study confirms findings from research on HTA establishment in other middle-
income countries, which highlights the importance of HTA advocates and their 
ability to form policy networks (Góméz-Dantés and Frenk, 2009; Ozieranski, McKee 
and King, 2012; Löblová, 2018a). Policy networks have also been found influential 
in the transfer of policy ideas between countries (Rhodes and Marsh, 1992; Dolowitz 
and Marsh, 2000; Benson and Jordan, 2011), and even an emerging type of 
governance as more non-state actors became involved in policy-making (Marsh and 
Smith, 2000). In studies of the role of networks in establishing HTA, epistemic 
communities have been found to be particularly relevant to explain why certain 
countries have embraced the use of HTA while others have not (Löblová, 2018a). 
Epistemic communities refer to a specific type of policy network consisted of 
professionals with a variety of backgrounds and from different disciplines,  but ‘with 






claim to policy relevant knowledge within that domain or issue-area’ (Haas, 1992, p. 
3). Löblová (2016) noted that international networks were important in explaining 
the transfer of HTA to between countries, in addition to domestic networks. Benoit 
and Gorry (2017) traced the links between different members of a large global 
network for HTA whose members worked towards promoting HTA both in their 
own countries and internationally. This thesis confirms their assessment, as findings 
show that proponents of HTA in both Thailand and the Philippines had direct contact 
with experts who were active within global HTA networks. When Thailand became 
a model of HTA in Southeast Asia, the HTA proponents in the Philippines also 
sought advice from experts in Thailand. The influence of international policy 
networks also resonates with the observation that the actors in both countries shared 
the same conception of the policy problems to which HTA was considered the 
solution initially.  
In both countries, however, the influence of advocates and policy networks was 
mediated (through constraints and opportunities) by existing rules of behaviour for 
civil servants, hinting at the influence of institutions. Civil servants used the 
resources of the bureaucracy, in addition to the resources of the policy network, to 
mobilise support for HTA. This finding is in line with other studies of policy change 
which suggest that policy networks can drive policy change, but that these changes 
usually follow a pattern shaped by institutions (Tuohy, 1999; Béland, 2010; Shearer 
et al., 2016). Indeed, studies of policy networks formed around shared knowledge 
(i.e. epistemic communities) also suggested that the mere absence or presence of this 
type of policy network is insufficient to explain the establishment of HTA. Löblová 
(2018b) studied the mechanism by which epistemic communities influenced 
adoption of HTA in Poland and the Czech Republic. She found that the non-adoption 
of HTA in the Czech Republic was caused by a loss of interests from policy-makers, 
which undercut the ability of policy networks to achieve their preferred policy 






that bureaucratic power was an integral part of the establishment of HTA in the two 
countries of her study, unlike earlier conceptual work on policy networks, which 
considered the bureaucracy as less important for networks to achieve policy change 
(Haas, 1992).  
Some studies from high-income countries also suggest that formal institutions, 
specifically the civil service system and the administrative traditions in which health 
systems operate have an impact on the type of organisations that are created to 
conduct or coordinate HTA. For example, Torbica et al. (2018) found that 
administrative systems in Britain and the US (also known as Anglo-American 
systems) were more likely to establish independent agencies than Napoleonic 
systems (for example the administrative system in France or Spain). Torbica and 
colleagues reason that the former systems tend to offer a higher degree of 
independence to civil servants than the latter systems, and are more likely to delegate 
specialised tasks to subordinate authorities. They (2018) conclude that these 
characteristics explain the organisational structures that coordinate HTA. They give 
the example of NICE, an independent HTA agency with decision-making power in 
England and Wales, and contrast it with the HTA agency in France, which is tasked 
with making coverage decisions, but remains under closer control of the government 
(Torbica, Tarricone and Drummond, 2018).   
However, there are some limits to making the same connection for the administrative 
systems in middle-income countries and HTA organisations. First, these 
categorisations of administrative systems might not effectively explain how civil 
service systems in middle-income countries operate, even though the latter often 
followed the example of high-income countries, either as a consequence of being 
imposed during colonisation, or by policy learning from existing examples (Haque, 
2007). Supporting this view, this study found that the two countries took different 
approaches to the establishment of HTA organisations, although they both fall into 






Thailand; and a presidential system in the Philippines). It therefore concludes that 
studies of administrative systems in high income countries do not sufficiently 
explain the development of HTA organisations in middle-income countries.   
Tsebelis (2000) offers an alternative explanation for the degree of independence 
within the civil service in different political and administrative traditions. He argues 
that veto players - defined as ‘individual or collective decision makers whose 
agreement is required for the change of the status quo’ (Tsebelis, 2000, p. 442) - can 
explain the degree of independence within the bureaucracy better than the 
administrative traditions or the overall political system. His veto points theory 
hypothesises that the more veto points exist in a system, the higher the independence 
of the bureaucracy, because the latter can use veto players against each other 
(Tsebelis, 2000). Bump and Chang (2017) also suggest that veto player theory can be 
useful to help analyse differences in approaches to priority-setting in health systems, 
of which HTA is a part. They also acknowledge that veto points are relevant in 
shaping the opportunities of interest groups to advance their agendas, as proposed by 
Immergut (1992).  
In both countries, the degree of independence of the bureaucracy, which underpinned 
the actions of civil servants, played a decisive role in how HTA organisations were 
established. In Thailand, this study found that the administrative system allowed 
some degree of independence to civil servants, which contributed to shaping the 
organisations created to conduct HTA. Interviewees described a pattern within the 
bureaucracy of establishing organisations that enjoyed various degrees of 
independence from the ministries to which they were formally subordinate. This 
pattern was confirmed by existing literature and included establishing ‘network 
organisations’ that would be tasked with specialised mandates. These network 
organisations often also included foundations, which increased their financial 
independence (Lorsuwannarat, 2014). An alternative explanation for this ability 






its wider efforts for health system reforms. Harris studied the progressive policy 
network that also advocated for HTA to advance the goal of universal coverage 
reform through the ‘developmental capture’ of the state (Harris, 2015). This study 
suggests that, while the policy network of health reformists was important, the 
administrative system in Thailand made a key contribution to the type of 
organisation created for the purpose of HTA.  Interviewees suggested that the HSRI 
initially attempted to establish an HTA body within the DMS (which eventually 
became IMRTA) by following the example of network organisations. The 
establishment of HITAP also followed this strategy to some extent, as some of its 
governance structures were reminiscent on ‘network’ organisations (e.g. establishing 
an attached foundation to a body that is technically part of the MoPH bureaucracy). 
HITAP’s establishment also benefitted from the resources – financial, links with top 
policy-makers - of the network, which explains its special ‘semi-autonomous’ status 
because HITAP was not directly part of the structure of any MoPH department. 
The importance of the administrative system becomes even clearer when comparing 
the two country case studies. In contrast to Thailand, civil servants in the Philippines 
had less discretion when creating organisations mandated with new tasks. The 
administrative system in the Philippines has been characterised as one of ‘hyper-
presidentialism’ (Rose-Ackerman, Desierto and Volosin, 2011) where the President 
of the Philippines can take charge of public agencies – often through naming 
political appointees rather than career civil servants at the helm of these agencies 
(Monsod, 2017). According to these analyses, the power to establish specialised 
bodies was therefore concentrated at the highest levels of the executive branch unless 
Congress passed legislation that curtails the power of the executive. These rules 
could be seen in operation when organisations that were mandated with HTA were 
established. For most of its development, HTA was attached as a specialised task of 
existing bodies and had little independence. This changed in 2018, when debates 






referred to as a HTA board, as well as details about its placement and organisational 
structures.   
As mentioned previously, the establishment of HTA processes followed different 
mechanisms than the establishment of HTA organisations. HTA processes were 
developed incrementally by building on existing institutions, specifically existing 
decision-making processes associated with coverage decisions (e.g. the essential 
medicines lists and reimbursement policies of payers). Similar observations were 
made by other authors who suggest that HTA and other mechanisms for priority-
setting in middle-income countries are always fitted into an existing context and 
never start entirely from scratch (Goddard, Hauck and Smith, 2006; Baltussen et al., 
2016; Lauer, Rajan and Bertram, 2017). However, the literature on how exactly these 
institutions influence HTA establishment remains scarce.  
This study brings specificity to the relevance of existing processes for the 
development of HTA processes. The analysis shows that the old and new institutions 
co-existed, and that any attempts to establish new processes to make coverage 
decisions had to deal with the processes already in place. This confirms an element 
of path dependency, whereby specific choices, once made, limit the options available 
in the future (Béland, 2010), which is well established in institutional and policy 
studies. It also demonstrates that the process of policy-making was incremental, 
whereby policy-makers made smaller adjustments, which could be reversed or 
modified if, for example, there were unexpected consequences, as well as being 
easier to establish in the first place (Lindblom, 1959).  
Lowndes and Roberts (2013a) try to explain why building new institutions is 
consistently seen as a worthy pursuit, even though most attempts to ‘institutionalise’ 
end in failure. They argue that institutionalisation is desirable because the role of 
institutions is to ‘stabilize and regularize political behaviour’ and ‘prescribe and 






stability is what makes institutionalisation desirable, incrementalism, which means 
continuous change (Lindblom, 1959), complicates the nature of institutionalisation. 
Lowndes and Roberts (2013a) argue that institutionalisation has two main elements, 
which they term ‘robustness’ and ‘revisability’. Robustness, they argue, refers to the 
degree to which values embedded in institutions are clear and how newly established 
institutions are enforced (i.e. whether they influence the behaviour of policy actors). 
Revisability refers to whether institutions are flexible enough to adapt to contestation 
and have a degree of variability (i.e. whether they allow for different design 
variations to adjust to new circumstances) (Lowndes and Roberts, 2013a). Each 
characteristic of institutionalisation is reflected below in the two processes of 
institutionalisation that were analysed in this study.   
The values that become institutionalised through HTA processes, sometimes referred 
to as social values, are the existing principles of distributional justice that have been 
proposed for priority-setting in both high-income and middle-income countries 
(Littlejohns et al., 2012). Empirical studies suggest that some of these principles are 
given more importance in some countries than in others due to the  values and 
cultures embedded in their health systems (Torbica, Tarricone and Drummond, 
2018), and depending on whether the former are in congruence with societal values, 
which can be measured by public preference surveys (Landwehr and Klinnert, 2014). 
Others suggest that some principles, in particular maximising population coverage 
based on evidence of cost-effectiveness, are implicitly and unduly given too much 
weight as part of HTA processes (Baltussen et al., 2016).  
This study showed that the importance of values starts from the level of how policy 
problems were defined. Certain values are already embedded in existing institutions 
as well as being added through the newly developed HTA processes. Specifically, in 
both countries, HTA was established in the context of long - term movements 
towards health system reform, as part of the development of UHC. However, health 






available under the umbrella-term of UHC.  In Thailand, policy actors noted that 
establishing limits to the health benefit package was avoided in the design of the 
UCS. The reasons for this was twofold. First, health reformers believed that 
identifying the interventions the UCS would offer could be controversial and risk 
delaying or stopping the reform process, for example by supporting criticism of the 
UCS system as a second class system.  They also feared that discussing the values 
underpinning coverage decisions would deflect from the principal goal and values of 
the policy reform, which was to expand access to health care by increasing 
population coverage and offering financial protection, rather than by establishing the 
appropriate services to cover (Pitayarangsarit, 2004). Coverage decisions became 
important only after the UCS had been established and functioning.  
In the Philippines, it was found that the values embedded in existing institutions 
were clashing and in turn influenced the definition of the policy problems. The initial 
thrust of social health insurance scheme (NHIP) was to gradually increase population 
coverage and reach UHC. However, the NHIP had not set a clear goal with regards 
to financial risk protection (Obermann, Jowett and Kwon, 2018). Consequently, the 
NHIP approached increasing population coverage by adding certain services 
(through condition specific benefit packages) alongside new categories of 
membership (which were offered different levels of coverage). This resulted in lower 
importance given to ensuring financial risk protection. As more financing sources 
became available, the problem of consolidating coverage decisions became 
prominent (Picazo et al., 2014). The proposed solution was in line with the existing 
practice of defining covered services first, by defining a basic guaranteed benefit 
package for the most common conditions, in addition to an HTA process to 
determines the inclusion of new services into the benefit package.  
This view of HTA processes as institutions that require enforcement also helps 
explain the importance of methodological guidelines and process clarity which 






Philippines. In March and Olsen’s terminology (1998), guidelines establish a ‘logic 
of appropriateness’ which leads to actors’ acting according to ‘rules and practices 
that are socially constructed, publicly known, anticipated and accepted’ (March and 
Olsen, 1998, p. 952). This logic of appropriateness is particularly important for 
decisions which are likely to be contested, of which coverage decisions in health care 
are a classic example. Applying the logic of appropriateness to this field does not 
mean that the presence of guidelines prevents contestation. However, this thesis 
finds that contestation of coverage decisions in the presence of guidelines led to 
debates being framed within the existing agreement provided by the guidelines – 
certain values were therefore institutionalised and enforced through guidelines. 
Further, decisions were challenged within the confines of the guidelines, but were 
not challenging the approach to decision-making itself. The contestation became 
focused on methodologies, and not values. In the absence of guidelines, actors such 
as researchers, even if their academic credentials were respected, found involvement 
in generating or appraising evidence difficult precisely because the lack of clarity 
about the rules for evidence generation and appraisal increased their risk of being 
seen at fault. 
The degree to which proposed HTA processes were enforced in both countries also 
depended on whether and how these processes were compatible with other aspects of 
health system governance. This compatibility with existing institutions was not only 
an important part of HTA process design, but shaped its way of working. Most 
studies of HTA processes focus on how the coverage decisions are made and 
whether procedural aspects influence the outcome of the decision (Allen et al., 
2013). However, emerging literature on HTA processes in high income countries 
looks at the implementation of these decisions by other actors involved in health 
system governance. (Williams, 2013; Smith and Chalkidou, 2017).  For example, an 
often overlooked aspect of decision-making by NICE in England and Wales is that 






Commissioning Groups, might mean that services approved by NICE may not be 
available to their patients based on resource allocation decisions. Williams (2016) 
described this phenomenon as an example of ‘implicit priority-setting’ within a 
system of explicit decision-making.  
In both case study countries, the degree to which coverage decisions were 
implemented through procurement or reimbursement mechanisms emerged as an 
important factor to both the development and operation of HTA processes. This was 
most obvious when HTA was not well aligned with other parts of the system 
associated with resource allocation, such as rules relating to procurement and 
reimbursement. The HTA processes that were integrated into existing procurement 
and reimbursement mechanisms had more chances reach their expressed goal, in the 
sense that the covered medicines were bought at the agreed price and made available 
to patients. In Thailand, HTA was successfully used in decisions about high-cost 
medicines because coverage decisions were directly linked to procurement. A Price 
Negotiation Working Group that included representatives of the NHSO (payer) 
negotiated prices of high-cost medicines, which were then centrally procured by the 
NHSO, which implemented a high-cost procurement programme designed to provide 
these medicines as part of the UCS. In the Philippines, coverage decisions for 
medicines were made in parallel with coverage decisions made by the payer. The 
latter undermined PNDF decision-making because some health benefit packages 
reimbursed services without specifying which medicines were being used. This 
practice went against an existing rule that the payer, PhilHealth, could only 
reimburse medicines that were already included in the PNDF. Respondents indicated 
that this practice constituted an important challenge to the HTA process relating to 
medicines.  
Lowndes and Roberts (2013) argue that institutions need to be revisable in order to 
be sustainable in the face of contestation from powerful interests and actors jostling 






countries, ideas, interests, and institutions continued to interact and influence the 
process of institutionalising HTA. Both power struggles and shifting interests led to 
actors trying to shift the agenda towards including new policy problems and 
launching new solutions, thus attempting to establish new ‘rules of the game’.  Such 
new ideas did not always relate directly to HTA, but often impacted on the existing 
institutions that interacted with HTA, which shaped the process of 
institutionalisation.  
In both countries, HTA processes and organisations developed and operated in the 
context of power struggles between governmental payer organisations (NHSO in 
Thailand, PhilHealth in the Philippines) and the MoPH or DoH. Such struggles for 
dominance could be observed in both countries, yet they manifested themselves in 
different forms.  
In Thailand, conflicts between the MoPH and the NHSO, identified by interviewees, 
foreshadowed important changes to the purchasing infrastructure which came into 
effect after the end of this study. After 2016, the Cabinet, decided to strip the NHSO 
of its power to procure medicines and other devices centrally, and shift the budget 
and authority for procurement to a large Bangkok-based hospital, under the 
administration of the DMS. Simultaneously, the existence of HITAP was questioned 
by some actors who argued that HTA processes should be consolidated under the 
authority of the MoPH, suggesting that activities of either IMRTA or HITAP should 
be terminated. If policy-makers would decide to suspend HITAP as the Thai HTA 
agency, HTA would be firmly placed under the control of MoPH.  
In the Philippines, the DoH and the payer (PhilHealth) are engaged in a similar 
conflict. Some interviewees participating in this study believed that there should be a 
‘strategic alignment’ between the DoH and PhilHealth whereby the DoH would be 
charged with making coverage decisions informed by HTA, while PhilHealth 






fragmentation of governance and improve the coverage and provision of services in 
the country. Other actors, however, believed that PhilHealth should maintain its role 
in making coverage decisions and organising the reimbursement of these services, 
but it should strive to bring together its various health benefits package into one 
single basic benefits package. In 2018, Congress passed a UHC Bill which will have 
the likely effect that HTA will become a responsibility of the DoH, while PhilHealth 
maintained some coverage responsibilities. In other words, neither of the two 
positions won out. 
To conclude, the two countries followed similar patterns of policy development, 
starting from establishing social health insurance programme in the early 1990s, 
deciding to move towards UHC and managing the implementation of their UHC 
programmes. In both countries, HTA was initially promoted by advocates, among 
whom senior civil servants were able to make a decisive contribution to shaping the 
agenda and who adapted the idea of HTA to policy problems defined by reference to 
the specific context of each country. These findings highlight the importance of 
considering the influence of actor interests together with the presence of ideas, in this 
case the idea of HTA as a solution to policy problems associated with the need to 
more clearly specify the type of service available under UHC.  
This thesis also highlighted the importance of considering the role of institutions, 
both as they relate to the operations of government administration, and the 
opportunities and challenges arising from these practices, and the rules and practices 
already in existence for making coverage decisions.  Over time, HTA organisations 
and processes in Thailand and the Philippines developed in different directions as a 
result of two institutional factors: a) the degree to which civil servants were able to 
use their discretion to create semi-autonomous organisations, and  b) the approaches 
and rules of government applied to the procurement and reimbursement of health 
service. In addition, this study also identified the role of power struggles between 






both countries. Such power struggles are not unusual in many countries, which mean 
that they should be considered as a relevant factor potentially influencing that 
institutionalisation of HTA in any country irrespective of its classification as high or 
middle-income.  
Contributions to knowledge 
This thesis contributes to the literature on how HTA becomes established in middle-
income countries by analysing the long-term process of HTA development in two 
countries that have institutionalised HTA to different degrees.  Establishing 
institutions to undertake coverage decisions in an evidence-informed, transparent 
manner is expressed by many experts and organisations as a desirable goal for low 
and middle-income countries (World Health Organization, 2001; Glassman and 
Chalkidou, 2012; Augustovski et al., 2015; Downey et al., 2017; Wild, Stricka and 
Patera, 2017).  As a consequence, there is substantial interest in the mechanisms of 
transfer of HTA to low and middle-income countries. Existing guidance looks at the 
key elements of HTA or normative principles for HTA processes 
(Chootipongchaivat et al., 2016; Wild, Stricka and Patera, 2017). The literature that 
explains what determines specific configurations of HTA in a comparative country 
context is scarce, although there are a few exceptions from high-income countries 
(Landwehr and Böhm, 2014; Hassenteufel et al., 2017). Only a few studies 
specifically focus on HTA in middle-income countries. However, they focus their 
analyses the early stages of the institutionalisation process (Castro, 2017; Löblová, 
2018b).  
This study also provides insights into the path towards institutionalisation in 
Thailand and the Philippines specifically. In particular, Thailand is often seen as 
successful in using HTA and has become a model for other middle-income countries 
(Culyer, Podhisita and Santatiwongchai, 2016). This study highlights the importance 






understanding the development of HTA in Thailand. It also hints at continuous 
power struggles within the health system, which are likely to influence the future 
evolution of HTA in Thailand. This study also adds insights into the difficulties of 
establishing HTA in the Philippines, including the dominance of political actors over 
the bureaucracy, as well as less overall development of evidence use in policy-
making, for purposes outside of HTA. These findings are not about the level of 
capacity to generate evidence in the Philippines, but rather about a lack of a ‘logic of 
appropriateness’ recognised by actors with regards to evidence informing policy-
making.  
Finally, this study confirms earlier observations that the making of coverage 
decisions should be seen in a wider systems perspective (Hanson et al., 2019), 
especially with regard to the interaction of HTA with procurement and 
reimbursement processes, which together determine whether the use of HTA is 
sustainable.  
Limitations of this study  
This section describes the limitations of this study, as they relate to the study design, 
the methods of data collection and the analysis of country case studies.  
Country cases selected 
This study examined two cases of HTA being established in middle-income 
countries, using interviews with policy actors and document reviews as methods of 
data collection. The two cases provide substantial detail about a long-term process of 
HTA development.  
The cases were not selected with a view of establishing causality and ensuring 
predictive value to the findings, for example by using cases that are most similar or 






causal links between contextual characteristics and HTA establishment, the case 
selection and the approach taken to the analysis allows for generalisation in two 
ways.   
First, the factors that have been found relevant in these two countries may be 
relevant in other places, although they may operate differently. Based on the findings 
of this study, some of these characteristics are: independence of the bureaucracy, 
existing processes to make coverage decisions, as well as the overall power struggles 
in health system governance. The cases are described in their context, in sufficient 
detail to allow the reader to draw their own conclusions about whether the findings 
of this study may be transferable to other countries. This will depend on context and 
needs to be carefully considered.  In order to do that, it is necessary for readers to 
both have sufficient detail of the context in which these findings apply, and to 
understand whether such context characteristics are relevant for other middle-income 
countries.  
Second, the comparison of the two cases allowed for broader conclusions about the 
establishment of HTA in middle-income countries. As other authors have suggested, 
emerging economies often share similar challenges, especially as many of these 
countries aspire to move towards UHC and expand access to publicly funded health 
care services. As shown by this study, however, comparing cases that involve policy 
transfer necessitates an in-depth look at the context within the country. The 
conceptual framework used for this study suggests a structured manner in which to 
analyse context.  
Document analysis 
The document analysis was particularly important in corroborating interview data 
and ensuring reliability of the findings. However, the long-term perspective taken in 






describe the process accurately and uniformly over 20 years. Consequently, some 
periods in the process of establishing HTA are presented with more details than 
others.  
Furthermore, some types of documents (e.g. administrative documents, meeting 
minutes) were not available for the case study on Thailand as documents tended to 
be published in Thai only. However, this lack of documents was offset by secondary 
sources such as reports and journal articles published in English (and some 
documents published in both Thai and English).  As a result, policy documents were 
an important primary source of data for the analysis of HTA in the Philippines, but 
less so for the analysis of Thailand, while there were more studies available as 
secondary sources on Thailand than the Philippines.   
However, the documents identified were used in systematically for both case studies. 
Specifically, documents were reviewed to prepare interviews, to corroborate specific 
information from the interviews and to collect data describing the development of 
HTA and of the procedural aspects of HTA. In both cases, the authors/source of the 
documents were reviewed to analyse the position of the author(s) of the document in 
the process of establishing HTA. This was done systematically for all documents, 
including reports or journal articles. 
Interviews 
It was not always possible to interview the same number of actors in each actor 
categories in both countries. More specifically, policy-makers including members of 
the civil service tend to outweigh actors in other categories significantly. However, 
special efforts were made to interview both advocates and critics of HTA from 
within the same actor category (e.g. civil service) in both countries to be able to 






It was particularly difficult to convince physicians who were likely to have 
reservations about the use of HTA to agree to be interviewed.   Actors who were 
identified as opponents of HTA were particularly cautious in the way they expressed 
their views. In one case, one interviewee seemed offended when one particular topic 
was explored in more detail – specifically, they had expressed support for using cost-
effectiveness analysis, but disagreed with how it was applied as a principle by a 
specific organisation. In such interviews,  careful consideration of non-verbal cues 
was important, as well as needing more interviewing skills to draw out what was of 
interest for the research question but was expressed in an indirect manner and what 
was irrelevant. In some circumstances, interviewees would also not be available for 
further clarifying questions following the interview. In these cases, as well as when 
interviewees had difficulties recalling certain details, relying documentary review 
became particularly important. Data collected through such interviews had to be 
contextualised with particular care during data analysis, when it was necessary to do 
extensive documentary review in order to corroborate information and to draw 
conclusions with confidence.  
Data analysis 
Data analysis for this study was guided by an analytical framework that was 
informed by the two bodies of literature: studies relating to establishing HTA and 
studies relating to the analysis of interests, ideas and institutions.  
Two factors influenced the degree of detail that could be provided for the country 
cases. First, the long-term perspective on the process of establishing HTA added to 
the already difficult task of piecing together complex policy processes.  For instance, 
there was variation as to how much detail interviewees could recall, and how many 
documents were available and accessible for earlier stages of development. 
Furthermore, because the two countries were at different stages of development, 






the other. Second, the conceptual framework provided an incentive for analysing 
cases in as much detail as possible, because it covers broad concepts that will be 
relevant in any policy development process. Therefore, a balance needed to be found 
between the length of the process analysed and the level of detail analysed for each 
episode and theme.  At times the complexity and level of detail of each case were 
almost overwhelming. However, when it was possible to make a meaningful 
comparison between each aspect of HTA establishment between the two countries, it 
was deemed that a sufficient amount of detail has been reached. 
Conclusions 
This study examined the process of HTA institutionalisation in two countries over 20 
years, which includes how HTA was transferred and how the policy problem was 
perceived to which HTA was seen to bring the solution. Middle-income countries are 
likely to share the same problems concerning coverage decisions (Voorhoeve, Tan-
Torres Edejer, Kapiriri, Norheim, Snowden, Basenya, Bayarsaikhan, Chentaf, Eyal, 
Folsom, Halina Tun Hussein, et al., 2017), especially since many of them have 
adopted the overarching goal of moving towards UHC. Further, it also confirms 
earlier observations that changes to the mechanism of making coverage decisions 
rarely start ‘from a blank slate’ (Hauck, Thomas and Smith, 2016), while adding 
specificity to how institutions needed to be adjusted to encompass HTA. These 
findings also confirm the value of a longer term perspective of the policy process 
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History of HTA: policy decision for establishment  
• Can you tell me about the history of HTA in your country?  
- How did HTA appear on the policy agenda?  
• What were key actors’ positions regarding the establishment of HTA? 
- Did the position of the actors change?  
Process and organisational establishment  
• Can you tell me about the creation of the institutional structure of HTA?  
- What were the differences between what the body was set up to do and 
what it ended up doing in practice? 
- How did the body change throughout the years? Has its mandate get 
expanded or limited, formally or informally? 
 
• Can you tell me about the establishment of HTA processes? 
- What were the challenges and opportunities for HTA process 
establishment? 
 
Reflections about the current state of HTA 
• Can you tell me about the current status of HTA in your country? 







Identification of controversial episodes 
• What would you say was a key episode of the use of HTA in your country? 
- Are there any written documents on this episode? 
 
Identification of other informants and of relevant documents  
• Who else would you recommend I speak to for this study? 
• What do you feel are the most relevant published reports and materials 
about HTA in your country? 
Closing 
• What would you like to add?  








Appendix 3. Consent Form 
CONSENT FORM 
 
Title of Project: The establishment and functioning of health technology assessment 
(HTA) agencies in Thailand and the Philippines 
 
Investigator: Ioana Vlad, MSc, PhD candidate 
 
London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine 
15-17 Tavistock Place 
London, WC1H 9SH, UK 




My questions concerning this study have been answered by:  
I have read the information sheet concerning this research and I understand what is 
involved in the interview proposed. I understand that at any time I may withdraw from 
the interview. This interview will be recorded unless I request otherwise. 
If you agree to take part, please tick (only) one box as appropriate: 
[  ] I agree to take part in this interview, and for quotes and other material arising from 
my participation to be used and attributed by name.  
(Note, individual statements can still be requested to remain anonymous during the 
interview) 
[  ] I agree that material from my interview may be quoted, but I would like my name 
to be anonymised. 
[  ] I agree that material from my interview may be quoted, but I would like my name 
to be anonymised as well as any other information that might be used to identify me, 
including the organisation that employs me and my position within it. 
[ ] I do not agree that any material from my interview may be quoted, but the 










Name of Participant Date  Signature 
 
Investigator Date  Signature 
 
 
